The Crisis of Democracy - Trilateral Commission - 1975

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The
Crisis

Democracy

REPORT ON THE GOVERNABILITY
OF DEMOCRACIES TO THE
TRILATERAL COMMISSION

MICHEL J. CROZIER

SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON

JOJI WATANUKI

The Crisis Of Democracy

Michel Crozier

Samuel P. Huntington

Joji Watanuki

Report on the Governability of Democracies
to the Trilateral Commission

Published by
New York University Press

The Trilateral Commission was formed in 1973 by private citizens of
Western Europe, Japan, and North America to foster closer cooperation
among these three regions on common problems. It seeks to improve
public understanding of such problems, to support proposals for han-
dling them jointly, and to nurture habits and practices of working
together among these regions.

Clothbound editions of Columbia University Press books

are Smyth-sewn and printed on permanent

and durable acid-free paper.

Copyright ® 1975 by The Trilateral Commission

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 75-27167
ISBN: 0-8147-1364-5 (cloth)
0-8147-1305-3 (paper)

Manufactured in the United States of America
9 8 7 6 5

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

Is democracy in crisis? This question is being posed with
increasing urgency by some of the leading statesmen of the
West, by columnists and scholars, and— if public opinion polls
are to be trusted— even by the publics. In some respects, the
mood of today is reminiscent of that of the early twenties,
when the views of Oswald Spengler regarding "The Decline of
the West" were highly popular. This pessimism is echoed,
with obvious Schadenfreude, by various communist ob-
servers, who speak with growing confidence of "the general
crisis of capitalism" and who see in it the confirmation of
their own theories.

The report which follows is not a pessimistic document. Its
authors believe that, in a fundamental sense, the democratic
systems are viable. They believe, furthermore, that democra-
cies can work provided their publics truly understand the
nature of the democratic system, and particularly if they are
sensitive to the subtle interrelationship between liberty and
responsibility. Their discussion of "The Crisis of Democracy"
is designed to make democracy stronger as it grows and be-
comes more and more democratic. Their conclusions-doubt-
less in some respects provocative— are designed to serve that
overriding objective.

The Trilateral Commission decided to undertake this
project because it has felt, rightly in my view, that the vital-
ity of our political systems is a central precondition for the
shaping of a stable international order and for the fashioning
of more cooperative relations among our regions. Though
very much concerned with issues pertaining to foreign affairs,
trilateral as well as East -West and North-South, the Trilateral
Commission has promoted the study which follows in the
belief that at this juncture it is important for the citizens of
our democracies to reexamine the basic premises and the

workings of our systems. This rethinking can contribute, it is
our hope, to the promotion of the central purposes of the
democratic system of government: the combination of per-
sonal liberty with the enhancement of social progress.

This report has been prepared for the Trilateral Commis-
sion and is released under its auspices. The Commission is
making the report available for wider distribution as a contri-
bution to informed discussion and handling of the issues
treated. The report was discussed at the Trilateral Commis-
sion meetings in Kyoto, Japan, on May 30-31, 1975. The
authors, who are experts from North America, Western
Europe and Japan, have been free to present their own views.

The report is the joint responsibility of the three rappor-
teurs of the Trilateral Commission's Task Force on the
Governability of Democracies, which was set up in the spring
of 1974 and which submitted its report in the spring of 1975.
The chapter on Japan is the work of Joji Watanuki. The
chapter on Western Europe is the work of Michel Crozier.
The chapter on the United States is the work of Samuel P.
Huntington.

Although only the three authors are responsible for
the analysis and conclusions, they were aided in their task by
consultations with experts from the trilateral regions. In each
case, consultants spoke for themselves as individuals and not
as representatives of any institutions with which they are
associated. Those consulted included the following:

Robert R. Bowie, Professor of International Affairs,
Harvard University

Zbigniew Brzezinski, Director, The Trilateral Commission

James Cornford, Professor of Politics, University of Edin-
burgh

George S. Franklin, North American Secretary, The Tri-
lateral Commission

Donald M. Fraser, United States House of Representatives

Karl Kaiser, Director, Research Institute of the German

Society for Foreign Policy
Seymour Martin Lipset, Professor of Sociology, Harvard

University
John Meisel, Professor of Political Science, Queen's Uni-
versity
Erwin Scheuch, Professor of Political Science, University

of Cologne
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Professor of Humanities, The

City University of New York
Gerard C. Smith, North American Chairman, The Trilateral

Commission
Yasumasa Tanaka, Professor of Political Science, Gak-

ushuin University
Tadashi Yamamoto, Japanese Secretary, The Trilateral

Commission

In the course of its work, the task force held a number of
joint meetings:

April 20-21, 1974— Rapporteurs and Brzezinski met in Palo
Alto, California, to develop general outline of report.

November 11-12, 1974-Rapporteurs and Brzezinski met in
London to consider first drafts of regional chapters and
establish more precise outline of study.

February 22-23, 1975— Rapporteurs met with experts from
Trilateral regions in New York City, considered second
drafts of regional chapters and draft of Introduction.

May 31, 1975— Full draft of study debated in plenary meet-
ing of The Trilateral Commission in Kyoto.

I would like to express our appreciation for the energy and
dedication shown by Charles Heck and Gertrude Werner in
preparing this book for publication.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

Director

The Trilateral Commission

THE AUTHORS

MICHEL CROZIER is the founder and director of the
Centre de Sociologie des Organisations in Paris and Senior
Research Director of the Centre Nationale de la Recherche
Scientifique. Born in 1922 in northern France, Professor
Crozier received his higher education at the University of
Paris. He has been a regular consultant to the French govern-
ment on matters of economic planning, education, and public
administration. He -has lectured and taught at a number of
North American universities, including three years at Harvard
(1966-67, 1968-70) and two years at the Center for Ad-
vanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford
(1959-60, 1973-74). Among the books which Professor
Crozier has written are The Bureaucratic Phenomenon (1964)
and The Stalled Society (1970). He was President of the
French Sociological Association in 1970-72.

SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON is Frank G. Thomson Profes-
sor of Government at Harvard University and Associate
Director of Harvard's Center for International Affairs. He is
also a founder and editor of the quarterly journal, Foreign
Policy. Born in 1927 in New York City, Professor Hunting-
ton was educated at Yale University (B.A., 1946), the Uni-
versity of Chicago (M.A., 1949), and Harvard University
(Ph.D., 1951). He taught at Harvard University from 1950 to
1958, then was Associate Director of the Institute of War and
Peace Studies at Columbia University from 1959 to 1962,
when he returned to Harvard. Professor Huntington has been
a consultant to the Policy Planning Council of the Depart-
ment of State, the Agency for International Development,
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and other or-
ganizations. Among the books which he has written are
Political Order in Changing Societies (1968) and The Com-
mon Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics (1961).

He is coauthor with Zbigniew Brzezinski of Political Power:
USA/USSR (1964).

JOJI WATANUKI is Professor of Sociology at Sophia Uni-
versity (Tokyo), where he is associated with the Institute of
International Relations for Advanced Studies on Peace and
Development in Asia. Born in 1931 , in Los Angeles, Professor
Watanuki received his undergraduate and graduate education
at the University of Tokyo. He taught in the Department of
Sociology of the University of Tokyo from 1960 to 1971,
when he joined the Sophia University faculty. Professor
Watanuki has spent a number of years teaching and doing
research at universities in the United States. He was at Prince-
ton University-in 1962-63 (Rockefeller Foundation Fellow
and Visiting Fellow) and at the University of California at
Berkeley in 1963-64 (Research Associate at Institute of In-
ternational Studies). He was a Visiting Professor in the De-
partment of Political Science at the University of Iowa in
1969-70, and a Senior Scholar in the Communications Insti-
tute of the East-West Center in Honolulu in 1973. Professor
Watanuki has written numerous articles and books. Among
the latter are Gendai Seiji to Shakai Hendo [Contemporary
Politics and Social Change] (1962) and Nihon no Seiji Shakai
[Japanese Political Society] (1967).

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I-INTRODUCTION

I. The Current Pessimism About Democracy

II. The Challenges Confronting Democratic
Government

CHAPTER II-WESTERN EUROPE
by Michel Crozier

I. Are European Democracies Becoming
Ungovernable? 11

1 . The Overload of the Decision-Making Systems

2. Bureaucratic Weight and Civic Irresponsibility

3. The European Dimension

II. Social, Economic and Cultural Causes 20

1 . The Increase of Social Interaction

2. The Impact of Economic Growth

3. The Collapse of Traditional Institutions

4. The Upsetting of the Intellectual World

5. The Mass Media

6. Inflation

III. The Role and Structure of Political Values 39

1 . The Values Structure and the Problem
of Rationality

2. Core Political Beliefs

3. The Impact of Social, Economic and Cultural
Changes on the Principles of Rationality and
on the Core Political Beliefs

4. Traditional Factors as a Counterweight

5. The Risks of Social and Political Regression

IV. Conclusions: European Vulnerability 52

CHAPTER III-THE UNITED STATES
by Samuel P. Huntington

I. The Viability and Governability of American
Democracy 59

II. The Expansion of Governmental Activity 65

III. The Decline in Governmental Authority 74

1 . The Democratic Challenge to Authority

2. Decline in Public Confidence and Trust

3. The Decay of the Party System

|4. The Shifting Balance Between Government
and Opposition

IV. The Democratic Distemper: Consequences 102

V. The Democratic Distemper: Causes 106

VI. Conclusion: Toward a Democratic Balance 113

CHAPTER IV-JAPAN
by Joji Watanuki

I. Japanese Democracy's Governability 119

1 . External Conditions

2. Domestic Conditions and Capabilities

II. Changing Values, New Generations and
Their Impact on the Governability of

Japanese Democracy 138

1 . Political Beliefs

2. Social and Economic Values

III. Consequences for and Future Perspectives on the
Governability of Japanese Democracy 149

1 . Time Lag

2. Decline of Leadership and Delay of
Decisions

3. Vagaries of Urban, Educated Nonpartisans

4. The Place of the Communists in the
Multiparty System

5. What Will Happen in the 1980s?

CHAPTER V-CONCLUSION

I. The Changing Context of Democratic
Government 157

II. Consensus Without Purpose: The Rise

of Anomic Democracy 158

III. The Dysfunctions of Democracy 161

1 . The Delegitimation of Authority

2. The Overloading of Government

3. The Disaggregation of Interests

4. Parochialism in International Affairs

IV. Variations Among Regions 168

APPENDICES

Appendix I— Discussion of Study during Plenary Meeting of
The Trilateral Commission— Kyoto, May 31, 1975 173

A. Arenas for Action

B. Excerpts of Remarks by Ralf Dahrendorf

C. Discussion of the Study

Appendix II— Canadian Perspectives on the Governability of
Democracies— Discussion in Montreal, May 16, 1975 . . . .203

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

I. THE CURRENT PESSIMISM ABOUT DEMOCRACY

For almost a quarter-century the Trilateral countries have
shared a tripartite interest in military security, economic
development, and political democracy. They have
coordinated their efforts to provide for their common
defense. They have cooperated together in the tasks of
economic reconstruction, industrial development, and the
promotion of trade, investment, and welfare within a
framework of common international economic institutions.
They have brought the comforts— and the anxieties— of
middle-class status to a growing majority of their peoples. In
somewhat parallel fashion, they have, also, each in its own
way, developed and consolidated their own particular forms
of political democracy, involving universal suffrage, regular
elections, party competition, freedom of speech and
assembly. After twenty-five years, it is not surprising that
earlier assumptions and policies relating to military security
need to be reviewed and altered in the light of the changed
circumstances. Nor is it surprising that the policies and
institutions of the postwar economic system based on the
preeminence of the dollar are in need of a drastic overhaul.
Governments, after all, have traditionally existed to deal with

2 The Crisis of Democracy

problems of security and economics, and, individually and
collectively, to adapt their policies in these areas to changing
environments.

What is much more disturbing, because it is more
surprising, is the extent to which it appears that the process
of reconsideration must extend not only to these familiar
arenas of governmental policy but also to the basic
institutional framework through which governments govern.
What are in doubt today are not just the economic and
military policies but also the political institutions inherited
from the past. Is political democracy, as it exists today, a
viable form of government for the industrialized countries of
Europe, North America, and Asia? Can these countries
continue to function during the final quarter of the twentieth
century with the forms of political democracy which they
evolved during the third quarter of that century?

In recent years, acute observers on all three continents
have seen a bleak future for democratic government. Before
leaving office, Willy Brandt was reported to believe that
"Western Europe has only 20 or 30 more years of democracy
left in it; after that it will slide, engineless and rudderless,
under the surrounding sea of dictatorship, and whether the
dictation comes from a politburo or a junta will not make
that much difference." If Britain continues to be unable to
resolve the seemingly unresolvable problems of
inflation-cum-prospective depression, observed one senior
British official, "parliamentary democracy would ultimately
be replaced by a dictatorship." "Japanese democracy will
collapse," warned Takeo Miki in his first days in office,
unless major reforms can be carried out and "the people's
confidence in politics" be restored.1 The image which recurs
in these and other statements is one of the disintegration of
civil order, the breakdown of social discipline, the debility of
leaders, and the alienation of citizens. Even what have been
thought to be the most civic of industrialized societies have

Introduction 3

been held to be prey to these disabilities, as observers speak
of the Vietnam ization of America and the Italianization of
Britain.

This pessimism about the future of democracy has
coincided with a parallel pessimism about the future of
economic conditions. Economists have rediscovered the
fifty-year Kondratieff cycle, according to which 1971 (like
1921) should have marked the beginning of a sustained
economic downturn from which the industrialized capitalist
world would not emerge until close to the end of the
century. The implication is that just as the political
developments of the 1920s and 1930s furnished the
ironic— and tragic— aftermath to a war fought to make the
world safe for democracy, so also the 1970s and 1980s might
furnish a similarly ironic political aftermath to twenty years
of sustained economic development designed in part to make
the world prosperous enough for democracy.

Social thought in Western Europe and North America
tends to go through Pollyanna and Cassandra phases. The
prevalence of pessimism today does not mean that this
pessimism necessarily is well founded. That such pessimism
has not been well founded in the past also does not mean that
it is necessarily ill founded at present. A principal purpose of
this report is to identify and to analyze the challenges
confronting democratic government in today's world, to
ascertain the bases for optimism or pessimism about the
future of democracy, and to suggest whatever innovations
may seem appropriate to make democracy more viable in the
future.

II. THE CHALLENGES CONFRONTING
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT

The current pessimism seems to stem from the conjunction
of three types of challenges to democratic government.

4 The Crisis of Democracy

First, contextual challenges arise autonomously from the
external environments in which democracies operate and are
not directly a product of the functioning of democratic
government itself. The Czechoslovak government, for in-
stance, is less democratic today than it might otherwise be
not because of anything over which it had any control. A
severe reversal in foreign relations, such as either a military
disaster or diplomatic humiliation, is likely to pose a
challenge to regime stability. Defeat in war is usually fatal to
any system of government, including a democratic one.
(Conversely, the number of regimes in complex societies
which have been overthrown in circumstances not involving
foreign defeat is extremely small: all regimes, including
democratic ones, benefit from a Law of Political Inertia
which tends to keep them functioning until some external
force interposes itself.) So, also, worldwide depression or
inflation may be caused by factors which are external to any
particular society and which are not caused directly by the
operation of democratic government; and yet they may
present serious problems to the functioning of democracy.
The nature and seriousness of the contextual challenges may
vary significantly from one country to another, reflecting
differences in size, history, location, culture, and level of
development. In combination, these factors may produce few
contextual challenges to democracy, as was generally the
case, for instance, in nineteenth-century America, or they
may create an environment which makes the operation of
democracy extremely difficult, as for instance in Weimar
Germany.

Changes in the international distribution of economic,
political, and military power and in the relations both among
the Trilateral societies and between them and the Second and
Third Worlds now confront the democratic societies with a
set of interrelated contextual challenges which did not exist
in the same way a decade ago. The problems of inflation,
commodity shortages, international monetary stability, the

Introduction 5

management of economic interdependence, and collective
military security affect all the Trilateral societies. They
constitute the critical policy issues on the agenda for
collective action.2 At the same time* however, particular
issues pose special problems for particular countries. With the
most active foreign policy of any democratic country, the
United States is far more vulnerable to defeats in that area
than other democratic governments, which, attempting less,
also risk less. Given the relative decline in its military,
economic, and political influence, the United States is more
likely to face serious military or diplomatic reversal during
the coming years than at any previous time in its history. If
this does occur, it could pose a traumatic shock to American
democracy. The United States is, on the other hand,
reasonably well equipped to deal with many economic
problems which would constitute serious threats to a
resource-short and trade-dependent country like Japan.

These contextual challenges would pose major issues of
policy and institutional innovation in the best of
circumstances. They arise, however, at a time when
democratic governments are also confronted with other
serious problems stemming from the social evolution and
political dynamics of their own societies. The viability of
democracy in a country clearly is related to the social
structure and social trends in that country. A social structure
in which wealth and learning were concentrated in the hands
of a very few would not be conducive to democracy; nor
would a society deeply divided between two polarized ethnic
or regional groups. In the history of the West,
industrialization and democratization moved ahead in
somewhat parallel courses, although in Germany,
democratization lagged behind industrialization. Outside the
West, in Japan, the lag was also considerable. In general,
however, the development of cities and the emergence of the
bourgeoisie diversified the sources of power, led to the
assertion of personal and property rights against the state,

6 The Crisis of Democracy

and helped to make government more representative of the
principal groups in society. The power of traditional
aristocratic groups hostile to democracy tended to decline.
Subsequently, democratic trends were challenged, in some
cases successfully, by the rise of fascist movements appealing
to the economic insecurities and nationalistic impulses of
lower-middle-class groups, supported by the remaining
traditional authoritarian structure. Japan also suffered from
a reactionary military establishment, against which the
bourgeoisie found itself too weak to struggle and to
be able to coexist. In addition, in many countries, com-
munist parties developed substantial strength among the
working class," advocating the overthrow of "bourgeois
democracy" in the name of revolutionary socialism. The
political and organizational legacy of this phase still exists in
France and Italy, although it is by no means as clear as it
once was that communist participation in the government of
either country would necessarily be the prelude to the death
of democracy there. Thus, at one time or another, threats to
the viability of democratic government have come from the
aristocracy, the military, the middle classes, and the working
class. Presumably, as social evolution occurs, additional
threats may well arise from other points in the social
structure.

At the present time, a significant challenge comes from the
intellectuals and related groups who assert their disgust with
the corruption, materialism, and inefficiency of democracy
and with the subservience of democratic government to
"monopoly capitalism." The development of an "adversary
culture" among intellectuals has affected students, scholars,
and the media. Intellectuals are, as Schumpeter put it,
"people who wield the power of the spoken and the written
word, and one of the touches that distinguish them from
other people who do the same is the absence of direct
responsibility for practical affairs."3 In some measure, the
advanced industrial societies have spawned a stratum of

Introduction 7

value-oriented intellectuals who often devote themselves to
the derogation of leadership, the challenging of authority,
and the unmasking and delegitimation of established
institutions, their behavior contrasting with that of the also
increasing numbers of technocratic and policy-oriented
intellectuals. In an age of widespread secondary school and
university education, the pervasiveness of the mass media,
and the displacement of manual labor by clerical and
professional employees, this development constitutes a
challenge to democratic government which is, potentially at
least, as serious as those posed in the past by the aristocratic
cliques, fascist movements, and communist parties.

In addition to the emergence of the adversary intellectuals
and their culture, a parallel and possibly related trend
affecting the viability of democracy concerns broader
changes in social values. In all three Trilateral regions, a shift
in values is taking place away from the materialistic
work-oriented, public-spirited values toward those which
stress private satisfaction, leisure, and the need for
"belonging and intellectual and esthetic self-fulfillment."4
These values are, of course, most notable in the younger
generation. They often coexist with greater skepticism
towards political leaders and institutions and with greater
alienation from the political processes. They tend to be
privatistic in their impact and import. The rise of this
syndrome of values is presumably related to the relative
affluence in which most groups in the Trilateral societies
came to share during the economic expansion of the 1960s.
The new values may not survive recession and resource
shortages. But if they do, they pose an additional new
problem for democratic government in terms of its ability to
mobilize its citizens for the achievement of social and
political goals and to impose discipline and sacrifice upon its
citizens in order to achieve those goals.

Finally, and perhaps most seriously, there are the intrinsic
challenges to the viability of democratic government which

8 TTie Crisis of Democracy

grow directly out of the functioning of democracy.
Democratic government does not necessarily function in a
self-sustaining or self-correcting equilibrium fashion. It may
instead function so as to give rise to forces and tendencies
which, if unchecked by some outside agency, will eventually
lead to the undermining of democracy. This was, of course, a
central theme in de Tocqueville's forebodings about
democracy; it reappeared in the writings of Schumpeter and
Lippmann; it is a key element in the current pessimism about
the future of democracy.

The contextual challenges differ, as we have seen, for each
society. Variations in the nature of the particular democratic
institutions and processes in each society may also make
some types of intrinsic challenges more prominent in one
society than in another. But, overall, the intrinsic threats are
general ones which are in some degree common to the
operation of all democratic systems. The more democratic a
system is, indeed, the more likely it is to be endangered by
intrinsic threats. Intrinsic challenges are, in this sense, more
serious than extrinsic ones. Democracies may be able to
avoid, moderate, or learn to live with contextual challenges
to their viability. There is deeper reason for pessimism if the
threats to democracy arise ineluctably from the inherent
workings of the democratic process itself. Yet, in recent
yearSj the operations of the democratic process do indeed
appear to have generated a breakdown of traditional means
of social control, a delegitimation of political and other forms
of authority, and an overload of demands on government,
exceeding its capacity to respond.

The current pessimism about the viability of democratic
government stems in large part from the extent to which
contextual threats, societal trends., and intrinsic challenges
have simultaneously manifested themselves in recent years. A
democratic system which was not racked by intrinsic
weaknesses stemming from its own performance as a
democracy could much more easily deal with contextual
policy challenges. A system which did not have such

Introduction 9

significant demands imposed upon it by its external
environment might be able to correct the deficiencies which
arose out of its own operations. It is, however, the
conjunction of the policy problems arising from the
contextual challenges, the decay in the social base of
democracy manifested in the rise of oppositionist
intellectuals and privatistic youth, and the imbalances
stemming from the actual operations ot democracy itself
which make the governability of democracy a vital and,
indeed, an urgent issue for the Trilateral societies.

This combination of challenges seems to create a situation
in which the needs for longer-term and more broadly
formulated purposes and priorities., for a greater overall
coherence of policy, appear at the same time that the
increasing complexity of the social order, increasing political
pressures on government, and decreasing legitimacy of
government make it more and more difficult for government
to achieve these goals.

The demands on democratic government grow, while the
capacity of democratic government stagnates. This, it would
appear, is the central dilemma of the governability of
democracy which has manifested itself in Europe, North
America, and Japan in the 1970s.

NOTES

1 See The New York Times, October 7, 1974; The Economist, March
23, 1974, p. 12; Geoffrey Barraclough, "The End of an Era," New
York Review of Books, June 27, 1974, p. 14.

2 Many of these issues have been dealt with in the reports of other
Trilateral Commission task forces. See particularly Triangle Papers nos.
1-7, embodying reports on the world monetary system, international
cooperation, North-South economic relations, world trade, and energy.

3 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy
(New York: Harper & Bros., 2d ed., 1947), p. 147.

4 See Ronald Inglehart, "The Silent Revolution in Europe:
Intergenerational Change in Postindustrial Societies," American
Political Science Review, 65 (December 1971), pp. 991 ff.

CHAPTER II

WESTERN EUROPE

Michel Crozier

I. ARE EUROPEAN DEMOCRACIES
BECOMING UNGOVERNABLE?

The vague and persistent feeling that democracies have
become ungovernable has been growing steadily in Western
Europe. The case of Britain has become the most dramatic
example of this malaise, not because it is the worst example
but because Britain, which had escaped all the vagaries of
continental politics, had always been considered everywhere
as the mother and the model of democratic processes. Its
contemporary troubles seem to announce the collapse of
these democratic processes or at least their incapacity to
answer the challenges of modern times.

Certainly appearances remain safe in most West European
countries but almost everywhere governing coalitions are
weak and vulnerable while alternative coalitions seem to be as
weak and possibly even more contradictory. At the same
time decisions have to be taken whose consequences may be
far-reaching while the governing processes, because of the
conjunction of contradictory pressures, seem to be capable of
producing only erratic results.

These difficulties are compounded by the existence of
Europe as a problem. The whirlpool of each national

11

j 2 The Crisis of Democracy

governing system has more and more restrained the margin of
freedom on which progress in European unification can be
built. The European bureaucracy, which had been for a time
a useful protective device for making rational solutions more
acceptable, has now lost its role. Contradictions at the
governing level therefore tend to grow while governments are
forced to be much more nation-centered and much less
reliable.

Each country, of course, is substantially different. The
main characteristic of Western Europe is its diversity. But
across the widely different practices and rationalizations, two
basic characteristics hold true about the basic problem of
govern ability:

• The European political systems are overloaded with
participants and demands, and they have increasing difficulty
in mastering the very complexity which is the natural result
of their economic growth and political development.

• The bureaucratic cohesiveness they have to sustain in
order to maintain their capacity to decide and implement
tends to foster irresponsibility and the breakdown of
consensus, which increase in turn the difficulty of their task.

1 . The Overload of the Decision-Making Systems

The superiority of democracies has often been ascribed to
their basic openness. Open systems, however, give better
returns only under certain conditions. They are threatened
by entropy if they cannot maintain or develop proper
regulations. European democracies have been only partially
and sometimes theoretically open. Their regulations were
built on a subtle screening of participants and demands; and
if we can talk of overload, notwithstanding the progress made
in handling complexity, it is because this traditional model of
screening and government by distance has gradually broken
down to the point that the necessary regulations have all but
disappeared.

Western Europe 13

There are a number of interrelated reasons for this
situation. First of all, social and economic developments have
made it possible for a great many more groups and interests
to coalesce. Second, the information explosion has made it
difficult if not impossible to maintain the traditional distance
that was deemed necessary to govern. Third, the democratic
ethos makes it difficult to prevent access and restrict
information, while the persistence of the bureaucratic
processes which had been associated with the traditional
governing systems makes it impossible to handle them at a
low enough level. Because of the instant information model
and because of this lack of self-regulating subsystems, any
kind of minor conflict becomes a governmental problem .

These convergences and contradictions have given rise to a
growing paradox. While it has been traditionally believed that
the power of the state depended on the number of decisions

*

it could take, the more decisions the modern state has to
handle, the more helpless it becomes. Decisions do not only
bring power; they also bring vulnerability. The modern
European state's basic weakness is its liability to blackmailing
tactics.

Another series of factors tending to overload all industrial
or post-industrial social systems develops from the natural
complexity which is the result of organizational growth,
systemic interdependence, and the shrinking of a world
where fewer and fewer consequences can be treated as
acceptable externalities. European societies not only do not
escape this general trend, they also do not face it with the
necessary increase of governing capacities. Politicians and
administrators have found it easier and more expedient to
give up to complexity. They tend to accommodate to it and
even to use it as a useful smoke screen. One can give access to
more groups and more demands without having to say no and
one can maintain and expand one's own freedom of action
or, in more unpleasant terms, one's own irresponsibility.1

Beyond a certain degree of complexity, however, nobody

14 The Crisis of Democracy

can control the outcomes of one system; government
credibility declines; decisions come from nowhere; citizens'
alienation develops and irresponsible blackmail increases,
thus feeding back into the circle: One might aTgue that the
Lindblom model of partisan mutual adjustment would give a
natural order to this chaotic bargaining, but this does not
seem to be the case because the fields are at the same time
poorly structured and not regulated..2

One might also wonder why European nations should
suffer more complexity and more overload than the United
States, which obviously has a more complex system open to
more participants. But. overload and complexity are only
relative to the capacity to handle them, and the present
weakness of the European nations comes from the fact that
their capacity is much lower because their tradition has not
enabled them to build decision-making systems based on
these premises. This judgment about the European
nation-states' decision-making capabilities may be surprising
since European countries, like Britain and France, pride
themselves in having the best possible elite corps of
professional decision-makers, in many ways better trained or
at least better selected than their American counterparts. The
seeming paradox can be understood if one accepts the idea
that decision-making is not done only by top civil servants
and politicians but is the product of bureaucratic processes
taking place in complex organizations and systems. If these
processes are routine-oriented and cumbersome, and these
organizations and systems overly rigid, communications will
be difficult, no regulation will prevent blackmail, and poor
structure will increase the overload. For all their
sophistication, modern decision-making techniques do not
seem to have helped very much yet because the problem is
political or systemic and not a technical one.

One of the best examples of their failure has been shown
in a recent comparative study of the way two similar
decisions were made in Paris in the 1890s and in the 1960s:

Western Europe 15

the decision to build the first Parisian subway and the
decision to build the new regional express transit system.
This comparison shows a dramatic decline in the capacity to
take rational decisions between the two periods. The 1890s
decision gave rise to a very difficult but lively political debate
and was a slow decision-making sequence, but it was arrived
at on sound premises financially, economically, and socially.
The 1960s decision was made in semisecret, without open
political debate, but with a tremendous amount of lobbying
and intrabureaucratic conflict. Its results', when one analyzes
the outcomes, were strikingly poorer in terms of social,
economic, and financial returns. It seems that the elite
professional decision-makers backed up with sophisticated
tools could not do as well as their less brilliant predecessors,
while the technical complexity of the decision was certainly
not greater. The only striking difference is the tremendous
increase in the level of complexity of the system and its
dramatic overload due to its confusing centralization.3

It is true that there are many differences among the
European countries in this respect and one should not talk
too hastily of common European conditions. There is quite a
strong contrast, for example, between a country like Sweden,
which has developed an impressive capability for handling
complex problems by relieving ministerial staffs of the
burden of administrative and technical decisions and by
allocating considerable decision-making powers to
strengthened local authorities, and a country like Italy, where
a very weak bureaucracy and an unstable political system
cannot take decisions and cannot facilitate the achievement
of any kind of adjustment. Nevertheless, the majority of
European countries are somewhat closer to the Italian model
and Sweden seems to be, for the moment, a striking
exception. This exception does not seem to be due to the size
or type of problems since small countries, like Belgium or
even the Netherlands and Denmark, are also victims of

1 6 The Crisis of Democracy

overload and complexity due to the rigidity and complexity
of group allegiances and to the fragmentation of the polity.

2. Bureaucratic Weight an&Civic Irresponsibility

The governability of West European nations is hampered
by another set of related problems which revolve around the
general emphasis on bureaucratic rule, the lack of civic
.responsibility, and the breakdown of consensus.

A basic problem is developing everywhere: the opposition
between the decision-making game and the implementation
game. Completely different rationales are at work at one level
and at the other. In the decision-making game, the capacity
to master a successful coalition for a final and finite
agreement is a function of the nature and rules of the game in
which the decision is one outcome. Since the same partici-
pants are playing the same game for quite a number of crucial
decisions, the nature of their game, the participants' re-
sources, and the power relationships between them may have
as much validity in predicting outcomes as the substance of
the problem and its possible rational solution. In the
implementation game, however, completely different actors
appear whose frames of reference have nothing to do with
national decision-making bargaining and whose game is
heavily influenced by the power structure and modes of
relationship in the bureacracy on one hand, and in
the politico-administrative system in which the decision is to
be implemented on the other. It is quite frequent that the
two games work differently and may even be completely at
odds. A gap can therefore exist between the rationality of the
decision-makers and the outcomes of their activity, which
means that collective regulation of human activities in a
complex system is basically frustrating. Such a situation is
reproduced and exemplified at the upper political level where

Western Europe 1 7

all modern democratic systems suffer from a general
separation between an electoral coalition and the process of
government. A completely different set of alliances is
necessary to get an electoral majority and to face the
problems of government. The United States and Japan also
have these problems, but they are especially acute in West
European countries because of the fragmentation of social
systems, the great difficulties of communication, and the
barriers between different subsystems which tend to close up
and operate in isolation.

Two different models, however, are predominant in
Western Europe. One model, which has worse consequences
for governability, is the bureaucratic model associated with a
lack of consensus. This is the model exemplified especially by
countries like France and Italy, where a very sizable part of
the electorate will always vote for extremist parties, of the
left and to some extent of the right, that do not accept the
minimum requirements of the democratic system. In these
countries social control is imposed on the citizens by a state
apparatus which is very much isolated from the population.
Politico-administrative regulations work according to a basic
vicious circle: bureaucratic rule divorced from the political
rhetoric and from the needs of the citizens fosters among them
alienation and irresponsibility which form the necessary con-
text for the breakdown of consensus that has developed. Lack
of consensus in its turn makes it indispensable to resort to
bureaucratic rule, since one cannot take the risk of involving
citizens who do not accept the minimum rules of the game.
Generally, when social control has been traditionally achieved
by strong bureaucratic pressure, democratic consensus has not
developed fully and consensual breakdowns are endemic
possibilities. All European countries retain some of these
traditional control mechanisms.

However, an alternative model is exemplified by the

1 8 The Crisis of Democracy

countries of northwestern Europe where a broad consensus
has been achieved early enough and constantly reinforced,
thus preventing the state bureaucracy from dominating too
exclusively. Sweden, with its strong local decision-making
system, with its consensual labor-management bargaining
system, and with its ombudsman grievance procedures against
the bureaucracy, is the best example of such a model.

Nevertheless, a general drift toward alienation, irre-
sponsibility, and breakdown of consensus also exists in
these countries and even in Sweden. In time, group
bargaining has become more and more routinized, that is,
more and more bureaucratic, and workers, if not citizens
generally, have also tended to feel as alienated as those in
revolutionary Europe. In Denmark, the Netherlands, and
Britain, the social democratic consensus is breaking down
while the relationships between groups have become so
complex and erratic that citizens are more and more
frustrated. Politics become divorced from the citizens'
feelings and even from reality. Vicious circles therefore tend
to develop which bring these countries much closer than they
ever were to the countries of continental Europe. Even
Sweden has been affected, at least in its labor relations.4

3. The European Dimension

All these problems are certainly multiplied by the new
dimension of international problems which has made the
European national state a somewhat obsolete entity. One
could obviously conceive of a federal European system which
could rely on strong decentralized local and regional
decision-making systems, thus reducing the overload on the
top, the bureaucratic nature of the intermediary processes,
and the citizens' alienation. But efforts at unification have
tended to reinforce the national bureaucratic apparatuses
as if these traditional nervous centers of European affairs
could not help but harden again. Thus, Western Europe faces

Western Europe 19

one of its most impossible dilemmas. Its problems are more
and more European in nature, but its capacity to face them
relies on institutional instruments of a national and
bureaucratic nature that are more and more inadequate but
that tend at the same time to harden their hold on the
system.

Personalization of power in Western Europe also has been
used in national and international affairs to fight the
bureaucratic entanglements and to foster citizens'
identification when participation could not work. Its results,
however, are always disappointing. Leaders become prisoners
of their image and are too vulnerable to act. They become
public relations figures, thus creating a credibility gap and
broadening the misunderstanding between citizens and their
decision-making system.

One should not, however, overemphasize the general drift
toward irresponsibility and impotence in individual European
states and in Europe as a whole. Problems are threatening,
the capacity to handle them seems to have diminished, but
there are still many areas where government performances are
satisfactory compared with those of past governments, those
of other Trilateral areas, and those of the rest of the world.
European societies are still very civilized societies whose
citizens are well-protected and whose amenities and possibil-
ities of enjoyment have not only been maintained but
extended to a great many more people. In addition Europe
suffers less from social disruption and crime than the United
States.

There are growing areas, nevertheless, where governments'
capacity to act and to meet the challenge of citizens'
demands has been drastically impaired. Almost everywhere
secondary education and the universities are affected as well
as, frequently, metropolitan government, land use, and urban
renewal. This impairment of capacities is becoming prevalent
in more countries in bargaining among groups, income
redistribution, and the handling of inflation.

20 The Crisis of Democracy

II. SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND CULTURAL CAUSES

In order to better understand these general features of the
socio-political systems of Western Europe, and to be able to
suggest general orientations for the discussion of possible
change, we should first try to concentrate on the social,
economic, and cultural causes of the present crises. Causes
and consequences, however, are basically interrelated, and it
is impossible to disentangle them. Therefore, we will try to
focus successively on some of the major problem areas which
can be used for a better understanding of the present
situation.

First of all, we will try to assess the general socio-economic
context, which can be characterized sociologically by the
explosion of social interaction and economically by the
disruptive effect of continuous growth. We will then try to
analyze the general collapse of traditional institutions, which
may be the immediate background of the crisis. We will then
move on to the problem of cultural institutions, focusing
especially on the intellectuals, education, and the media. We
will conclude by reviewing a last circumstantial problem
which has had an accelerating impact — the problem of
inflation.

1 . The Increase of Social Interaction

In every developed country man has become much more a
social animal than before. There has been an explosion of
human interaction and correlatively a tremendous increase of
social pressure. The social texture of human life has become
and is becoming more and more complex and its management
more difficult. Dispersion, fragmentation, and simple ranking
have been replaced by concentration, interdependence, and a
complex texture. Organized systems have become tre-
mendously more complex, and they tend to prevail, in a much
more composite and complex social system, over the more

Western Europe 21

simple forms of yesterday. Because of the basic importance
of the contemporary complex social texture, its management
has a crucial importance, which raises the problem of social
control over the individual.

Europe is in a very special situation because it has a long
record of traditional social control imposed upon the
individual by collective authorities, especially the state, and
by hierarchical religious institutions. Certainly these
authorities and institutions had been liberalized over the
centuries since the time of absolutism. Nevertheless, a strong
association between social control and hierarchical values still
persists, which means that a basic contradiction tends to
reappear. Citizens make incompatible claims. Because they
press for more action to meet the problems they have to face,
they require more social control. At the same time they resist
.any kind of social control that is associated with the hier-
archical values they have learned to discard and reject. The
problem may be worldwide, but it is exacerbated in Europe,
where social discipline is not worshipped as it still is in Japan,
and where more indirect forms of social control have not
developed as in North America.

European countries, therefore, have more difficult
problems to overcome to go beyond a certain level of
complexity in their politico-administrative, social, and even
economic systems. There are differences in each country,
each one having maintained a very distinctive collective
system of social control. But each one of these systems now
appears to be insufficient to solve the problems of the time.
This is as true for Britain, which was considered to have
mastered forever the art of government, as it is for Italy,
which could have been an example of stable "nongovern-
ment." France, also, has a centralized apparatus less and less
adequate to manage modern complex systems and becomes
therefore more vulnerable. To some extent Germany benefits
from the deep trauma of nazism, which has forced more basic
change in the management of its social texture, but it is
nevertheless under the same kind of strains.

22 The Crisis of Democracy

2. The Impact of Economic Growth

The impact of economic growth can be better understood
in view of these basic strains. It was believed in the fifties and
early sixties that the achievement of economic growth was
the great problem for European nations. If only their GNP
could grow for long enough, most of their troubles as divided
and nonconsensual polities would gradually disappear. This
fact was so overwhelmingly accepted that for a long time the
official line of the communist parties was to deny the reality
of the material progress of the working class and to argue
that capitalist development had brought not only a relative
but also an absolute decline of workers' income. However,
certain facts had to be finally faced: namely, the tremendous
economic gains made during the past twenty years by all
groups and especially the workers. But the consequences of
this were to be the opposite of what had been expected.
Instead of appeasing tensions, material progress seems to have
exacerbated them.

Three main factors seem necessary to account for the
paradox. First, as it happens everywhere, change produces
rising expectations which cannot be met by its necessarily
limited outcomes. Once people know that things can change,
they cannot accept easily anymore the basic features of their
condition that were once taken for granted. Europe has been
especially vulnerable since its unprecedented economic boom
had succeeded a long period of stagnation with pent-up
feelings of frustration. Moreover, its citizens have been more
sophisticated politically and especially vulnerable to invidious
comparisons from category to category.

A second factor has to be taken into consideration: the
special role played by radical ideology in European
working-class politics. At a simple level, the European
revolutionary and nonconsensual ideologies of working-class
parties and trade unions were associated with the economic
and cultural lag that did not allow the working people a fair

Western Europe 23

share in society's benefits. But ideology is only partially a
consequence of frustration; it is also a weapon for action.
And in the European context, it remains the most effective
available instrument for mobilization. When ideology
declines, the- capacity of the unions to achieve results also
declines. The processes of orderly collective bargaining,
even when they bring results, tend to be also so complex and
bureaucratic that they produce disaffection. Rank-and-file
workers do not recognize themselves in such a bureaucratic
process and they tend to drift away, which means that the
more trade unions and working-class parties accept regular
procedures, the weaker they become in their capacity to
mobilize their followers and to put real pressure on the
system. Thus, they have to rediscover radicalism. This is
much more true for the Latin countries, which had never
achieved a satisfactory bargaining system, but radical drift
has also been very strong in northwest Europe. Generally,
even if workers have become better integrated in the overall
social system, they nevertheless remain basically frustrated
with the forms of bargaining which do not allow them much
participation. Therefore, a radical ideology is necessary to
enable them to commit themselves to the social game. This
situation is especially strong in many countries where it can
be argued that working-class groups have not benefited from
prosperity as greatly as they should or could have. Converse-
ly, those countries where blue-collar-workers' progress has
been comparatively the greatest and the steadiest, such as
Germany, are also those whose resistance to inflation and to
the ideological drift is the strongest.

A third factor may be more fundamental. This is the most
disruptive consequence of accelerated change. It is true
enough that change often brings greater material results and
that people have been able to recognize and appreciate their
gains, although they might have denied them for a long time.
But accelerated change is extremely costly in terms of
disruption. It means that many branches and enterprises

24 The Crisis of Democracy

decline and even disappear while others undergo tremendous
growth. People are forced to be mobile geographically and
occupationally, which can be accounted for in terms of
psychological costs. They have had to face a new form of
uncertainty and are likely to compare their fates more often
to the fates of other groups. Tensions, therefore, are bound
to increase.

Moreover, these processes have had a direct and profound
impact on the modes of social control operating in society..
And this is where Europe has been much more vulnerable
than either the United States or Japan. In a society where
social control had traditionally relied on fragmentation,
stratification, and social barriers to communication, the
disruptive effect of change which tends to destroy these
barriers, while forcing people to communicate, makes it more
and more difficult to govern. The problem has never been so
acute in North America, which has always been on the whole
a much more open society; and it is still not yet as developed
in Japan, which has been able up to now to maintain its
forms of social control while undergoing even more economic
change.

Wide differences of course persist between the very diverse
European nations. Italy and to some extent France have been
less directly perturbed because they have remained more
hierarchical in their social texture.5 Throughout the world
individuals have lost a great deal of their traditional frames of
reference and have not found substitutes in their
relationships with the collective group. Everywhere anomie
has increased for young people; groups are more volatile and
social control is much weaker. At the same time, the direct
effect of economic and geographical disruptions requires
proper handling; it requires the imposition of collective
disciplines which these disruptions make it impossible to
generate.6

A no-growth economy is, of course, no solution, as Britain
has clearly shown. No country can isolate itself from general

Western Europe 25

change. British society may have suffered less disruption than
the continental countries, but it is now, in counterpart, the
victim of its poor economic performance. British people may
still be individually less tense than people on the continent,
but they are becoming collectively demoralized. Egalitari-
anism and mass participation pressures have increased as they
did elsewhere and the gap between promises and expectations
has widened even more, leading to repeated and frustrating
clashes between the bureaucracy and various sectors of the
general public, to poorer and poorer government perform-
ances, and to widespread feelings of political alienation.

3. The Collapse of Traditional Institutions

The contradiction regarding social control has been
amplified by the near collapse of the traditional authority
structure which was buttressing social control processes. The
collapse is partly due to the disruptive effect of change, but it
can also be viewed as the logical outcome of a general
evolution of the relationship of the individual to society.

Everywhere in the West the freedom of choice of the
individual has increased tremendously. With the crumbling of
old barriers everything' seems to be possible. Not only can
people choose their jobs, their friends, and their mates
without being constrained by earlier conventions, but they
can drop these relationships more easily. People whose range
of opportunities is greater and whose freedom of change also
is greater can be much more demanding and cannot accept
being bound by lifelong relationships. This is, of course,
much more true for young people. It has further been
compounded by the development of sexual freedom and by
the questioning of woman's place in society. In such a
context traditional authority had to be put into question.
Not only did it run counter to the tremendous new wave of
individual assertion, but at the same time it was losing the
capacity which it had maintained for an overly long time to

26 The Crisis of Democracy

control people who had no alternatives.

The late sixties have been a major turning point. The
amount of underlying change was dramatically revealed in
the political turmoil of the period which forced a sort of
moral showdown over a certain form of traditional authority.
Its importance has been mistaken inasmuch as the revolt
seemed to be aiming at political goals. What was at stake
appears now to be moral much more than political
authority— churches, schools, and cultural organizations more
than political and even economic institutions.

In the short space of a few years, churches seem to have
been the most deeply upset. In most of Europe, a basic shift
was accelerated which deprived them of their political and
even moral authority over their flocks and within society at
large. The Catholic church has been hit the hardest because it
had remained more authoritarian. Yet as opinion polls have
shown, religious feelings and religious needs persist. They
may even have been reactivated by the anxieties of our time
so that eventually churches will be able to regain some of the
ground they have lost. In order to succeed they will have to
open up and abandon what remains of their traditional
principles.

This may have been already achieved since the authoritarian
pattern is vanishing. The crisis is much more apparent within
the hierarchy than among the laity. Priests are leaving the
churches at an increasing rate; they cannot be replaced, and
those who stay do not accept the bureaucratic authority of
their superiors and the constraints of the dogma as
obediently as before. They are in a position to exact a much
better deal, and they get it. Conversely, they feel less capable
of exerting the traditional moral authority they maintained
over laymen. It may be exaggerated to pretend that the
age-old system of moral obligations and guidance that
constituted the church has crumbled; it is still alive, but it has
changed more in the last decade than during the last two
centuries. Around this change the new effervescence that has

Western Europe 27

developed may be analyzed as a proof of vitality. New
rationales may emerge around which the system will stabilize.
But it seems clear enough already that the traditional model,
which had been for so long one of the main ideological
strongholds of European societal structures, has disintegrated.
This is certainly a major change for European societies. Such
a model provided a basic pattern for the social order and was
used as a last recourse for buttressing social control, even in
the so-called laicist countries like France where the Catholic
church was supposed to have only a minor influence. The
impact of the basic shift of values will be widespread. Even
the nonreligious milieus, which had maintained similar
models of social control despite their opposition to the
Catholic principles, will not be able to resist change any
better even if at first glance they seem less directly affected.

Education as a moral establishment is faced with the same
problem and may be the first example of this corresponding
similarity between opposing traditions. Whatever philosophi-
cal influences were exerted over it in particular countries,
education is in trouble all over Western Europe. It has lost its
former authority. Teachers cannot believe anymore in their
"sacred" mission and their students do not accept their
authority as easily as they did before. Along with the
religious rationale for the social order, educational authority
does not hold firm anymore. Knowledge is widely shared.
Teachers have lost their prestige within society, and the
closed hierarchical relations that made them powerful figures
in the classroom have disappeared. Routine makes it possible
for the system to work and the sheer necessity and weight of
its functions will maintain it in operation. But the malaise is
deep. The dogmatic structure disintegrates; no one knows
how to operate without a structure and new forms do not
seem to be emerging. We are still in the process of
destructuration where generous Utopias still seem to be the
only constructive answers to the malaise.

Higher education, which has had a more spectacular

28 The Crisis of Democracy

revolution, may have been partly revived, but in many
countries and in many disciplines it is still in chaos. European
universities do not offer any kind of institutional leadership.
They are not real institutions for their students.
Very few teachers will be able to propose positive and
nonideological models of commitment to values which can be
acceptable to students. Consequently, the universities'
potential cannot be used as a stimulant for change in society
and young people's energies are easily diverted toward
meaningless and negative struggles.

Other institutions are also, if less severely, perturbed by
this collapse of moral authority. Among them the army, at
least in its roles as training school for organizational
disciplines and symbol and embodiment of patriotic values,
has lost its moral and psychological appeal. Defense may be
more and more entrusted to professional armies that may
remain reliable. But the conscript army as a school for the
citizen and as a model of authority is on the wane. It has lost
all sense of purpose. It is really isolated from the mainstream
of human relationships. Thus, another stronghold of the
moral fabric of Western societies disappears.

Curiously enough the problem of authority in economic
organizations, which had always been considered the most
difficult battlefield of industrial society, seems comparatively
less explosive. Difficulties have been reactivated during the
upheaval of the late sixties. Economic sanctions and the
visibility of results, however, give participants some accept-
able rationale for collective endeavor. Nevertheless, European
enterprises are weaker as institutions, on the whole, than
their American or Japanese counterparts. They lack con-
sensus over the system of authority as well as over the system
of resources allocation, and they even often lack enough
agreement regarding the rules of the game in conflict situa-
tions.

The problems are more difficult when the social system
has maintained some of the rigid features of a former class

Western Europe 29

society and when authority is supposed to be imposed from
above. The situation is considerably more touchy in Italy and
to some extent also in France than in Scandinavia and
Germany, where discipline has long been internalized.7
Nevertheless, the problem remains more acute in Europe than
in the United States, where people have gradually learned
newer forms of social control, or in Japan, where older forms
of social control persist and readjust to present requirements
in a very active fashion.

Two important series of consequences are derived from
this institutional weakness. First, the integration of the
working class into the social game is only partial, especially in
the Latin countries and in France. Second, the weight of the
organizational middle classes of middle executives and
supervisors constitutes a conservative, eventually paralyzing
force.

The lack of integration of the working class not only
prevents direct bargaining and understanding, which makes
the European enterprise more vulnerable, but it is at the root
of the widespread reluctance of young people to accept the
humiliating, underpaid lower-blue-collar jobs. European
entrepreneurs have found an easy solution to the workforce
problem by turning to migrant workers from Southern
Europe and North Africa. However, this policy, which had
been highly successful for a while and which has fed the
industrial development of Western Europe during its boom
years, has brought new and difficult problems in the
community life of West European cities. Gradually another
factor of instability has developed since foreign workers have
begun to question their place and range of opportunities in
the social and economic system.

Efforts at promoting working-class jobs and upgrading and
integrating blue-collar jobs into the mainstream of industrial
development have usually failed because of the weight of the
hierarchy. And the middle-most hierarchical categories have
slowed down the modernization of the institutional fabric of

30 The Crisis of Democracy

economic organizations. Their attitudes, furthermore, help
maintain in these European organizations the rigidity of
social control that prevents modernization and growth.

Indeed, if European enterprises look more healthy than
European churches and schools, this is also because they still
rely more on the old model of social control. One may
surmise that economic organizations will have to follow suit
after the others, which probably means disruption.
Differences between countries remain considerable. Sweden,
for instance, is well ahead in the development of a new model
while Italy is in a stage of partial disruption.

4. The Upsetting of the Intellectual World

Another basic source of disruption of Western societies
comes from the intellectual world. Daniel Bell has rightly
pointed out the basic importance of culture in the coming of
post-industrial society. Knowledge tends to become the basic
resource of humanity. Intellectuals as a social group are
pushed into the forefront of sociopolitical struggles and the
relationships of the intellectual world to society change
radically. But neither Daniel Bell nor any other futurologist
has foreseen the importance and the painfulness of such an
ongoing process of change. There is no reason to believe that
the contemporary cultural revolution will be more peaceful
than the industrial revolutions of the past.

We seem to be, as a matter of fact, in a cultural crisis
which may be the greatest challenge that confronts Western
societies, inasmuch as our incapacity to develop appropriate
decision-making mechanisms— the ungovernability of our
societies— is a cultural failure. Europe, in this respect, is the
most troubled and the most vulnerable of the three Trilateral
areas, primarily because the strength and centrality of its
intellectual tradition makes it more difficult to develop new
models.

The first element of the crisis is the problem of numbers.
The coming of a post-industrial society means a tremendous

Western Europe 3 1

increase in the numbers of intellectuals, would-be
intellectuals, and para-intellectuals. Not only do older
intellectual professions develop, but newer ones appear, and
many nonintellectual jobs become professional. But the more
intellectuals there are, the less prestige there is for each. Here
again we come to the real paradox: The more central a
profession becomes, the less prestige and influence its average
member will have as an individual. There would not be any
problem if the socialization and training process would be
geared to the new state of affairs. But people continue to be
trained in the traditional aristocratic ethos of the prestigious
roles of yesterday. They are thus prepared to expect a
completely different pattern of activities and relationships
with the outside world than is actually the case. Moreover,
the cumulative effects of their individual endeavors to
promote and modernize their roles tend to diminish and
routinize them.

A new stratification thus develops between those persons
who can really play a leading role and those who have to
accept a humbler status. But this stratification is in turn a
factor in the malaise because in many countries, particularly
France and Britain, the happy few acquire and maintain their
positions by restrictive monopolistic practices.

Another factor of discontent comes from the importance
of the aristocratic tradition in Western Europe's cultural
world. According to that tradition, intellectuals are romantic
figures who naturally get a position of prominence through a
sort of aristocratic exaltation. This attitude is still very much
alive and dominant at a subconscious level. Yet intellectuals
as agents of change and moral guides in a period of fast
changes should be and are effectively in the vanguard of the
fight against the old aristocratic tradition. Thus not only are
they working to destroy the privileges that they
unconsciously crave, but many of them undergo a moral
crisis for which a radical stand is often an easy solution.

The internal upsetting of the traditional intellectual roles,
whose new occupants discover that they do not meet the

32 The Crisis of Democracy

expectations which had prompted their own personal
commitments, is increased, if not multiplied, because of the
existence of a very strong displacement within the
intellectual world itself. While a long tradition had given the
humanities an honored position, the new trend favors the
new intellectual professions that may be of more practical
use. The more post-industrial society becomes intellectu-
alized, the more it tends to displace traditional value-oriented
intellectual disciplines to the benefit of action-oriented ones,
that is, those disciplines that can play a direct role in
policy-making.

Value-oriented intellectuals do not disappear or even
decline, however. They find new and rapidly-developing
openings in the fields of communications. But such a
reorientation may be morally painful since it can be viewed
as somewhat debasing. In any case, the opposition of the two
cultures, described by C.P. Snow, has shifted greatly. It has
become a battle between those persons who play the
audience, even if it is a protest type, and those who
contribute to the process of decision-making. Thus, the basic
crisis of the intellectual world is a crisis of identity in a
rapidly changing world where the basic mechanisms of
regulation have been put severely into question.

Many other factors, of course, are at work. The cultural
world may be considered as a sounding board for the other
forms of malaise of Western societies. But one should
emphasize that this sounding board plays a very important,
autonomous role of its own, first of all because it reinforces
the uncertainties and driving anxieties it is expressing and,
second, because it projects on the whole of society the crises
of identity its members are experiencing.

Notwithstanding the many differences between countries,
one can clearly recognize a general drift in the art and literary
worlds toward a protest and even revolutionary posture. It
has clearly shaped the cultural context in which the younger
generations move.

The importance of such a trend should not be

Western Europe 33

underestimated. True enough, one can correctly dismiss its
immediate political influence and recognize the superficiality
of its fashionable aspects. But it has a meaning and an
influence at a deeper level. It is an expression of a basic
weakening of Western Europe's sense of purpose, capacity to
lead, and to govern itself. Above all, it is the source of a
profound divorce between the ruling people and the young
talents.

Even if it does not affect the general public, which tends
to react against highbrow pessimism, the overall mood of
Western societies is shaped by a general cultural tendency.
West European values are not rejuvenated in a convincing
way. No model of civilization emerges from the present-day
drifting culture, no call for reform and pioneering. Ritualism
and self-pity remain the basic undercurrent behind the
arrogant radical criticism that prevails on the surface. Vague
Utopias certainly do not counterbalance the stronger
apocalyptic nihilism that forms the texture of our vanguard
culture. On the other hand, there is no possible dialogue
between the ruling elite and the new generation. Fragmenta-
tion and stratification, which were stifling traditional class
society, seem to perpetuate themselves through new cultural
cleavages. Other regulatory mechanisms which we cannot
distinguish yet may be at work. A new blossoming may well
follow this long hibernating process. But we must face the
fact that we are now in the most vulnerable part of the cycle
of change or, to put it a better way, of the process of
transition to post-industrial society.

5. The Mass Media

The vulnerability of the cultural world and its importance
for the whole of society is compounded because of the
central role it plays in two basic subsystems of modern
societies: education and the media.

Education exemplifies some of the same basic
contradictions as the world of culture. The prestige of

34 The Crisis of Democracy

teachers has decreased with the tremendous increase of their
numbers while their expectations are still greatly influenced
by the traditional liberal flavor of their calling. And they are,
even more than other intellectuals, directly confronted with
the revolution in human relations that perturbs their
traditional mode of social control. At the same time, with its
cultural drift society has lost the stimulating moral guidance
it requires. As a consequence the transmission of social,
political, and cultural norms has been very deeply perturbed,
thus feeding back into society as a whole. Already research
results show the extent of intellectual breakdown and
disorientation that prevails in many sectors of the
population. People's behavior is not touched, really, but they
can no longer rely on a coherent rationalization of its
context, and they feel at a loss to find out how they relate to
society. Anomic rebellion, estrangement from society, and
alienation certainly have dangerously progressed because of
this cultural void.

The media are not in as great a crisis as education is.
However, they have been transformed by the explosion and
expansion of communications and the new role played by
value-intellectuals. The media's influence on politics and
governability is much more direct than that of education, and
the media play a most decisive role in the present drift of
Western societies. They are a very important source of
disintegration of the old forms of social control inasmuch as
they contribute to the breakdown of old barriers to
communication. Television, particularly, has played a major
role in this respect. It has made it impossible to maintain the
cultural fragmentation and hierarchy that was necessary to
enforce traditional forms of social control. Its impact has
been more recent and more difficult than in the United
States or Japan because of the much stronger resistance of
fragmented and stratified European societies. Its use is still
more differentiated according to social categories or classes.
Nevertheless, the strength of the appeal of television is such

Western Europe 35

that it has forced a complete change of public and social life,
and has also indirectly helped the press to restructure itself.
The main impact of these changes, of course, is visibility. The
only real event is the event that is reported and seen. Thus,
journalists possess a crucial role as gatekeepers of one of the
central dimensions of public life.

The media have thus become an autonomous power. It is
not new to talk about the Fourth Estate. But we now are
witnessing a crucial change when the profession tends to
regulate itself in such a way as to resist pressure from
financial or governmental interests. Television, which is
heavily influenced in many countries by governmental
control, works ~ much less openly than newspapers;
self-regulation, however, is everywhere on the increase. This
could be viewed as tremendous progress. But at the same
time these mechanisms of self-regulation of the media tend to
be strongly biased. If journalists can create events, they have
a structuring impact on public and social life. And if their
basic logic in creating events is to reach the widest possible
audience, they will tend to bias the social game in such a way
that public figures will have to play for this audience much
more than for real outcomes. This has many consequences:

First, the media become a tremendous sounding board for
the difficulties and tensions of society. Movements and
fashions take broader proportions. It is much more difficult
to escape the whirlpool of public relations events and to
concentrate on more basic problems. Second, the media
deprive governments and to some extent also other
responsible authorities of the time lag, tolerance, and trust
that make it possible to innovate and to experiment
responsibly.

Third, the pressure of the media makes it extremely
difficult to solve a basic dilemma of modern complex
systems, which has been brought to light as the
counterintuitive effect.8 Systems operate in such a way that
very often the general outcome of individual action runs

36 The Crisis of Democracy

counter to the will of the actors and to the general intuition
one may have in advance. Thus it is imperative to give much
more importance to systems analyses than to the immediate
and apparent views of the actors, which is evidently the bias
of the media. The more this sounding board emphasizes the
emotional appeal of the actors' "life experience," especially
as biased by the techniques of the media, the less easy it is to
force a real analysis of the complex game on which political
leaders must act. Finally, the emphasis on direct evidence
appears to be as loaded with ideology and manipulation as
old style oratory. Journalists' autonomy does not lead
necessarily to transparency and truth but may distort the
perception of reality.

Here we find the problem of journalists as value-oriented
intellectuals who tend to be governed by the game of
catching the audience's attention and are responsible
therefore for the acceleration of the cultural drift. In the long
run, this problem may be much more important than the
problems of financial and government interference in the
media, which are everywhere tending to recede.

In politics, however, the public relations effect is quite
different from the North American one since the ruling elite
and the educated audience play a major role as an important
screen. They constitute the primary audience of the
highbrow publications, which in turn tend to structure the
problems that will finally reach the broader audience. Public
relations of a public figure will be conditioned by the
existence of these two levels. This means that there is a very
serious buffer against too immediate reactions. But this does
not mean a suppression of the public relations distortion,
only a transformation of its conditions. At any rate the
pressure for change that is against secrecy and protection of
leaders seems to be more on the increase. The only ready
answer to counterbalance it is the use of bureaucracy for real
action, which means that the gap between the decision-
making system, distorted by public relations problems, and

Western Europe 37

the implementation system, protected but also bound and
biased by bureaucratic machine-regulating mechanisms, will
tend to increase, thus triggering constant new waves of
frustration and anger and diminishing the amount of trust
people will give to their leadership.

6. Inflation

Inflation can be considered a direct result of the
ungovernability of Western democracies. It is an easy answer
to the tensions of growth. The less a society is capable of
facing them, the readier it is to accept inflation as a less
painful solution. At the same time it is an independent source
of disruption which" exacerbates conflicts and still diminishes
the capacity of groups and societies to act. Present-day
inflation, therefore, ought to be considered, even if very
briefly, as another independent variable to be analyzed as a
supplementary cause of disruption.

It is no wonder that the countries whose social fabric is the
weakest, those whose model of social control is still based on
hierarchy, fragmentation, and distance, have always been
much more vulnerable to inflation. In the 1960s, however, a
reasonable sort of equilibrium had been found according to
which the anticipation of growth was reasonably matched
with actual growth while Keynesian policies were stabilizing
the system. The golden age of economics, however, was
shorter in Europe, Germany excepted, than in North
America. In any case, no country can now resist the
tremendous pressure of the new turbulence in the world.

Present-day large-scale inflation has been for a time
remarkably well accepted. It has had a strong distorting
effect on the economic and social position of individuals and
groups. But its impersonal operation prevents direct
complaint. Furthermore, the groups which usually speak the
loudest are those which are likely to benefit from the pro-
cess. One can even claim that the combination of public feel-
ing, trade union pressure, and governmental intervention has

38 The Crisis of Democracy

tended to operate in favor of low salaries. Thus, professional
salaried middle classes, which were certainly privileged, have
lost some of their advantages. It is not as unfair an outcome
as one would immediately tend to believe.

The problems of inflation, however, change their nature
when the so-called double-digit numbers seem to become a
stable feature of the economic picture. The costs seem then
more and more unbearable. Not only do distortions appear,
but social relationships become unstable. Lack of trust
prevents the necessary regulation of large and small economic
and social subsystems. More people, moreover, anticipate a
crisis, and the governments' margin of freedom is reduced to
the lowest level. We can observe this in Britain and in Italy.
Between unemployment and inflation there does not seem
any middle way. Basically, governments appear to be unable
to induce groups which are in strategic positions to accept
sacrifices. European unity is not much of a real help since it
is much easier for any government to dump on the outside
world the consequences of its own weaknesses. European
countries' foreign economic policies tend to be, on the
whole, not only uncoordinated but even erratic.

There are, however, some positive elements in the picture:
Germany's understanding that it cannot retain its prosperity
alone; France's surprisingly better economic results; and
Franco-German cooperation. While these factors may not yet
be inspiring for the presently weaker countries, they may be
a new point of departure and, if some success develops, they
will play a very important symbolic role for the development
of the new capacities Europe requires.

Inflation and its twin evil depression finally make the
problem of governability an immediate and practical
one. And the basic question is: Are the European countries
ready to meet the challenge of the new situation, to develop
in time of crisis the institutional capacity they could not
develop in time of prosperity? To make an educated guess on
this very crucial problem, one must now focus more closely

Western Europe 39

on the role and structure of political values in present-day
Western Europe.

III. THE ROLE AND STRUCTURE
OF POLITICAL VALUES

1 . The Values Structure and the Problem of Rationality

Behind all these governability problems of modern Western
societies lie some more basic problems of values.
Participation, people's consent, equality, the right of the
collectivity to intervene in personal affairs, and the possible
acceptance of authority seem to be the preliminary questions
to debate beforegiving a reasonable diagnosis and proposing
possible solutions.

The relationship of values to behavior and especially to
institutionalized behavior is much more complex than is
usually believed, which makes the interpretation of opinion
polls highly questionable. Above all, there is a wide
discrepancy between professed values— what we can get
through opinion polls and even attitude surveys— and actual
behavior— what people will eventually do when problems
force them to choose. Not only is there a discrepancy but the
nature, importance, and even direction of this discrepancy
are difficult to understand and therefore to predict. For
instance, shortly before the French students' revolt in May
1968, opinion polls gave an almost idyllic representation of
students' docility, conformism, and even satisfied apathy.

However, at an unconscious level, we can surmise that
there is a rationale in people's behavior which is buttressing
the maintenance of the social games and their social and
cultural characteristics, and these rationales can be
considered as more stable and meaningful value orientations.
These value orientations, however, cannot be easily made evi-
dent. It will be a task for new generations of social scientists
to set these problems in more operational terms. For the mo-
ment, we can only present some hypotheses that cannot be

40 The Crisis of Democracy

supported by data and represent only educated guesses which
have been elaborated by confronting the problems to be
solved— governability problems— with the institutional pat-
terns and what we know of their evolution and the professed
values of people about them.

In this perspective, JJie^ first and most central hypothesis
concerns the concept "of rationality and its relationship to
the structure of values. Western Europe, as the Western world
generally, has lived during the last two or three centuries with
a certain model of rationality which has had a decisive
influence on values, at least by giving them the basic structure
within which they could be expressed. This kind of
rationality, which can be considered as the most powerful
tool humanity had discovered for managing collective action,
is founded upon a clear distinction between ends and means
and an analytical fragmentation of problems within a world
that could be considered infinite. Within such a framework
people can define goals according to their preferences (i.e.,
their values). Society's technical knowledge could then
provide them with the necessary (and sufficient) means to
implement their goals. Every problem can be redefined in
such a way that ends and means may be clearly separate and
so that a rational solution could easily be found. Of course,
collective action implies several participants with different
orders of preferences. But in the economic sphere analytical
structuring will help sort out single deciders to whom others
will be linked by definite contracts (into which they will
enter according to their orders of preference). And in the
political sphere democratic procedures organized around the
twin concepts of general will and sovereignty give the
rationale for the same logic.

Of course difficulties can arise with this model of
rationality, and they may be (reluctantly) recognized. It will
be necessary, therefore, to resort to manipulation, compro-
mise, and even coercion in order to arrive at a decision. For
the elaboration of decisions, democracy can be viewed as

Western Europe 41

both the least evil and most ideal embodiment of rationality.
In order to achieve implementation of these decisions,
bureaucratic means are supposed to insure accurate and
impersonal compliance. Conflict over means may be another
worry, but good leadership and energy will finally overcome
the obstacles. If there are failures, they are due to the
weakness of human nature and have to be tolerated as such.

As a general consequence a stable dichotomy has always
persisted between the ideal objectives which pertain to the
logic of values and the muddy, messy world of reality, which
is the realm of unsavory "political" deals. But the
discrepancy, although perturbing, does not shake this
fundamental modelof reasoning. On the contrary, the more
ideals may be compromised in practice, the more idealized
and the more worshiped they will remain in the domain of
values.

The system has worked well enough as long as societal
change was slow, the intervention of public authorities rather
limited, and the fragmentation and stratification of society
strong enough to insure a pragmatic acceptance of social
order and established authority. But once the explosion of
communication and social interaction has disturbed the
necessary barriers that made societies more simple and
therefore more manageable, this basic pattern of rationality
disintegrates.

First, there is no way to order goals either rationally or
democratically. Furthermore, the quality and authenticity of
preferences and goals becomes questionable. It is all very well
to say that people should choose according to their
preferences. But where do these preferences come from? The
context of influences that is exerted over them appears to be
determinant. Manipulation becomes a sort of basic fear which
pervades the democratic creed. At the same time, social
sciences begin to question this preference model by showing
how people do not have a priori wants but discover goals
from their experience; that is, they learn what they want by

42 The Crisis of Democracy

trial and error and implementation schemes. Finally, ends
develop only through means.

Second, ends do not appear in a vacuum. They are part of
structured universes which also encompass means.
Furthermore, they are interrelated and conflictual. None of
them can be pushed very far without interfering with other
ends. Finally what are ends for one individual or one group
are means for other individuals or groups.

Third, the breakdown of barriers means that people
participate in very large structured sets where this unilateral,
rationality scheme becomes terribly oppressive. If means,
according to the logic of this scheme, are the domain of ines-
capable rational techniques, the 95 percent or 99 percent of
human beings whose universe does not go beyond these
means do not have the possibility to participate in a
meaningful way in the government of their daily lives. If
rational techniques can provide the one best solution, they
cannot even discuss the relevance of their experience for the
common good.

Fourth, rationality was always tempered by the limits of
tradition and custom, and by the fragmentation of the
problems. If limits disappear, if therefore rationality wins too
much, if established authority-whether religious or social-
crumbles, rationality explodes; it becomes in a certain sense
irrational.

If with this brief analysis of the crisis of modern
rationality as a goal-structuring scheme we revert to our
problems of governability of Western democracies, we can
draw a first set of conclusions. There is no wonder that the
concept of rationality has been put into question. Its own
success was bound to make its contradictions explode. The
cultural and moral breakdown of the late sixties therefore has
expressed something important for the future. Whatever its
vagaries and the dangerous threats it is presenting to the
democratic way of government, it has above all exposed the
illusions of traditional rationality and may help us learn a

Western Europe 43

new kind of reasoning where professed values will not be the
only guide for moral action.

The search for a broader kind of rationality, as well as the
search for new kinds of social and organizational games that
can embody it, is the major problem of Western societies.
New social and psychological Utopias, such as the community
drive, the encounter group philosophy, and the
self-government dreams are useful tools for this search as well
as dangerous illusions. Conversely, political reemphasis of
local and regional ties may be as much a conservative "retro"
fashion as a necessary axis for the renewal of governmental
processes.

European societies, and U.S. society as well, are engaged in
this impossible search. European societies start, however,
with a handicap, inasmuch as they are still much more
involved in the former model of rationality, while the
rapidity of change is destroying the customary protections
that were counterbalancing its rigid use. These difficulties are
closely linked with social stratification problems, especially
the social gap between the world of decision and the world of
execution and the parallel but nonidentical gap between the
educated and the noneducated classes.

2. Core Political Beliefs

If we distinguish core political beliefs from principles of
action, we discover a rather paradoxical situation which
may be emphasized as one basic characteristic of our
contemporary scene. While those principles of action that
seemed formerly immutable appear to be deeply shaken,
forcing people to open up to existential bewilderment about
the meaning of their action and their social identity, core
political beliefs about which changes had been always
hypothesized remain much more stable.

While people commonly feel that the usual way to achieve
goals is not acceptable any more (one cannot order people

44 The Crisis of Democracy

around even if one pretends one can or even does), and while
community feelings seem much more important for young
people than the real content of any goal, the basic tenets of
the democratic and Christian creed are still very much alive
and color revolutionary as well as conservative enterprises. In
this respect four clusters of values seem to me as
predominant now as they have been for a long time.

First, the freedom of the individual is the cardinal value
which is not only unanimously shared but seems to be
rediscovered again by any kind of new movement whether
extremely radical or conservatively religious. It will be
immediately argued that these movements have widely
different conceptions of freedom. But this is not so certain if
one remains at the level of values or core political beliefs. The
only fundamental distinction one can see at this point is the
opposition between the European conception of freedom—
which is a sort of freedom-from, that is, emphasizing the
inalienable right of the individual not to be interfered
with— and the American one— which is rather a freedom-to,
that is, the inalienable right to take initiatives and to lead
others if they so wish. European freedom-from antedates
political democracy and has deep Christian roots. It has
different forms according to the European country, with
some orientation of the more Protestant countries toward the
freedom-to concept; but, on the whole, there is much more
convergence than one would think across countries and
across class barriers and political groupings.

Second, equality, whatever its ambiguity and possible
threats, remains a dominant value orientation all over
Western Europe. European egalitarianism, however, shows
again a difference from the American variety. It is still a
stratified kind of egalitarianism. People may require equality
with their peers most punctiliously while they may accept
inequality between statuses and strata. Contrary to North
Americans, they might be shocked by differences of
treatment that do not recognize people's status while they

Western Europe 45

would not mind the differences between statuses per se.

Order and efficiency may be more surprising items to put
among the core political beliefs of West Europeans. One
cannot escape being struck, however, with the importance of
these kinds of values in the political process. Whenever the
development of freedom threatens to bring chaos, the
demand for order is immediate, even violent. It is not a lost
or dwindling part of core political beliefs whatever the
possible evolution of its forms in the direction of more
tolerance. The special West European form of order,
however, has a more social and less juridical connotation
than in the United States. Things (and people) have to be put
in their proper place for society to operate. Due process is
not the cardinal element of this belief. Furthermore,
efficiency may be added to it inasmuch as it has a
legitimating connotation. Order is the way to achieve
efficiency, which is the condition of a well-functioning
society. West Europeans still value the good "efficient"
scheme more than the concrete results. Order is the burden
of the white man; efficiency may be the demonstration of it
in a modern rationalized society.

Finally, I would emphasize dualism as a fourth cluster of
core political beliefs. Contrary to Eastern countries, West
Europeans never had a unitary conception of legitimacy.
Church and State opposition antedates modern left-right
conflicts. Group cooperation may be dreamed of as a possible
unanimous harmony, but it has never been practiced without
the due protection of dualism. Free choice can be preserved
only if the existence of an opposition preserves the
independence of individuals who could be otherwise too
dependent on the predominant power to be able to assert
their rights. All situations where such an oppositon
disappears have to be avoided as paternalistic, feudalistic, and
oppressive. Conflict may be handled most painfully through
such dualism. Real conflicts may be stifled and distorted, but
one feels that the price is worth paying since prior harmony

46 The Crisis of Democracy

is always suspect. This core belief, which is completely
foreign to Japan, is widely shared in North America, but the
American form of it emphasizes checks and balances more
than conflict and dualism. Absolute power in this conception
is evil and must therefore be checked, but this does not
necessarily imply the division of the citizens. In Europe this
division is the center of the game, and one can tolerate a
greater abuse of governmental prerogatives since government
will be paralyzed by the division of society.

3. The Impact of Social, Economic,

and Cultural Changes on the Principles of Rationality

and on the Core Political Beliefs

Political behavior and political changes do not depend
directly on political values but on the possible learning
people can do within the constraints of the core political
beliefs they adhere to and the principles of rationality they
apply. What then may be, more precisely, the impact of
social, economic, and cultural changes on these two kinds of
societal dimensions?

All over Western Europe the development of social
interaction, the disruptive effects of cumulative change, the
cultural drift, and the exposure of government to media
publicity have made it more and more difficult to maintian
•social control and to answer the demands of the citizens.
Traditional rationality, therefore, disintegrates. But values or
core political beliefs are not affected. They may even be
reinforced.

The urge for freedom does not level off. On the contrary,
it may be intensified by the helplessness of uprooted
individuals within a too complex world and their
concomitant blackmailing power over weakened institutions.
Not only is the demand for freedom exacerbated, but it does
not shift from a freedom-from to a freedom-to orientation.
The traditional posture still pays off.

Western Europe 47

The drive for equality, of course, develops; it may progress
from a narrow categorical frame of reference to a broader
one. But basically the tightness of the social and political
game is such that no significant shift can be expected in a
near enough future. Conversely, the need for order is
reactivated by the chaotic aspect of a generalized
blackmailing game. And it is of a more regressive than
progressive kind. No learning seems to take place. As usual
people ask for freedom for themselves and order for the
others. Even dualism may be reinforced inasmuch as the
breakdown of rationality and the weakness of government
leave the field open for the game of division and opposition.

What is at stake, therefore, is not the democratic creed and
the Christian ethos, which are less directly threatened than
they were for example in the thirties,9 but the contradiction
between these core political beliefs and the principles of
action that could make it possible to implement them.

Earlier democratic processes had been built on the
separation of groups and classes. They relied as much on
institutionalized noncommunication as on democratic
confrontation. Authority was worshiped as an indispensable
means for achieving order although it was rejected as a
dangerous interference with freedom. Such a model could
not stand structural changes that destroy barriers, force
people to compete outside traditional limits, and suppress the
distance that protected traditional authority. A profound
contradiction therefore develops. People tend to try different
and more open practices or are being forced into them, but
they cannot stand the tensions these practices bring. Since
they cannot also stand the authority that could moderate
these tensions and bring back order over them, a very
resilient vicious circle develops. Little real learning takes
place, and authority hides behind public relations and
complexity but becomes more vulnerable because it does not
dare to assert itself. And the more vulnerable it becomes, the
more it generates blackmailing group pressures, the less

48 The Crisis of Democracy

margin it retains for more responsible longer-term action and
the less chance it stands to regain legitimacy.

New patterns of tolerance and mutual adjustment have to
be learned and are in fact being learned to deal with these
growing tensions and the chaotic consequences they can have
if the easy solution of inflation is not available. But this
cannot take place yet at the level of values or the core belief
system. We can only hope that action will anticipate beliefs,
that is, that people will learn from experience instead of
obeying already existing motivations. This kind of learning is
perfectly compatible with the core belief system although it
implies some shift from the freedom-from concept to the
freedom-to concept and the extension of the traditional
narrow egalitarianism to broader domains. Nevertheless, it
would mean the appearance of new beliefs alongside the core
system. If such learning does not develop quickly enough,
however, there is a growing risk of crisis and regression.

4. Traditional Factors As a Counterweight

European societies still live on a series of traditional
adjustments that are not called into question because they
are taken for granted: the persistence of old forms of
patronage networks which allow due consideration to
forgotten human factors; symbiotic adjustments between
opposed social and economic partners according to which
conflicts and tensions are maintained at a workable level;
implicit bargaining arrangements between groups that cannot
face each other squarely; implicit consensus on some sort of
professional or work ethic, and so on.

There is, moreover, a longing and a search for earlier
community practices to be rediscovered and revived, a
longing and search which testify to the need of finding more
roots at a time when the acceleration of change destroys the
support as well as the constraints around which humanity
could find meaning. On the whole, however, Western Europe
seems to be worse off than either Japan or North America.

Western Europe 49

Japan still benefits from the existence of a huge capital of
collective capacity upon which it can rely. North America
does not have this capital of tradition; but even if it suffers
from some of the same problems Western Europe has to face,
it has had more time to learn, and it benefits from more slack
in its social and economic system which allows it to
experiment more easily. Western Europe has used up a lot
more of its own reserves than Japan and does not have the
learning experience and the learning capacity of the United
States. It should, therefore, be much more careful with
whatever resources is has and invest as much as it can to
develop them and learn new patterns of adjustment. It does
not have time to wait; it-must learn and learn as quickly as
possible. A purely defensive strategy would be suicidal
because the risk of regression is a very concrete one.

5. The Risks of Social and Political Regression

Western Europe has known already a tragic period of
regression when the chaotic and effervescent world born out
of World War I could' not face its tensions, especially those of
the depression, and when its needs for order were met by
recourse to the fascist and Nazi regressions. Fascism and
Nazism can be analyzed as a return to older forms of
authority to restore or impose the indispensable order. This
was associated with a sudden shift in patterns of behavior
reactivating those which were closer to earlier types.

Can Western Europe suffer another such setback?

Certainly not in the same form and in the same direction.
There is little left in the present core beliefs in which to find
support. There is no strong will, no sense of mission, no real
dedication to fight for the restoration of an earlier moral
order; there is not so much will to fight for capitalism or even
for free enterprise as such. No strong movement can be
expected therefore from a right-wing "reactionary"
background.

But regression can come also from the left for two

50 The Crisis of Democracy

converging reasons: The communist parties have emerged
more and more as the parties of order, whose leaders are the
only ones able to make people work, and there has always
been a very strong tendency to develop state socialism and
public bureaucracy interference as the easy solution to
manage the impossible, that is, to maintain order in the face
of unmanageable conflicts.

These affirmations may seem paradoxical. The communist
parties generally have lost ground or leveled off almost
everywhere in Western Europe. Their ideology does not have
the same appearance any more. It looks very much like a
routinized church whose charisma has at least partially
disappeared. Why should such sedate and moderate parties
be a threat to democracy just at the time they are beginning
.to respect its basic tenets?

The strength of the present communist parties of Western
Europe does not lie, however, either in their revolutionary
appeal or in their electoral capabilities. They must have
enough of them certainly. But their unique superiority is
their organizational one. They are the only institutions left in
Western Europe where authority is not questioned, where a
primitive but very efficient chain of command can
manipulate a docile workforce, where there is a capacity to
take hard decisions and adjust quickly, and where goods can
be delivered and delays respected.

Authority may be heavy-handed in these parties and the
close atmosphere they have maintained over their people has
certainly been a brake to their development. Turnover has
always been considerable. But granted these costs, their
machine has remained extraordinarily efficient and its super-
iority has tremendously increased when other major institu-
tions have begun to disintegrate. There is now no other
institution in Europe, not even the state bureaucracies, that
can match the communist parties' capabilities in this domain.

True enough, as long as the problem of order does not
become central, they are out of the game; but if chaos should

Western Europe 5 1

develop for a long enough time following a greater economic
depression, they can provide the last solution. Most European
countries have always had a very strong tradition of state
control and bureaucratic procedures to substitute for their
political systems' weaknesses. While bureaucracy may be
anathema for the majority of people in opinion polls, it is
still the easy solution for any kind of problem. This, of
course, may be more true for France and Britain, but it is
also true in the smaller countries and Germany, which, while
it has moved away from state socialism, still has a strong
tradition to which one can appeal.

For some of the Western countries the idea of
nationalization, after years of oblivion and little ideological
appeal, has become an issue again. In time of political chaos
and economic depression it may appear as the last recourse to
save employment and to equalize sacrifices. The communist
parties are certainly better trained to administer the resulting
confusion and to restore order to leaderless organizations.
They will win then not because of their appeal but by default
because the communists are the only ones capable of filling
the void.

They have already shown proof of their capabilities. For
instance they have shown remarkable efficiency in
administering various cities in Italy and France; they have
helped to restore order in Italian, French, and even German
universities; and they have shown everywhere, even in
Britain, how to influence key trade unions by using minority
control devices. Their potential, therefore, is much higher at
that level than it is at the electoral level or at the
revolutionary level. And because of this potential they can
attract experts and professionals of high caliber and also
increase their capabilities on the technical side.

Nevertheless, the communists do have problems. The most
pressing one is the danger of being contaminated by the
general trends of the societies in which they have to operate,
that is, to be unable to prevent the disintegration of their

52 The Crisis of Democracy

model of authority. This is why they take such great care to
maintain their revolutionary identity. They have been
protected by their minority ghetto-like status and as long as
they can maintain it, their hard core membership has so
deeply .internalized their so far successful practices that they
can stand the pressure of the environment for quite a long
time.

They have a difficult game to play, nevertheless. They
must be enough in to be present when high stakes are at
issue, while remaining sufficiently out to maintain their
organizational capacity. Their basic weakness lies in their
difficulty in respecting the freedom-from belief and their
incapacity to" accept dualism. Can they govern and control
societies whose core political beliefs are alien to them?
Wouldn't they trigger an extremely strong backlash? It is a
difficult question to answer because these societies are in the
midst of a deep cultural transformation which affects, with
the principles of rationality, the basis of their political
strategy.

Let us just suggest that if the takeover would be sudden,
an anticommunist backlash would be likely; but if the
breakdown would be intensive and profound but also
gradual, the communists coming to power could be very
difficult to question.

IV. CONCLUSIONS: EUROPEAN VULNERABILITY

This review of some of the major problems of
governability in Western Europe may suffer from an overly
pessimistic overtone. By focusing on the more intractable
problems one is easily led to overemphasize contradictions
and to give the misleading impression that breakdowns are
soon likely to occur.

To present a more balanced conclusion, we would put
these analyses in a more general perspective. The problems of
European societies are difficult to solve but they are not

Western Europe 53

intractable, and European societies, whatever their
weaknesses, do still possess a lot of resources that can be
mobilized when wanted. They have already shown during the
contemporary period considerable resilience and an
unexpected capacity to adapt, to adjust, and to invent. Right
now they still manage to maintain democratic stability
against very difficult odds. And during the past twenty years
they have carried through a very impressive mutation that
few observers would have trusted them to accomplish. If
there was no external constraint, there would be no reason to
believe they could not accomplish the second mutation that
seems necessary now- ._. .

The basic situation, therefore, that should concern us is
not so much the intractability of the problems and the
incapacity of the European societies to meet the challenge; it
is the vulnerability of Europe. Indeed, all European nations
have to live through the same impossible situation: They have
to carry through a basic mutation in their model of
government and their mode of social control while facing at
the same time a crisis from within and a crisis from without.

European nations have different capacities and some of
them at first glance seem more likely to succeed than others.
But none of them has the leeway and resources of the United
States or the collective capacity of action of Japan.
Furthermore, they are so interdependent that, while they can
help and emulate each other strongly, they are partially
dependent on the vulnerability of the weakest link in the
chain.

The crisis from within revolves, of course, basically around
economic and social instability. Inflation at the rate it has
reached increases the tensions it had alleviated formerly. Its
disruptive effects undermine the basis of the social bond
because of the loss of trust and the impossibility to plan
ahead. But too much deflation would force an impossible
reallocation of resources and/or raise unemployment to an
unacceptable level. Countries are therefore in an impossible

54 The Crisis of Democracy

vicious circle, which it is very difficult for them to break
without entering a deeper depression, and whose risks seem
impossible to accept in view of the fragility of their social
fabric.

Managing such a crisis imposes the need to give priority to
short-term considerations and makes it all the more difficult
to meet the more basic challenge of the necessary mutation
of social controls.

This is, of course, compounded by the consequences of the
crisis from without which is not only the crisis of energy and
the crisis of the balance of payments but the relative
situation of weakness of the European nations whose welfare
is for the ffrsf time directly dependent on outside pressures
from non-Western powers. Here again the failure of one or
two countries can be managed with the help of the strongest,
but if France, for example, would follow, the whole
European system would crumble.

In such a difficult situation, state socialism may appear to
be the easiest solution for some countries, especially the
Latin ones, since it would give workers guarantees and help
spread out employment. But such a course of action, a
possibility which must be taken very seriously, would trigger
a period of social chaos in which the communist parties
would play a decisive role because they would be the only
ones capable of bringing back order and efficiency. This
scenario, of course, could not apply to the whole of Europe,
but it could quickly spread to Italy, France, and Spain and
put unbearable pressure on Germany. At that time Finland-
ization would appear as the least evil.

Such a disastrous drifting of Western Europe is not
inevitable. It is not even likely, but the fact that the
possibility must be taken seriously is a measure of the present
vulnerability of Europe. To prevent it, European nations
should try to go beyond their present dire constraints and
face at the same time the challenges of the future.

First, they should try to accelerate the shift away from

Western Europe 55

their old model of fragmentation, stratification, secrecy, and
distance, which produced an acceptable balance between
democratic processes, bureaucratic authority, and some
aristocratic tradition, and experiment with more flexible
models that could produce more social control with less
coercive pressure. Such experimentation, which is bound to
succeed in the long run, looks dangerous in the present
vulnerable situation when we hesitate naturally to jeopardize
what remains of the old means of social control as long as
one is not sure of the quality of the new means. Innovation,
nevertheless, seems to be absolutely indispensable. It has to
be careful innovation^ but it is the only possible answer to
Europe's dilemma.

European nations should at the same time try to reorient
the trend of economic growth. They badly need to maintain
growth to prevent unemployment and an exacerbation of
social conflicts, but they cannot maintain the type of growth
of preceding years which has brought more and more costly
disruptions and can be considered one of the important
causes of inflation. A new emphasis on quality, on collective
amenities, on a more careful allocation of space is not
impossible. New goals for facing the future can be given
priority: modernizing the education process; improving
community and regional decision-making; establishing more
responsible information systems; radically changing working
conditions and restoring the status of manual work;
developing income maintenance programs; making public
bureaucracies responsible to the citizens and private
bureaucracies to the consumers.

The diverse background and history of the different
European nations can be viewed as an asset for such
endeavors since there exists among them a tremendous
reservoir of experience and of capable talents. European
interdependence, on the other hand, forces European nations
to face the impossible problem of unity. A united Europe
was for a long time the ideal dream to help maintain the drive

56 The Crisis of Democracy

to overcome the outdated modes of government that
prevailed in the national state systems. But the advocates of
European unity have stumbled too long on the obstacle of
the central states' nodal power, which the present crises have
reinforced even more, to maintain hope for the near future.
Investments in a European common capacity remain
nevertheless indispensable not only for Europe's sake but for
each country's capacity to overcome its own narrow
determinisms. Can they be made in view of the present
pressure? This may be the most difficult question. It may
certainly be helped in any case by a better appreciation in
the two other regions of the difficulty of their partners'
problem and by their willingness to help solve it.

NOTES

l.When asked what to do with a difficult problem a famous
contemporary French politician well known for his skillful use of the
system used to sum up this practice by saying, "Let's muddle it up a
little more."

2. This seems to be one basic weakness of the Lindblom model in
The Intelligence of Democracy: it does not give due attention to the
way the field in which adjustments take place is structured and
regulated. Sensible partisan mutual adjustments take place only within
fields which a minimum of structure and regulation has neutralized.
Chaos will only bring chaos. Good "partisan mutual adjustment"
systems are a construct, as is any kind of market.

3. See Alain Cottereau, "L'agglomeration parisienne au debut du,
siecle," Sociologie du Travail, 4, 1969, pp. 342-65.

4. To some extent Switzerland might be an interesting exception,
which is a lasting testimony to the exceptional strength of its
decentralized local decision-making system.

5. This proposition is very difficult to substantiate since each
country may rate differently on the diverse categories of a very
complex social universe. One can argue that class differences are still
stronger in Britain and Germany than in France. It seems however that
French institutions and organizational systems still rely more on

Western Europe 57

hierarchical mechanisms that their counterparts in Britain and
Germany. The crumbling of social barriers in any case has been more
spectacular in France and Italy in one of the key areas of modern
change, the universities. The influx of students in these two countries
has been much higher in the sixties than in Britain and Germany, with a
concomitant breakdown of social control.

6. This is certainly one of the reasons for the development of
inflation, which is the consequence of the disruption of traditional
social regulation as much as it is a cause of it.

7. One should, of course, add that the economic gains of blue-collar
workers in these countries have been comparatively much higher, but
there is no point opposing the two series of causes, which are
intertwined and do reinforce each other.

8. James Forrester was the first to use this formulation.

9. One may argue that they are eroded, but I personally feel that
they have fewer defenders because nobody attacks them and even more
because everybody agrees so much that they are taken for granted.

CHAPTER III

THE UNITED STATES*

Samuel P. Huntington

I. THE VITALITY AND GOVERNABILITY
OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY

The 1960s witnessed a dramatic renewal of the
democratic spirit in America. The predominant trends of that
decade involved the challenging of the authority of
established political, social, and economic institutions,
increased popular participation in and control over those
institutions, a reaction against the concentration of power in
the executive branch of the federal government and in favor
of the reassertion of the power of Congress and of state and
local government, renewed commitment to the idea of
equality on the part of intellectuals and other elites, the
emergence of "public interest" lobbying groups, increased
concern for the rights of and provision of opportunities for
minorities and women to participate in the polity and
economy, and a pervasive criticism of those who possessed or

*I am indebted to Kevin Middlebrook and Kenneth Juster for their
efficient help in the collection of material and data for this paper.

59

60 The Crisis of Democracy

were even thought to possess excessive power or wealth.*
The spirit of protest, the spirit of equality, the impulse to
expose and correct inequities were abroad in the land. The
themes of the 1960s were those of the Jacksonian Democra-
cy and the muckraking Progressives; they embodied ideas and
beliefs which were deep in the American tradition but which
usually do not command the passionate intensity of commit-
ment that they did in the 1 960s. That decade bore testimony
to the vitality of the democratic idea. It was a decade of
democratic surge and of the reassertion of democratic egali-
tarianism.

This democratic surge manifested itself in an almost
endless varietyof ways. Consider, for instance, simply a few
examples of this surge in terms of the two democratic norms
of participation and equality. Voting participation, which
had increased during the 1940s and 1950s, declined during
the 1960s, reaching lows of 55.6 percent in the 1972
presidential election and of 38 percent in the 1974 midterm
election. Almost all other forms of political participation,
however, saw a significant increase during the 1950s and
continuing into the 1960s. An index of campaign activity
(representing the mean number of campaign acts performed
each year) rose from a low of .58 in the 1952 election to a
peak of .83 in the 1960 election; thereafter, it declined
somewhat and leveled off, registering .69 in 1962, .77 in
1964, .73 in 1968, returning to its previous high of .83 in
1970, and then dropping to .73 in 1972. l The overall picture

*In addition to these democratic trends, and often interspersed with
them there were also, of course, some markedly antidemocratic trends
in the 1960s: elitist discrimination against middle-class groups (ration-
alized in the name of egalitarianism); the suppression of free speech
(particularly on university campuses); and the resort by extremist
minorities to physical coercion and violence. These activities formed,
in a sense, the dark outriders of the democratic surge, swept up in the
same sense of movement, but serving different goals with very different
means.

The United States 61

is one of a sharp increase in campaign activity in the 1950s
following which it remained on a high plateau in the 1 960s.
The Goldwater, McCarthy, Wallace, and McGovern
candidacies mobilized unprecented numbers of volunteer
campaign workers. In addition, the Republicans in 1962 and
the Democrats subsequently launched a series of major
efforts to raise a substantial portion of their campaign funds
from large numbers of small givers. In 1972 Nixon and
McGovern each collected $ 1 3 million to $ 1 5 million in small
amounts from over 500,000 contributors.

The 1960s also saw, of course, a marked upswing in other
forms of citizen participation, in the form of marches,
demonstrations, protest movements, and "cause"
organizations (such as Common Cause, Nader groups, and
environmental groups.) The expansion of participation
throughout society was reflected in the markedly higher
levels of self-consciousness on the part of blacks, Indians,
Chicanos, white ethnic groups, students, and women — all of
whom became mobilized and organized in new ways to
achieve what they considered to be their appropriate share of
the action and of the rewards. The results of their efforts
were testimony to the ability of the American political
system to respond to the pressures of newly active groups, to
assimilate those groups into the political system, and to
incorporate members of those groups into the political
leadership structure. Blacks and women made impressive
gains in their representation in state legislatures and Congress,
and in 1974 the voters elected one woman and two Chicano
governors. In a similar vein, there was a marked expansion of
white-collar unionism and of the readiness and willingness for
clerical, technical, and professional employees in public and
private bureaucracies to assert themselves and to secure
protection for their rights and privileges. Previously passive or
unorganized groups in the population now embarked on
concerted efforts to establish their claims to opportunities,
positions, rewards, and privileges, which they had not

62 The Crisis of Democracy

considered themselves entitled to before.

In a related and similar fashion, the 1960s also saw a
reassertion of the primacy of equality as a goal in social,
economic, and political life. The meaning of equality and the
means, of achieving it became central subjects of debate in
intellectual and policy-oriented circles. What was widely
hailed as the major philosophical treatise of the decade
(Rawls, A Theory of Justice) defined justice largely in terms
of equality. Differences in wealth and power were viewed
with increased skepticism. The classic issue of equality of
opportunity versus equality of results was reopened for
debate. The prevailing preoccupation with equality was well
revealed in the titles of books produced by social theorists
and sociologists over the course of three or four years/2 This
intellectual concern over equality did not, of course, easily
transmit itself into widespread reduction of inequality in
society. But the dominant thrust in political and social action
was all clearly in that direction.

The causes of this democratic surge of the 1960s could
conceivably be: (a) either permanent or transitory; (b)
either peculiar to the United States or more generally
pervasive throughout the advanced industrialized world. The
surge might, for instance, be the result of long-term social,
economic, and cultural trends which were producing
permanent changes in American society (often subsumed
under the heading of the "emergence of post-industrial
society") and which would in due course equally affect other
advanced industrialized countries. Or it could have been the
product of rapid social and cultural change or upheaval in the
1960s which in itself was transitory and whose political
consequences would hence eventually fade, that is, it could
have been the product of a transitory process of change
rather than the product of the lasting results of change (e.g.,
the rapid expansion of higher education enrollments in the
1960s rather than the resulting high level of enrollment in
higher education). In addition, given the similarities which

The United States 63

appeared to exist between the political temper and
movements of the 1960s and earlier periods in American
history, it is possible that the surge could have reflected a
peculiarly American dynamic working itself out on a
recurring or cyclical basis. On the other hand, it is also
possible that the sources for the democratic surge were in a
transient yet general crisis of the industrialized world which
manifested itself in comparable if different ways in other
Trilateral countries. Or, of course, most probable in fact and
least satisfying in theory, the surge could be the product of a
mixture of factors, permanent and transitory, specific and
general.

"In framing a government which is to be administered by
men over men," observed James Madison in The Federalist,
no. 51, "the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable
the government to control the governed; and in the next
place oblige it to control itself." To assume that there is no
conflict between these two requirements is sheer
self-delusion. To assume that it is impossible to reach a rough
balance between these two requirements is unrealistic
pessimism. The maintenance of that balance is, indeed, what
constitutional democracy is all about. Over the centuries, the
United States has probably been more successful than any
other government in combining governmental authority and
limits on that authority in an effective manner appropriate to
the environment, domestic and external, in which that
government has operated. Views as to what constitutes the
precise desirable balance between power and liberty,
authority and democracy, government and society obviously
differ. In fact, the actual balance shifts from one historical
period to another. Some fluctuation in the balance is not
only acceptable but may be essential to the effective
functioning of constitutional democracy. At the same time,
excessive swings may produce either too much government or
too little authority. The democratic surge of the 1960s raised
once again in dramatic fashion the issue of whether the

64 The Crisis of Democracy

pendulum had swung too far in one direction.

The consequences of that surge will be felt for years to
come. The analysis here focuses on the immediate -r- and
somewhat contradictory — effects of the democratic surge on
government. The basic point is this: The vitality of
democracy in the United States in the 1960s produced a
substantial increase in governmental activity and a substantial
decrease in governmental authority. By the early 1970s
Americans were progressively demanding and receiving more
benefits from their government and yet having less
confidence in their government than they had a decade
earlier. And paradoxically, also, this working out of the
democratic impulse was associated with the shift in the
relative balance in the political system between the decline of
the more political, interest-aggregating, "input" institutions
of government (most notably, political parties and the
presidency), on the one hand, and the growth in the
bureaucratic, regulating and implementing, "output"
institutions of government, on the other. The vitality of
democracy in the 1960s raised questions about the
governability of democracy in the 1970s. The expansion of
governmental activities produced doubts about the economic
solvency of government; the decrease in governmental au-
thority produced doubts about the political solvency of gov-
ernment. The impulse of democracy is to make government
less powerful and more active, to increase its functions, and
to decrease its authority. The questions to be discussed are:
How deep are these trends? How can these seemingly contra-
dictory courses be reconciled within the framework of the
existing political system? If a balance is to be restored be-
tween governmental activity and governmental authority,
what are the consequences of this restoration for the demo-
cratic surge and movement of the 1960s? Does an increase in
the vitality of democracy necessarily have to mean a decrease
in the governability of democracy?

The United States 65

II. THE EXPANSION OF GOVERNMENTAL ACTIVITY

The structure of governmental activity in the United
States — in terms of both its size and its content — went
through two major changes during the quarter-century after
World War II. The first change, the Defense Shift, was a
response to the external Soviet threat of the 1940s; the
second change, the Welfare Shift, was a response to the
internal democratic surge of the 1960s. The former was
primarily the product of elite leadership; the latter was
primarily the result of popular expectations and group
demands.

The year 1948 is an appropriate starting point for the
analysis of these changes in the structure of governmental
activity.* By that time governmental activity had adjusted
from its wartime levels and forms; demobilization had been
completed; the nation was setting forth on a new peacetime
course. In that year, total governmental expenditures
(federal, state, and local) amounted to 20 percent of GNP;
national defense expenditures were 4 percent of GNP; and
governmental purchases of goods and services were 12
percent of GNP. During the next five years these figures
changed drastically. The changes were almost entirely due to
the onslaught of the Cold War and the perception eventually

*In this analysis, governmental activity will be measured primarily in
terms of governmental expenditures. This indicator, of course, does not
do justice to many types of governmental activity, such as regulatory
action or the establishment of minimum standards (e.g., for automotive
safety or pollution levels or school desegregation), which have major
impact on the economy and society and yet do not cost very much. In
addition, the analysis here will focus primarily not on absolute levels of
governmental expenditures, which obviously expanded greatly both due
to inflation and in real terms, but rather to the relations among
expenditures, revenues, and the GNP and among different types of
expenditures.

66 The Crisis of Democracy

shared by the top executives of the government — Truman,
Acheson, Forrestal, Marshall, Harriman, and Lovett — that a
major effort was required to counter the Soviet threat to the
security of the West. The key turning points in the
development of that perception included Soviet pressure on
Greece and Turkey, the Czech coup, the Berlin blockade, the
communist conquest of China, the Soviet atomic explosion,
and the North Korean attack on South Korea. In late 1949, a
plan for major rearmament to meet this threat was drawn up
within the executive branch. The top executive leaders,
however, felt that neither Congress nor public opinion was
ready to accept such a large-scale military buildup. These
political obstacles were removed by the outbreak of the
Korean war in June 1950.3

The result was a major expansion in the U.S. military
forces and a drastic reshaping of the structure of
governmental expenditures and activity. By 1953 national
defense expenditures had gone up from their 1948 level of
$10.7 billion to $48.7 billion. Instead of 4 percent of GNP,
they now constituted over 13 percent of GNP. Nondefense
expenditures remained stable at 15 percent of GNP, thus
making overall governmental expenditures 28 percent of GNP
(as against 20 percent in 1948) and government purchases of
goods and services 22 percent of GNP (as against 12 percent
in 1948). The governmental share of the output of the
American economy, in short, increased by about 80 percent
during these five years, virtually all of it in the national
defense sector.

With the advent of the Eisenhower administration and the
end of the Korean war, these proportions shifted somewhat
and then settled into a relatively fixed pattern of
relationships, which remained markedly stable for over a
decade. From 1954 to 1966, governmental expenditures were
usually about 27 percent or 28 percent of GNP; governmental
purchases of goods and services varied between 19 percent
and 22 percent; and defense expenditures, with the exception

The United States 67

Table 1

Governmental Spending in Relation to GNP

All Govt. Defense Nondefense Purchase of Goods

Year Expenditures Expenditures Expenditures and Services

1948

20%

4%

16%

12%

1953

28

13

15

22

1960

27

9

18

20

1965

27

7

20

20

1971

32

7

25

22

1973 32 6 26 21

1974* 33 6 27 22

Source: Economic Report of the President, 1975 (Washington: Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1975).

*Preliminary.

of a brief dip in 1964 and 1965, were almost constantly
stable at 9 percent to 10 percent of GNP. The basic pattern
for this period was in effect:

Percent

of GNP

Governmental expenditures

28

Defense expenditures

9

Nondefense expenditures

19

Governmental purchases of
goods and services 21

68 The Crisis of Democracy

In the mid-1960s, however, the stability of this pattern
was seriously disrupted. The Vietnam war caused a minor
disruption, re/ersing the downward trend in the defense
proportion of GNP visible in 1964 and 1965 and temporarily
restoring defense to 9 percent of GNP. The more significant
and lasting change was the tremendous expansion of the
nondefense activities of government. Between 1965 and
1974, total governmental expenditures rose from 27 percent
to 33 percent of GNP; governmental purchases of goods and
services, on the other hand, which had also increased
simultaneously with total expenditures between 1948 and
1953, changed only modestly from 20 percent in 1965 to 22
percent in 1974. This difference meant, of course, that a
substantial proportion of the increase in governmental
spending was in the form of transfer payments; for example,
welfare and social security benefits, rather than additional
governmental contributions to the Gross National Product.
Nondefense expenditures, which had been 20 percent of GNP
in 1965, were 25 percent of GNP in 1971 and an estimated 27
percent of GNP in 1974. Defense spending went down to 7
percent of GNP in 1971 and 6 percent in 1974. Back in
1948, defense spending had been less than 20 percent of total
governmental spending. At the peak of the defense build-up
in 1953 it amounted to 46 percent of the total, and during
the long period of stable relationships in the 1950s and
1960s, defense accounted for about 33 percent of total
governmental spending. Under the impact of the Welfare
Shift of the late 1960s, however, the defense proportion of
total governmental spending again dropped down to less than
one-fifth of total governmental spending, that is, to the
relationship which had prevailed in 1 948 before the military
implications of the Cold War had become evident.

The extent of the Welfare Shift in the scope and substance
of governmental activity can also be seen by comparing the
changes in governmental expenditures during the two decades
of the 1950s and 1960s. Between 1950 and 1960, total

The United States 69

governmental expenditures rose by $81.0 billion, of which
$29.1 billion or roughly 36 percent was for defense and
international relations. Between 1960 and 1971, govern-
mental expenditures increased by $218.1 billion, of which,
however, only $33.4 billion or roughly 15 percent were
accounted for by defense and international relations, while
expenditures for domestic programs grew by $184.7 billion.
This growth in domestic spending is also reflected in a change
in the relative shares of federal, state, and local governments

Table 2

Governmental Revenues and Expenditures for Major Functions
(billions of dollars)

1950 1960 1965 1970 1971 1972

Total Revenues $66.7 $153.1 $202.6 $333.8 $342.5 $381.8

Total Expenditures 70.3 151.3 205.6 333.0 369.4 397.4

Defense and International 18.4 47.5 55.8 84.3 80.9 79.3

Education 9.6 19.4 29.6 55.8 64.0 70.0

OASI and Other Insurance .7 10.8 16.6 35.8 42.0 46.9

Interest on General Debt 4.9 9.3 11.4 18.4 21.7 23.1

Public Welfare 3.0 4.5 6.4 17.5 20.4 23.6

Health and Hospitals 2.8 5.2 7.7 13.6 14.8 17.0

Natural Resources 5.0 8.4 11.0 11.5 13.7 14.2

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United

States: 1974 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 246.

70 The Crisis of Democracy

in total governmental expenditures. In 1960 the federal
government share of total government spending, 59.7 per-
cent, was virtually identical with what it had been ten years
earlier, 60.3 percent. By 1971, 4he relative growth in state
and local spending had dropped the federal share of
governmental expenditures down to 53.8 percent of total
governmental expenditures.4

The major increases in government spending during the
1960s occurred in education, social security and related
insurance benefits, public welfare, interest on the public
debt, health, and hospitals. In 1960, government at all levels
in the United States spent about 125 percent more for
defense than it did for education; in 1972 it spent less than
15 percent more. In 1960, defense spending was about
four-and-a-half times that for social security ; in 1 972 it was less
than twice as much. In 1960 ten times as much was spent on
defense as on welfare; in 1972 the ratio was less than four to
one. Even in terms of federal government spending alone, the
same trends. were visible. In FY 1960, total foreign affairs
spending accounted for 53.7 percent of the federal budget,
while expenditures for cash income maintenance accounted
for 22.3 percent. In FY 1974, according to Brookings
Institution estimates, almost equal amounts were spent for
both these purposes, with foreign affairs taking 33 percent
and cash income maintenance 31 percent of the federal
budget.5 Across the board, the tendency was for massive
increases in governmental expenditures to provide cash and
benefits for particular individuals and groups within society
rather than in expenditures designed to serve national
purposes vis-a-vis the external environment.

The Welfare Shift, like the Defense Shift before it,
underlined the close connection between the structure of
governmental activity and the trend of public opinion.
During the 1940s and early 1950s, the American public
willingly approved massive programs for defense and
international affairs. When queried on whether the military

The United States 71

budget or the size of the armed forces should be increased,
decreased, or remain about the same, the largest proportions
of the public almost consistently supported a greater military
effort. In March 1950, for instance, before the Korean war
and the NSC 68 rearmament effort, 64 percent of the public
thought defense spending should be increased, 7 percent
thought it should be decreased and 24 percent thought it
should remain about the same. These figures were typical
results of the early years of the Cold War. During the middle
and later 1950s, after defense spending had in fact expanded
greatly, support for still further expansion eased somewhat.
But even then, only _a small minority of the public supported
a decrease, with the largest group approving the existing level
of defense effort. Popular support for other government
programs, including all domestic programs and foreign aid,'
almost always was substantially less than support for defense
spending.6

During the mid-1960s, at the peak of the democratic surge
and of the Vietnam war, public opinion on these issues
changed drastically. When asked in 1960, for instance, how
they felt about current defense spending, 1 8 percent of the
public said the United States was spending too much on
defense, 21 percent said too little, and 45 percent said the
existing level was about right. Nine years later, in July 1969,
the proportion of the public saying that too much was being
spent on defense had zoomed up from 18 percent to 52
percent; the proportion thinking that too little was being
spent on defense had dropped from 2 1 percent to 8 percent
and the proportion approving the current level had declined
from 45 percent to 3 1 percent. This new pattern of opinion
on defense remained relatively stable during the late 1960s
and early 1970s. Simultaneously, public opinion became
more favorable to governmental spending for domestic
programs. When polled in 1974, for instance, on whether
spending should be increased, decreased, or remain about the
same for some twenty-three governmental programs, the

72 The Crisis of Democracy

composite scores (where 50 represents maintaining the
existing level) for domestic programs were all in favor of an
increase* ranging from a score of 5 1 for welfare programs for
low income families up to scoresof 84 and 86 for helping the
elderly and developing greater self-sufficiency in energy. All
five foreign affairs programs rated much lower than any
domestic program, with their scores ranging from 39 for total
defense spending down to 20 for military aid for allies. For
every foreign affairs program, the weight of opinion was thus
in favor of reduced rather than higher spending. The overall
average score for domestic programs was 70, and for foreign
policy and defense programs it was only 29. 7 During the
1960s, a dramatic and large-scale change thus took place in
public opinion with respect to governmental activity.

So far, our analysis has focused on the relations between
governmental expenditures and GNP and between different
types of expenditures. The growth in expenditures, however,
also raises important issues concerning the relation between
expenditures and revenues. After the Defense Shift, during
the 1950s and early 1960s, governmental expenditures
normally exceeded governmental revenue, but with one
exception (1959, when the deficit was $15 billion), the gap
between the two was not large in any single year. In the late
1960s, on the other hand, after the fiscal implications of the
Welfare Shift had been felt, the overall governmental deficit
took on new proportions. In 1968 it was $17 billion and in
1971 $27 billion. The cumulative deficit for the five years
from 1968 through 1971 was $43 billion. The federal
government was, of course, the principal source of the
overall government deficit. In nine of the ten fiscal years
after 1965 the federal budget showed a deficit; the total
deficit for those ten years came to an estimated $111.8
billion, of which $74.6 billion came in the five years for FY
1971 through FY 1975.8

The excess of expenditures over revenues was obviously
one major source of the inflation which plagued the United

The United States 73

States, along with most other industrial countries, in the
early 1970s. Inflation was, in effect, one way of paying for
the new forms of government activity produced by the
Welfare Shift. The extent of the fiscal gap, its apparent
inevitability and intractableness, and its potentially
destabilizing effects were sufficiently ominous for the
existing system to generate a new variety of Marxist analysis
of the inevitable collapse of capitalism. "The fiscal crisis of
the capitalist state," in James O'Connor's words, "is the
inevitable consequence of the structural gap between state
expenditures and revenues." As Daniel Bell suggests, in
effect, the argument represents a neo-neo-Marxism : The
original Marxism said the capitalist crisis would result from
anarchical competition; neo-Marxism said it would be the
result of war and war expenditures, the garrison state; now,
the most recent revision, taking into consideration the
Welfare Shift, identifies the expansion of social expenditures
as the source of the fiscal crisis of capitalism.9 What the
Marxists mistakenly attribute to capitalist economics, how-
ever, is, in fact, a product of democratic politics.

The Defense Shift involved a major expansion of the
national effort devoted to military purposes followed by
slight reduction and stabilization of the relation of that
activity to total national product. The Welfare Shift has
produced a comparable expansion and redirection of
governmental activity. The key question is: To what extent
will this expansion be limited in scope and time, as was the
defense expansion, or to what extent will it be an
open-ended, continuing phenomenon? Has nondefense
governmental spending peaked at about 27 percent of GNP?
Or will it increase further or, conceivably, decrease? The
beneficiaries of governmental largesse coupled with
governmental employees constitute a substantial portion of
the public. Their interests clearly run counter to those groups
in the public which receive relatively little in cash benefits
from the government but must contribute taxes to provide

74 The Crisis of Democracy

governmental payments to other groups in society. On the
one hand, history suggests that the recipients of subsidies,
particularly producer groups, have more specific interests, are
more self-conscious and organized, and are better able to
secure .access to the political decision points than the more
amorphous, less well-organized, and more diffuse taxpaying
and consumer interests. On the other hand, there is also some
evidence that the conditions favorable to large-scale
governmental programs, which existed in the 1960s, may
now be changing significantly. The political basis of the
Welfare Shift was the expansion in political participation and
the intensified commitment to democratic and egalitarian
norms which existed in the 1960s. Levels of political
participation in campaigns have leveled off, and other forms
of political participation would appear to have declined.
Some polls suggest that the public has become more
conservative in its attitudes towards government generally
and more hostile towards the expansion of governmental
activity. In 1972, for instance, for the first time, as many
liberals as conservatives agreed with the proposition that
government is too big. At the same time, liberals continued
to be heavily in favor of new government programs, such as
national health insurance, which conservatives opposed. If,
however, the general skepticism about what government can
accomplish remains a significant component of public
opinion, the pattern of governmental activity which the
Welfare Shift produced by the early 1970s could well remain
relatively stable for the immediate future.

III. THE DECLINE IN GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY
1. The Democratic Challenge to Authority

The essence of the democratic surge of the 1960s was a
general challenge to existing systems of authority, public and
private. In one form or another, this challenge manifested

The United States 75

itself in the family, the university, business, public and
private associations, politics, the governmental bureaucracy,
and the military services. People no longer felt the same
compulsion to obey those whom they had previously
considered - superior to themselves in age, rank, status,
expertise, character, or talents. Within most organizations,
discipline eased and differences in status became blurred.
Each group claimed its right to participate equally— and
perhaps more than equally— in the decisions which affected
itself. More precisely, in American society, authority had
been commonly based on: organizational position, economic
wealth, specialized expertise, legal competence, or electoral
representativeness. Authority based on hierarchy, expertise,
and wealth all, obviously, ran counter to the democratic and
egalitarian temper of the times, and during the 1960s, all three
came under heavy attack. In the university, students who
lacked expertise, came to participate in the decision-making
process on many important issues. In the government,
organizational hierarchy weakened, and organizational sub-
ordinates more readily acted to ignore, to criticize, or to
defeat the wishes of their organizational superiors. In politics
generally, the authority of wealth was challenged and
successful efforts made to introduce reforms to expose and
to limit its influence. Authority derived from legal and
electoral sources did not necessarily run counter to the spirit
of the times, but when it did, it too was challenged and
restricted. The commandments of judges and the actions of
legislatures were legitimate to the extent that they promoted,
as they often did, egalitarian and participatory goals. "Civil
disobedience," after all, was the claim to be morally right in
disobeying a law which was morally wrong. It implied that
the moral value of law-abiding behavior in a society depended
upon what was in the laws, not on the procedural due pro-
cess by which they were enacted. Finally, electoral legitimacy
was, obviously, more congruent with the democratic surge,
but even so, it too at times was questioned, as the value of

76 The Crisis of Democracy

"categorical" representativeness was elevated to challenge the
principle of electoral representativeness.

The questioning of authority pervaded society. In politics,
it manifested itself in a decline in public confidence and trust
in political leaders and institutions, a reduction in the power
and effectiveness of political institutions such as the political
parties and presidency, a new importance for the "adversary"
media and "critical" intelligentsia in public affairs, and a
weakening of the coherence, purpose, and self-confidence of
political leadership.

2. Decline in Public Confidence and Trust

In a democracy, the authority of governmental leaders and
institutions presumably depends in part on the extent to
which the public has confidence and trust in those
institutions and leaders. During the 1960s that confidence
and trust declined markedly in the United States. That
decline can, in turn, be related back to a somewhat earlier
tendency towards ideological and policy polarization which,
in turn, had its roots in the expansion of political
participation in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The
democratic surge involved a more politically active citizenry,
which developed increased ideological consistency on public
issues, and which then lost its confidence in public institu-
tions and leaders when governmental policies failed to
correspond to what they desired. The sequence and direction
of these shifts in public opinion dramatically illustrates how
the vitality of democracy in the 1960s (as manifested in
increased political participation) produced problems for the
governability of democracy in the 1970s (as manifested in
the decreased public confidence in government).

During the 1960s public opinion on major issues of public
policy tended to become more polarized and ideologically
structured, that is, people tended to hold more consistent
liberal or conservative attitudes on public policy issues.

The United States 11

Between 1956 and 1960, for instance, an index of ideological
consistency for the average American voter hovered about
.15; in 1964 it more than doubled to .40 and remained at
similar levels through 1972.10 Thus, the image of American
voters as. independently and pragmatically making up their
minds in ad hoc fashion on the merits of different issues
became rather far removed from actuality.

This pattern of developing polarization and ideological
consistency had its roots in two factors. First, those who are
more active in politics are also more likely to have consistent
and systematic views on policy issues. The increase in
political participation in the early 1960s was thus followed
by heightened polarization of political opinion in the
mid-1960s. The increase in polarization, in turn, often
involved higher levels of group consciousness (as among
blacks) which then stimulated more political participation (as
in the white backlash).

Second, the polarization was clearly related to the nature
of the issues which became the central items on the political
agenda of the mid-1960s. The three major clusters of issues
which then came to the fore were: social issues, such as use
of drugs, civil liberties, and the role of women; racial issues,
involving integration, busing, government aid to minority
groups, and urban riots;- military issues, involving primarily,
of course, the war in Vietnam but also the draft, military
spending, military aid programs, and the role of the
military-industrial complex more generally. All three sets of
issues, but particularly the social and racial issues, tended to
generate high correlations between the stands which people
took on individual issues and their overall political ideology.
On more strictly economic issues, on the other hand,
ideology was a much less significant factor. Thus, to predict
positions of individuals on the legalization of marijuana or
school integration or the size of the defense budget, one
would want to ask them whether they considered themselves
liberals, moderates, or conservatives. To predict their stand

78 The Crisis of Democracy

on federally financed health insurance, one should ask them
whether they were Democrats, Independents, or Re-
publicans.11

The polarization over issues in the mid-1 960s in part, at
least, .explains the major decline in trust and confidence in
government of the later 1960s. Increasingly, substantial
portions of the American public took more extreme positions
on policy issues; those who took more extreme positions on
policy issues, in turn, tended to become more distrustful of
government.12 Polarization over issues generated distrust
about government, as those who had strong positions on
issues became dissatisfied with the ambivalent, compromising
policies of government. Political leaders, in effect, alienated
more and more people by attempting to please them through
the time-honored traditional politics of compromise.

At the end of the 1950s, for instance, about three-quarters
of the American people thought that their government was
run primarily for the benefit of the people and only 17
percent thought that it primarily responded to what "big
interests" wanted. These proportions steadily changed during
the 1960s, stabilizing at very different levels in the early
1970s. By the latter half of 1972, only 38 percent of the
population thought that government was "run for the benefit
of all the people" and a majority of 53 percent thought that
it was "run by a few big interests looking out for
themselves." (See Table 3.) In 1959, when asked what they
were most proud of about their country, 85 percent of
Americans (as compared to 46 percent of Britons, 30 percent
of Mexicans, 7 percent of Germans, and 3 percent of Italians,
in the same comparative survey) mentioned their "political
institutions." By 1973, however, 66 percent of a national
sample of Americans said that they were dissatisfied by the
way in which their country was governed.13 In similar
fashion, in 1958, 71 percent of the population felt that they
could trust the government in Washington to do what was
right "all" or "most" of the time, while only 23 percent said

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80 The Crisis of Democracy

that they could trust it only "some" or "none" of the time.
By late 1972, however, the percentage which would trust the
national government to do what was right all or most of the
time had declined to 52 percent, while that which thought it
would do what was right only some or none of the time had
doubled to 45 percent. (See Table 4.) Again, the pattern of
change shows a high level of confidence in the 1 950s, a sharp
decline of confidence during the 1960s, and a leveling off at
much reduced levels of confidence in the early 1970s.

The precipitous decline in public confidence in their
leaders in the latter part of the 1 960s and the leveling off or
partial restoration of confidence in the early 1970s can also
be seen in other data which permit a comparison between
attitudes towards government and other major institutions in
society. Between 1966 and 1971 the proportion of the
population having a "great deal of confidence" in the leaders
of each of the major governmental institutions was cut in
half. (See Table 5.) By 1973, however, public confidence in
the leadership of the Congress, the Supreme Court, and the
military had begun to be renewed from the lows of two years
earlier. Confidence in the leadership of the executive branch,
on the other hand, was— not surprisingly— at its lowest point.
These changes of attitudes toward governmental leadership
did not occur in a vacuum but were part of a general
weakening of confidence in institutional leadership. The
leadership of the major nongovernmental institutions in
society who had enjoyed high levels of public confidence in
the mid-1960s— such as large corporations, higher educational
institutions and medicine— also suffered a somewhat similar
pattern of substantial decline and partial recovery.
Significantly, only the leadership of the press and television
news enjoyed more confidence in 1973 than they had in
1966, and only in the case of television was the increase a
substantial and dramatic one. In 1973, the institutional
leaders in which the public had the greatest degree of
confidence were, in declining order of confidence: medicine,

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82 The Crisis of Democracy

higher education, television news, and the military.

The late 1960s and early 1970s also saw a significant
decline from the levels of the mid-1960s in the sense of
political efficacy on the part of" large numbers of people. In
1966, for instance, 37 percent of the people believed that
what they thought "doesn't count much anymore"; in 1973
a substantial majority of 61 percent of the people believed
this. Similarly, in 1960 42 percent of the American public
scored "high" on a political efficacy index developed by the
Michigan Survey Research Center and only 28 percent of the
population scored "low." By 1968, however, this distribution
had changed dramatically, with 38 percent of the people
scoring "high" and 44 percent of the population scoring
"low."14 This decline in political efficacy coincided with and
undoubtedly was closely related to the simultaneous decline
in the confidence and trust which people had in government.
As of the early 1970s, however, the full impact of this change
in political efficacy upon the overall level of political
participation had only partially begun to manifest itself.

In terms of traditional theory about the requisites for a
viable democratic polity, these trends of the 1960s thus end
up as a predominantly negative but still mixed report. On the
one side, there is the increasing distrust and loss of confidence
in government, the tendencies towards the polarization of
opinion, and the declining sense of political efficacy. On the
other, there is the early rise in political participation over
previous levels. As we have suggested, these various trends
may well all be interrelated. The increases in participation
first occurred in the 1950s; these were followed by the
polarization over racial, social, and military issues in the
mid-1960s; this, in turn, was followed by the decrease in
confidence and trust in government and individual political
efficacy in the late 1960s. There is reason to believe that this
sequence was not entirely accidental.15 Those who are active
in politics are likely to have more systematic and consistent
views on political issues, and those who have such views are,

The United States

83

Table 5

Proportion of Public Expressing "Great Deal of Confidence"
in Leadership of Institutions

Change
1966 1971 1972 1973 1966-73

Government
Federal executive

41% 23% 27% 19%

-22

Congress

42

19

21

29

-13

Supreme Court

51

23

28

33

-18

Military

62

27

35

40

-22

Social Institutions

Major companies

55

27

27

29

-26

Organized labor

22

14

15

20

- 2

Higher education

61

27

33

44

-17

Medicine

72

61

48

57

-15

Organized religion

41

27

30

36

- 5

Media
Press

29

18

18

30

+ 1

Television news

25

22

17

41

+16

Question: As far as people running these institutions are concerned,
•would you say you have a great deal of confidence, only
some confidence, or hardly any confidence in them?

Source: Louis Harris and Associates, Confidence and Concern: Citizens
View American Government. Committee Print, U.S. Senate,
Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on Inter-
governmental Relations, 93rd Congress, 1st Session, December 3, 1973.

84 The Crisis of Democracy

as we have shown above, likely to become alienated if
government action does not reflect their views. This logic
would also suggest that those who are most active politically
should be most dissatisfied with the political system. In the
past, exactly the reverse has been the case: the active political
participants have had highly positive attitudes towards
government and policies. Now, however, this relationship
seems to be weakening, and those who have low trust in
government are no more likely to be politically apathetic
than those with high trust in government.16

The decline in the average citizen's sense of political
efficacy could also produce a decline in levels of political
participation. Tri fact, the presidential election of 1972 did
see a substantial decline in the level of reported interest in
the election and a leveling off of citizen campaign activity as
compared to the levels in the 1968 election.17 There is, thus,
some reason to think that there may be a cyclical process of
interaction in which:

(1) Increased political participation leads to increased
policy polarization within society;

(2) Increased policy polarization leads to increasing
distrust and a sense of decreasing political efficacy
among individuals;

(3) A sense of decreasing political efficacy leads to
decreased political participation.

In addition, change in the principal issues on the political
agenda could lead to decreasing ideological polarization. The
fire has subsided with respect to many of the heated issues
of the 1960s, and, at the moment, they have been displaced
on the public agenda by overwhelming preoccupation with
economic issues, first inflation and then recession and
unemployment. The positions of people on economic issues,
however, are not as directly related to their basic ideological
inclinations as their positions on other issues. In addition,
inflation and unemployment are like crime; no one is in favor
of them, and significant differences can only appear if there

The United States 85

are significantly different alternative programs for dealing
with them. Such programs, however, have been slow in
materializing; hence, the salience of economic issues may give
rise to generalized feelings of lack of confidence in the
political system but not to dissatisfaction rooted in the
failure of government to follow a particular set of policies.
Such generalized alienation could, in turn, reinforce
tendencies towards political passivity engendered by the
already observable decline in the sense of political efficacy.
This suggests that the democratic surge of the 1 960s could
well generate its own countervailing forces, that an upsurge
of political participation produces conditions which favor a
downswing in political participation.

3. The Decay of the Party System

The decline in the role of political parties in the United
States in the 1960s can be seen in a variety of ways.

(a) Party identification has dropped sharply, and the
proportion of the public which considers itself Independent
in politics has correspondingly increased. In 1972 more
people identified themselves as Independent than identified
themselves as Republican, and among those under thirty,
there were more Independents than Republicans and
Democrats combined. Younger voters always tend to be less
partisan than older voters. But the proportion of
Independents among this age group has gone up sharply. In
1950, for instance, 28 percent of the twenty-one to twenty-
nine-year-old group identified themselves as Independent; in
1971, 43 percent of this age group did.18 Thus, unless there
is a reversal of this trend and a marked upswing in partisan-
ship, substantially lower levels of party identification among
the American electorate are bound to persist for at least
another generation.

(b) Party voting has declined, and ticket-splitting has
become a major phenomenon. In 1950 about 80 percent of

86 The Crisis of Democracy

the voters cast straight party ballots; in 1970 only 50 percent
did.19 Voters are thus more inclined to vote for the
candidate than to vote for the party, and this, in turn, means
that candidates have to campaign primarily as individuals and
sell themselves to the voters in terms of their own personality
and talents, rather than joining with the other candidates of
their party in a collaborative partisan effort. Hence they must
also raise their own money and create their own organization.
The phenomenon represented at the extreme by CREEP and
its isolation from the Republican National Committee in the
1972 election is being duplicated in greater or lesser measure
in other electoral contests.

(c) Partisan consistency in voting is also decreasing, that is,
voters are more likely to vote Republican in one election and
Democratic in the next. At the national level, there is a
growing tendency for public opinion to swing generally back
and forth across the board, with relatively little regard to the
usual differences among categorical voting groups. Four out
of the six presidential elections since 1952 have been
landslides. This phenomenon is a product of the weakening
of party ties and the decline of regionalism in politics. In
1920 Harding received about the same percentage of the
popular vote that Nixon did in 1972, but Harding lost eleven
states while Nixon lost only Massachusetts and the District of
Columbia.20 In a similar vein, the fact that the voters cast 60
percent of their votes for Nixon in 1972 did not prevent
them from reelecting a Democratic Congress that year and
then giving the Democrats an even more overwhelming
majority in Congress two years later.

As the above figures suggest, the significance of party as a
guide to electoral behavior has declined substantially. In part,
but only in part, candidate appeal took its place. Even more
important was the rise of issues as a significant factor
affecting voting behavior. Previously, if one wanted to
predict how individuals would vote in a congressional or
presidential election, the most important fact to know about

The United States 87

them was their party identification. This is no longer the
case. In 1956 and 1960, party identification was three or
four times as important as the views of voters on issues in
predicting how they would vote. In the 1964 and subsequent
elections, this relationship reversed itself. Issue politics has
replaced party politics as the primary influence on mass
political behavior.21 This is true, also, not only with respect
to the public and electoral behavior but also with respect to
members of Congress and legislative behavior. Party is no
longer as significant a guide as it once was to how members
of Congress will vote. In the House of Representatives, for
instance, during Truman's second term (1949-52), 54.5
percent of the roll call votes were party unity votes, in which
a majority of one party opposes a majority of the other
party. This proportion has declined steadily to the point
where in Nixon's first term (1969«72), only 3 1 percent of the
roll call votes were party unity votes.22

The decline in the salience of party for the mass public is
also, in some measure, reflected in the attitudes of the public
toward the parties as institutions. In 1972, the public was
asked which of the four major institutions of the national
government (President, Congress, Supreme Court, and
political parties) had done the best job and the worst job in
the past few years and which was most powerful and least
powerful. On both dimensions, the differences among the
three formal branches of the national government were, while
clearly observable, not all that great. Not one of the others,
however, came close to the political parties as the voters'
choice for doing the worst job and being the least powerful.
(See Table 6.) While these data could conceivably be
interpreted in a variety of ways, when they are viewed in the
context of the other evidence on the decline of partisan
loyalty, they strongly suggest that the popular attitude
towards parties combines both disapproval and contempt. As
might be expected, these attitudes are particularly marked
among those under twenty-five years of age. In 1973, for

88 The Crisis of Democracy

instance, 61 percent of college youth and 64 percent of
noncollege youth believed that political parties needed to be
reformed or to be eliminated; in comparison, 54 percent of
the college youth and 45 percent of the noncollege youth
believed big business needed to be reformed or eliminated.23

Table 6
Attitudes Towards Governmental Institutions, 1972

Best Job Most Powerful

Worst Job

Least Powerful

President

--■ 39%

31%

11%

8%

Congress

28

32

7

6

Supreme Court

13

26

23

9

Political Parties

3

4

43

62

Questions: (1) Which of the parts of the government on this list
do you think has done the best (worst) job in the
past couple of years?

(2) Which part of the government on the list would you
say is the most (least) powerful?

Source: University of Michigan, Center for Political Studies, 1972
postelection survey.

Not only has the mass base of the parties declined but so
also has the coherence and strength of party organization.
The political party has, indeed, become less of an
organization, with a life and interest of its own, and more of
an arena in which other actors pursue their interests. In some
respects, of course, the decline of party organization is an old
and familiar phenomenon. The expansion of government

The United States 89

welfare functions beginning with the New Deal, the increased
pervasiveness of the mass media, particularly television, and
the higher levels of affluence and education among the public
have all tended over the years to weaken the traditional bases
of party organization. During the 1960s, however, this trend
seemed to accelerate. In both major parties, party leaders
found it difficult to maintain control of the most central and
important function of the party: the selection of candidates
for public office. In part, the encroachment on party
organization was the result of the mobilization of issue
constituencies by issue-oriented candidates, of whom
Goldwater, McCarthy, Wallace, and McGovern were the
principal examples on the national level. In part, however, it
was simply a reaction against party politics and party leaders.
Endorsements by party leaders or by party conventions
carried little positive weight and were often a liability. The
"outsider" in politics, or the candidate who could make
himself or herself appear to be an outsider, had the inside
road to political office. In New York in 1974, for instance,
four of five candidates for statewide office endorsed by the
state Democratic convention were defeated by the voters in
the Democratic primary; the party leaders, it has been aptly
said, did not endorse Hugh Carey for governor because he
could not win, and he won because they did not endorse him.
The lesson of the 1960s was that American political parties
were extraordinarily open and extraordinarily vulnerable
organizations, in the sense that they could be easily
penetrated, and even captured, by highly motivated and
well-organized groups with a cause and a candidate.

The trends in party reform and organization in the 1960s
were all designed to open the parties even further and to
encourage fuller participation in party affairs. In some
measure, these reforms could conceivably mitigate the
peculiar paradox in which popular participation in politics
was going up, but the premier organization designed to
structure and organize that participation, the political party,

90 The Crisis of Democracy

was declining. At the same time, the longer-term effect of the
reforms could be very different from that which was
intended. In the democratic surge during the Progressive era
at the turn of the century, the direct primary was widely
adopted as a means of insuring popular control of the party
organization. In fact, however, the primary reinforced the
power of the political bosses whose followers in the party
machine always voted in the primaries. In similar fashion, the
reforms of the 1970s within the Democratic party to insure
the representation of all significant groups and viewpoints in
party conventions appeared likely to give the party leaders at
the national convention new influence over the choice of the
presid ential nominee.

As we have indicated, the signs of decay in the American
party system have their parallels in the party systems of other
industrialized democratic countries. In addition, however, the
developments of the 1960s in the American party system can
also be viewed in terms of the historical dynamics of
American politics. According to the standard theory of
American politics, a major party realignment occurs, usually
in conjunction with a "critical election," approximately
every twenty-eight to thirty-six years: 1800, 1828, 1860,
1898, 1932.24 In terms of this theory, such a realignment
was obviously due about 1968. In fact, many of the signs of
party decay which were present in the 1960s have also
historically accompanied major party realignments: a decline
in party identification, increased electoral volatility, third
party movements, the loosening of the bonds between social
groups and political parties, and the rise of new policy issues
which cut across the older cleavages. The decay of the old
New Deal party system was clearly visible, and the emergence
of a new party system was eagerly awaited, at least by
politicians and political analysts. Yet neither in 1 968 nor in
1972 did a new coalition of groups emerge to constitute a
new partisan majority and give birth to a new party
alignment. Nor did there seem to be any significant evidence

The United States 91

that such a realignment was likely in 1976— by which time it
would be eight to sixteen years overdue according to the
"normal" pattern of party system evolution.

Alternatively, the signs of party decomposition could be
interpreted as presaging not simply a realignment of parties
within an ongoing system but rather a more fundamental
decay and potential dissolution of the party system. In this
respect, it could be argued that the American party system
emerged during the Jacksonian years of the mid-nineteenth
century, that it went through realignments in the 1850s,
1890s, and 1930s, but that it reached its peak in terms of
popular commitment and organizational strength in the last
decades of the nineteenth century, and that since then it has
been going through a slow, but now accelerating, process of
disintegration. To support this proposition, it could be
argued that political parties are a political form peculiarly
suited to the needs of industrial society and that the
movement of the United States into a post-industrial phase
hence means the end of the political party system as we have
known it. If this be the case, a variety of critical issues must
be faced. Is democratic government possible without political
parties? If political participation is not organized by means of
parties, how will it be organized? If parties decline, will not
popular participation also drop significantly? In less
developed countries, the principal alternative to party
government is military government. Do the highly developed
countries have a third alternative?

4. The Shifting Balance Between Government and Opposition

The governability of a democracy depends upon the
relation between the authority of its governing institutions
and the power of its opposition institutions. In a
parliamentary system, the authority of the cabinet depends
upon the balance of power between the governing parties and
the opposition parties in the legislature. In the United States,

92 The Crisis of Democracy

the authority of government depends upon the balance of
power between a broad coalition of governing institutions
and groups, which includes but transcends the legislature and
other formal institutions of government, and the power of
those institutions and groups which are committed to
opposition. During the 1 960s the balance of power between
government and opposition shifted significantly. The central
governing institution in the political system, the presidency,
declined in power; institutions playing opposition roles in the
system, most notably the national media and Congress,
significantly increased their power.

"Who governs?" is obviously one of the most important
questions to ask concerning any political system. Even more
important, however, may be the question: "Does anybody
govern?" To the extent that the United States was governed
by anyone during the decades after World War II, it was
governed by the president acting with the support and
cooperation of key individuals and groups in the Executive
Office, the federal bureaucracy, Congress, and the more
important businesses, banks, law firms, foundations, and
media, which constitute the private establishment. In the
twentieth century, when the American political system has
moved systematically with respect to public policy, the
direction and the initiative have come from the White House.
When the president is unable to exercise authority, when he
is unable to command the cooperation of key decision-
makers elsewhere in society and government, no one else has
been able to supply comparable purpose and initiative. To
the extent that the United States has been governed on a
national basis, it has been governed by the president. During
the 1960s and early 1970s, however, the authority of the
president declined significantly, and the governing coalition
which had, in effect, helped the president to run the country
from the early 1940s down to the early 1960s began to
disintegrate.

These developments were, in some measure, a result of the

The United States 93

extent to which all forms of leadership, but particularly those
associated with or tainted by politics, tended to lose
legitimacy in the 1960s and early 1970s. Not only was there
a decline in the confidence of the public in political leaders,
but there was also a marked decline in the confidence of
political leaders in themselves. In part, this was the result of
what were perceived to be significant policy failures: the
failure "to win" the war in Indochina; the failure of the
Great Society's social programs to achieve their anticipated
results; and the intractability of inflation. These perceived
failures induced doubts among political leaders of the
effectiveness of their rule. In addition, and probably more
importantly, political leaders also had doubts about the
morality of their rule. They too shared in the democratic,
participatory, and egalitarian ethos of the times, and hence
had questions about the legitimacy of hierarchy, coercion,
discipline, secrecy, and deception— all of which are, in some
measure, inescapable attributes of the process of govern-
ment*

Probably no development of the 1960s and 1970s has
greater import for the future of American politics than the
decline in the authority, status, influence, and effectiveness
of the presidency. The effects of the weakening of the
presidency will be felt throughout the body politic for years
to come. The decline of the presidency manifests itself in a
variety of ways.

No one of the last four presidents has served a full course
of eight years in office. One President has been assasinated,
one forced out of office because of opposition to his policies,
and another forced out because of opposition to him

*And also, as my colleague Sidney Verba comments at this point, one
must not forget that "disorder, distrust of authority, difficulties in
reconciling competing claims on the government, conflict among
governmental branches, and yelling from the back of the room at city
council meetings are in some measure inescapable attributes of
democratic government."

94 The Crisis of Democracy

personally. Short terms in office reduce the effectiveness of
the president in dealing with both enemies and allies abroad
and bureaucrats and members of Congress at home. The
greatest weakness in the presidency in American history was
during the period from 1848 to 1860, during which twelve
years four presidents occupied the office and none of them
was reelected.

At present, for the first time since the Jacksonian
revolution, the United States has a president and a vice-
president who are not the product of a national electoral
process. Both the legitimacy and the power of the presidency
are weakened to the extent that the president does not come
into office through an involvement in national politics which
compels him to mobilize support throughout the country,
negotiate alliances with diverse economic, ethnic, and region-
al groups and defeat his adversaries in intensely fought state
and national electoral battles. The current president is a
product of Grand Rapids and the House— not of the nation.
The United States has almost returned, at least temporarily,
to the relations between Congress and president which
prevailed during the congressional caucus period in the
second decade of the nineteenth century.

Since Theodore Roosevelt, at least, the presidency has
been viewed as the most popular branch of government and
that which is most likely to provide the leadership for
progressive reform. Liberals, progressives, intellectuals have
all seen the presidency as the key to change in American
politics, economics, and society. The great presidents have
been the strong presidents, who stretched the legal authority
and political resources of the office to mobilize support for
their policies and to put through their legislative program. In
the 1960s, however, the tide of opinion dramatically reversed
itself: those who previously glorified presidential leadership
now warn of the dangers of presidential power.

While much was made in the press and elsewhere during
the 1960s about the dangers of the abuses of presidential

The United States 95

power, this criticism of presidential power was, in many
respects, evidence of the decline of presidential power.
Certainly the image which both Presidents Johnson and
Nixon had of their power was far different, and probably
more accurate, if only because it was" self-fulfilling, than the
images which the critics of the presidency had of presidential
power. Both Johnson and Nixon saw themselves as isolated
and beleaguered, surrounded by hostile forces in the
bureaucracy and the establishment. Under both of them, a
feeling almost of political paranoia pervaded the White
House: a sense that the president and his staff were "an
island" in a hostile world. On the one hand, these feelings of
suspicion and mistrust led members of the president's staff to
engage in reckless, illegal, and self-defeating actions to
counter his "enemies"; on the other hand, these feelings also
made it all the more difficult for them to engage in the
political compromises and to exercise the political leadership
necessary to mobilize his supporters.

During the late 1960s and early 1970s, Congress and the
courts began to impose a variety of formal restrictions on
presidential power, in the form of the War Powers Act, the
budgetary reform act, the limits on presidential impound-
ment of funds, and similar measures.

At the same time, and more importantly, the effectiveness
of the president as the principal leader of the nation declined
also as a result of the decline in the effectiveness of
leadership at other levels in society and government. The
absence of strong central leadership in Congress (on the
Rayburn-Johnson model, for instance) made it impossible for
a president to secure support from Congress in an economical
fashion. The diffusion of authority in Congress meant a
reduction in the authority of the president. There was no
central leadership with whom he could negotiate and come to
terms. The same was true with respect to the cabinet. The
general decline in the status of cabinet secretaries was often
cited as evidence of the growth in the power of the

96 The Crisis of Democracy

presidency on the grounds that the White House office was
assuming powers which previously rested with the cabinet.
But in fact the decline in the status of cabinet secretaries
made it more difficult for the, president to command the
support and cooperation of the executive bureaucracy; weak
leadership at the departmental level produces weakened
leadership at the presidential level.

To become president a candidate has to put together an
electoral coalition involving a majority of voters
appropriately distributed across the country. He normally
does this by: (1) developing an identification with certain
issues and positions which bring him the support of key
categorical groups—economic, regional, ethnic, racial, and
religious; and (2) cultivating the appearance of certain general
characteristics— honesty, energy, practicality, decisiveness,
sincerity, and experience— which appeal generally across the
board to people in all categorical groups. Before the New
Deal, when the needs of the national government in terms of
policies, programs, and personnel were relatively small, the
president normally relied on the members of his electoral
coalition to help him govern the country. Political leaders in
Congress, in the state houses, and elsewhere across the
country showed up in Washington to run the administration,
and the groups which comprised the electoral coalition acted
to put through Congress the measures in which they were
interested.

Since the 1930s, however, the demands on government
have grown tremendously and the problems of constituting a
governing coalition have multiplied commensurately. Indeed,
once he is elected president, the president's electoral
coalition has, in a sense, served its purpose. The day after his
election the size of his majority is almost— if not entirely-
irrelevant to his ability to govern the country. What counts
then is his ability to govern the country. What counts then is
his ability to mobilize support from the leaders of the key
institutions in society and government. He has to constitute a

The United States 97

broad governing coalition of strategically located supporters
who can furnish him with the information, talent, expertise,
workforce, publicity, arguments, and political support which
he needs to develop a program, to embody it in legislation,
and to see it effectively implemented. This coalition, as we
have indicated, must include key people in Congress, the
executive branch, and the private establishment. The govern-
ing coalition need have little relation to the electoral
coalition. The fact that the president as a candidate put
together a successful electoral coalition does not insure that
he will have a viable governing coalition.

For twenty years after World War II presidents operated
with the cooperation of a series of informal governing
coalitions. Truman made a point of bringing a substantial
number of nonpartisan soldiers, Republican bankers, and
Wall Street lawyers into his administration. He went to the
existing sources of power in the country to get the help he
needed in ruling the country. Eisenhower in part inherited
this coalition and was in part almost its creation. He also
mobilized a substantial number of midwestern businessmen
into his administration and established close and effective
working relationships with the Democratic leadership of
Congress. During his brief administration, Kennedy
attempted to recreate a somewhat similar structure of
alliances. Johnson was acutely aware of the need to maintain
effective working relations with the Eastern establishment
and other key groups in the private sector, but, in effect, in
1965 and 1966 was successful only with respect to Congress.
The informal coalition of individuals and groups which had
buttressed the power of the three previous presidents began
to disintegrate.

Both Johnson and his successor were viewed with a certain
degree of suspicion by many of the more liberal and
intellectual elements which might normally contribute their
support to the administration. The Vietnam war and, to a
lesser degree, racial issues divided elite groups as well as the

98 The Crisis of Democracy

mass public. In addition, the number and variety of groups
whose support might be necessary had increased
tremendously by the 1960s. Truman had been able to govern
the country with the cooperation of a relatively small
number of Wall Street lawyers and bankers. By the
mid-1960s, the sources of power in society had diversified
tremendously, and this was no longer possible.

The most notable new source of national power in 1970,
as compared to 1950, was the national media, meaning here
the national TV networks, the national news magazines, and
the major newspapers with national reach such as the
Washington Bosl and the New York Times.* There is, for
instance, considerable evidence to suggest that the develop-
ment of television journalism contributed to the undermining
of governmental authority. The advent of the half-hour
nightly news broadcast in 1963 led to greatly increased
popular dependence on television as a source of news. It also
greatly expanded the size of the audience for news. At the
same time, the themes which were stressed, the focus on

*Suggestive of the new power relationships between government and
media were the responses of 490 leading Americans when asked to rate
a number of public and private institutions according to "the amount
of influence" they had "on decisions or actions affecting the nation as a
whole." Television came in a clear first, well ahead of the president, and
newspapers edged out both houses of Congress. The average ratings, on
a scale from 1 (lowest influence) to 10 (highest influence), were:

1.

Television

7.2

2.

White House

6.9

Supreme Court

6.9

3.

Newspapers

6.4

4.

Labor unions

6.3

Industry

6.3

U.S. Senate

6.3

5.

Government bureaucracy

6.0

U.S. House of Representatives

6.0

U.S. News and World Report (April 22, 1974)

The United States 99

controversy and violence, and, conceivably, the values and
outlook of the journalists, tended to arouse unfavorable
attitudes towards established institutions and to promote a
decline in confidence in government, "Most newsmen," as
Walter Cronkite put it, "come to feel very little allegiance to
the established order. I think they are inclined to side with
humanity rather than with authority and institutions." 25
And, in fact, public opinion surveys show that, even with
controls for education and income, increased reliance on
television for news is associated with low political efficacy,
social distrust, cynicism, and weak party loyalty.26 Tele-
vision news, in short, functions as a "dispatriating" agency-
one which portrays the conditions in society as undesirable
and as getting worse. In the 1960s, the network organiza-
tions, as one analyst put it, became "a highly creditable,
never-tiring political opposition, a maverick third party which
never need face the sobering experience of governing."27

Less dramatic but somewhat parallel changes also occurred
in the political role of newspapers. It is a long-established and
familiar political fact that within a city and even within a
state, the power of the local press serves as a major check on
the power of the local government. In the early twentieth
century, the United States developed an effective national
government, making and implementing national policies.
Only in recent years, however, has there come into existence
a national press with the economic independence and
communications reach to play a role with respect to the
president that a local newspaper plays with respect to a
mayor. This marks the emergence of a very significant check
on presidential power. In the two most dramatic domestic
policy conflicts of the Nixon administration— the Pentagon
Papers and Watergate— organs of the national media
challenged and defeated the national executive. The press,
indeed, played a leading role in bringing about what no other
single institution, group, or combination of institutions and
groups, had done previously in American history: forcing out

100 The Crisis of Democracy

of office a president who had been elected less than two
years earlier by one of the largest popular majorities in
American history. No future president can or will forget that
fact. . _-. .

The 1960s and early 1970s also saw a reassertion of the
power of Congress. In part, this represented simply the latest
phase in the institutionalized constitutional conflict between
Congress and president; in part, also, of course, it reflected
the fact that after 1968 president and Congress were
controlled by different parties. In addition, however, these
years saw the emergence, first in the Senate and then in the
House, of a new generation of congressional activists willing
to challenge established authority in their own chambers as
well as in the presidency.

The new power of the media and the new assertiveness of
Congress also had their impact on the relations between the
executive branch and the president. During the Johnson and
Nixon administrations the White House attitude toward
executive branch agencies often seemed to combine mistrust
of them, on the one hand, and the attempt to misuse them,
on the other. In part, no doubt, the poisoning of the relation-
ship between White House and executive agencies reflected
the fact that not since Franklin Roosevelt has this country
had a chief executive with any significant experience as a
political executive. The record to date of former legislators
and generals in the presidency suggests they do not come to
that office well equipped to motivate, energize, guide, and
control their theoretical subordinates but actual rivals in the
executive branch agencies. The growth in the power of the
press and of Congress inevitably strengthens the independ-
ence of bureaucratic agencies vis-a-vis the president. Those
agencies are secondary contributors to the decline of presi-
dential power but primary beneficiaries of that decline.

The increased power of the national opposition, centered
in the press and in Congress, undoubtedly is related to and is
perhaps a significant cause of the critical attitudes which the

The United States 101

public has towards the federal as compared to state and local
government. While data for past periods are not readily
available, certainly the impression one gets is that over the
years the public has often tended to view state and local
government as inefficient, corrupt, inactive, and
unresponsive. The federal government, on the other hand, has
seemed to command much greater confidence and trust,
going all the way from early childhood images of the
"goodness" of the president to respect for the FBI, Internal
Revenue Service and other federal agencies having an impact
on the population as models of efficiency and integrity. It
would now appear Jthat there has been a drastic reversal of
these images. In 1973, a national sample was asked whether it
then had more or less confidence in each of the three levels
of government than it had five years previously. Confidence
in all three levels of government declined more than it rose,
but the proportion of the public which reported a decline in
confidence in the federal government (57 percent) was far
higher than those reporting a decline in confidence in state
(26 percent) or local (30 percent) government. Corroborating
these judgements, only 1 1 percent and 1 4 percent, respec-
tively, thought that local and state government had made
their life worse during the past few years, while 28 percent
and 27 percent of the population thought that local and state
government had improved their life. In contrast, only 23 per-
cent of the population thought that the federal government

had improved their lives, while a whopping 37 percent thought it
had made their lives worse. As one would expect, substantial
majorities also went on record in favor of increasing the
power of state government (59 percent) and of local govern-
ment (61 percent). But only 32 percent wanted to increase
the power of the federal government, while 42 percent voted
to decrease its power.28 The shift in the institutional balance
between government and opposition at the national level thus
corresponds neatly to the shift in popular attitudes towards
government at the national level.

102 The Crisis of Democracy

The balance between government and opposition depends
not only on the relative power of different institutions, but
also on their roles in the political system. The presidency has
been the principal national governing institution in the
United States; its power has declined. The power of the
media and of Congress has increased. Can their roles change?
By its very nature, the media cannot govern and has strong
incentives to assume an oppositional role. The critical
question consequently concerns Congress. In the wake of a
declining presidency, can Congress organize itself to furnish
the leadership to govern the country? During most of this
century, the trends in Congress have been in the opposite
direction. In recent years the increase in the power of
Congress has outstripped an increase in its ability to govern.*
If the institutional balance is to be redressed between
government and opposition, the decline in presidential power
has to be reversed and the ability of Congress to govern has
to be increased.

IV. THE DEMOCRATIC DISTEMPER: CONSEQUENCES

The vigor of democracy in the United States in the 1960s
thus contributed to a democratic distemper, involving the
expansion of governmental activity, on the one hand, and the
reduction of governmental authority, on the other. This
democratic distemper, in turn, had further important
consequences for the functioning of the political system. The

There are, it might be noted, some parallels between Congress and the
Communist parties in Europe, as described by Michel Crozier. Both
have long been accustomed to playing opposition roles; with the decline
in authority and power of other groups, the power of both these
institutions is increasing; and one crucial question for the future— and
governability— of democracy in Italy, France, and the United States is
whether these oppositional bodies can adapt themselves to play
responsible governing roles. Professor Crozier appears to be somewhat
more optimistic about the European communists in this respect than I
am about the American Congress at this moment in time.

Tne United States 1 03

extent of these consequences was, as of 1974, still unclear,
depending, obviously, on the duration and the scope of the
democratic surge.

The expansion of governmental activity produced
budgetary deficits and a major expansion of total
governmental debt from $336 billion in 1960 to $557 billion
in 1971. These deficits contributed to inflationary tendencies
in the economy. They also brought to the fore in the early
1970s the entire question of the incidence of the tax burden
and the issues of tax reform. The major expansion of
unionism in the public sector combined with the difficulty, if
not the impossibility, of measuring productivity or efficiency
for many bureaucratic activities made the salary and wage
determinations for governmental employee's a central focus
of political controversy. Unionization produced higher wages
and more vigorous collective bargaining to secure higher
wages. Strikes by public employees became more and more
prevalent: in 1961, only twenty-eight strikes took place
involving governmental workers; in 1970, there were 412
such strikes.29 Governmental officials were thus caught
between the need to avoid the disruption of public services
from strikes by governmental employees for higher wages and
the need to avoid imposing higher taxes to pay for the higher
wages which the governmental employees demand. The
easiest and obviously most prevalent way of escaping from
this dilemma is to increase wages without increasing taxes
and thereby to add still further to governmental deficits and
to the inflationary spiral which will serve as the justification
for demands for still higher wages. To the extent that this
process is accompanied by low or negative rates of economic
growth, tax revenues will be still further limited and the
whole vicious cycle still further exacerbated.

At the same time that the expansion of governmental
activity creates problems of financial solvency for
government, the decline in governmental authority reduces
still further the ability of government to deal effectively with

104 The Crisis of Democracy

these problems. The imposition of "hard" decisions imposing
constraints on any major economic group is difficult in any
democracy and particularly difficult in the United States
where the separation of powers provides a variety of points
of access to governmental decision-making for economic
interest groups. During the Korean war, for instance,
governmental efforts at wage and price control failed
miserably, as business and farm groups were able to riddle
legislation with loopholes in Congress and labor was able to
use its leverage with the executive branch to eviscerate wage
controls.30 All this occurred despite the fact that there was a
war on and thegovernment was not lacking in authority. The
decline in governmental authority in general and of the
central leadership in particular during the early 1 970s opens
new opportunities to special interests to bend governmental
behavior to their special purposes.

In the United States, as elsewhere in the industrialized
world, domestic problems thus become intractable problems.
The public develops expectations which it is impossible for
government to meet. The activities— and expenditures— of
government expand, but the success of government in
achieving its goals seems dubious. In a democracy, however,
political leaders in power need to score successes if they are
going to stay in power. The natural result is to produce a
gravitation to foreign policy, where successes, or seeming
successes, are much more easily arranged than they are in
domestic policy. Trips abroad, summit meetings, declarations
and treaties, rhetorical aggression, all produce the appearance
of activity and achievement. The weaker a political leader is
at home, the more likely he is to be traveling abroad. Nixon
had to see Brezhnev in June 1974, and Tanaka, for similar
reasons, desperately wanted to see Ford in September 1974.
Despite the best efforts by political leaders to prop each
other up at critical moments, there remains, nonetheless,
only limited room for substantive agreements among nations
among whom there are complex and conflicting interests.-

The United States 105

Consequently, politicians in search of bolstering their
standing at home by achievements abroad either have to
make a nonachievement appear to be an achievement (which
can be done successfully only a limited number of times), or
they have, to make an achievement which may have an
immediate payoff but which they and, more importantly,
their countries are likely to regret in the long run. The
dynamics of this search for foreign policy achievements by
democratic leaders lacking authority at home gives to
dictatorships (whether communist party states or oil
sheikhdoms), which are free from such compulsions, a major
advantage in the conduct of international relations.

The expansion of expenditures and the decrease in
authority are also likely to encourage economic nationalism
in democratic societies. Each country will have an interest in
minimizing the export of some goods in order to keep prices
down in its own society. At the same time, other interests are
likely to demand protection against the import of foreign
goods. In the United States, this has meant embargoes, as on
the export of soybeans, on the one hand, and tariffs and
quotas on the import of textiles, shoes, and comparable
manufactured goods, on the other. A strong government will
not necessarily follow more liberal and internationalist
economic policies, but a weak government is almost certain
to be incapable of doing so. The resulting unilateralism could
well weaken still further the alliances among the Trilateral
countries and increase their vulnerability to economic and
military pressures from the Soviet bloc.

Finally, a government which lacks authority and which is
committed to substantial domestic programs will have little
ability, short of a cataclysmic crisis, to impose on its people
the sacrifices which may be necessary to deal with foreign
policy problems and defense. In the early 1 970s, as we have
seen, spending for all significant programs connected with the
latter purposes was far more unpopular than spending for any
major domestic purpose. The U.S. government .has given up

106 The Crisis of Democracy

the authority to draft its citizens into the armed forces and is
now committed to providing the monetary incentives to
attract volunteers with a stationary or declining percentage of
the Gross National Product. At the present time, this would
appear to pose no immediate deleterious consequences for
national security. The question necessarily arises, however,
of whether in the future, if a new threat to security should
materialize, as it inevitably will at some point, the govern-
ment will possess the authority to command the resources
and the sacrifices necessary to meet that threat.

The implications of these potential consequences of the
democratic distemper extend far beyond the United States.
For a quarter-century the United States was the hegemonic
power in a system of world order. The manifestations of the
democratic distemper, however* have already stimulated
uncertainty among allies and could well stimulate adventur-
ism among enemies. If American citizens don't trust their
government, why should friendly foreigners? If American
citizens challenge the authority of American government,
why shouldn't unfriendly governments? The turning inward
of American attention and the decline in the authority of
American governing institutions are closely related, as both
cause and effect, to the relative downturn in American power
and influence in world affairs. A decline in the governability
of democracy at home means a decline in the influence of
democracy abroad.

V. THE DEMOCRATIC DISTEMPER: CAUSES

The immediate causes of the simultaneous expansion of
governmental activity and the decline of governmental
authority are to be found in the democratic surge of the
1960s. What, however, was in turn responsible for this sharp
increase in political consciousness, political participation, and
commitment to egalitarian and democratic values? As we
have indicated, the causes of the surge can be usefully
analyzed in terms of their scope and timing. Are these causes

The United States 107

country-specific or Trilateral-general? Are they transitory,
secular, or recurring? In actuality, as we have suggested, the
causes of the democratic surge seem to partake of all these
characteristics.

The most specific, immediate, and in a sense "rational"
causes of the democratic surge could conceivably be the
specific policy problems confronting the United States
government in the 1960s and 1970s and its inability to deal
effectively with those problems. Vietnam, race relations,
Watergate, and stagflation: these could quite naturally lead to
increased polarization over policy, higher levels of political
participation (and protest), and reduced confidence in
governmental institutions and leaders. In fact, these issues
and the ways in which the government dealt with them did
have some impact; the unraveling of Watergate was, for
instance, followed by a significant decline in public
confidence in the executive branch of government. More
generally, however, a far-from-perfect fit exists between the
perceived inability of the government to deal effectively with
these policy problems and. the various attitudinal and
behavioral manifestations of the democratic surge. The
expansion of political participation was underway long
before these problems came to a head in the mid-1960s, and
the beginnings of the decline in trust and of the increase in
attitude consistency go back before large-scale American
involvement in Vietnam. Indeed, a closer look at the
relationship between attitudes towards the Vietnam war and
confidence in government suggests that the connection
between the two may not be very significant. Opposition to
U.S. involvement in Vietnam, for instance, became
widespread among blacks in mid-1966, while among whites
opponents of the war did not outnumber supporters until
early 1968. In terms of a variety of indices, however, white
confidence and trust in government declined much further
and more rapidly than black confidence and trust during the
middle 1960s. In late 1967, for instance, whites were divided

108 The Crisis of Democracy

roughly 46 percent in favor of the war and 44 percent
against, while blacks were split 29 percent in favor and 57
percent against. Yet in 1968, white opinion was divided 49.2
percent to 40.5 percent on whether the government was run
for the benefit of all or a "few big interests," while blacks
though that it was run for the benefit of all by a margin of
63.1 percent to 28.6 percent.31 Black confidence in
government plummeted only after the Nixon administration
came to power in 1969. While the evidence is not as
complete as one would desire, it does, nonetheless, suggest
that the actual substantive character of governmental policies
on the war, as well as perhaps on other matters, was of less
significance Tor the decrease in governmental authority than
were the changes generated by other causes in the attitudes
of social groups towards government and in the intensity
with which social groups held to particular political values.

At the opposite extreme in terms of generality, the
democratic surge can also be explained in terms of
widespread demographic trends of the 1960s. Throughout
the industrialized world during the 1960s, the younger age
cohorts furnished many of the activists in the democratic and
egalitarian challenges to established authority. In part, this
revolt of the youth was undoubtedly the product of the
global baby boom of the post-World War II years which
brought to the fore in the 1960s a generational bulge which
overwhelmed colleges and universities. This was associated
with the rise of distinctive new values which appeared first
among college youth and then were diffused among youth
generally. Prominent among these new values were what have
been described as "changes in relation to the authority of
institutions such as the authority of the law, the police, the
government, the boss in the work situation." These changes
were "in the direction of what sociologists call 'de-
authorization,' i.e., a lessening of automatic obedience to,
and respect for, established authority. . . ." The new
disrespect for authority on the part of youth was part and

The United States 109

parcel of broader changes in their attitudes and values with
respect to sexual morality, religion as a source of moral
guidance, and traditional patriotism and allegiance "to my
country right or wrong."32

As a result of this development, major differences over
social values and political attitudes emerged between
generations. One significant manifestation of the appearance
of this generational gap in the United States is the proportion
of different age groups agreeing at different times in recent
decades with the proposition: "Voting is the only way that
people like me can have any say about how the government
runs things." In 1952 overwhelming majorities of all age
groups agreed witlr this statement, with the difference
between the youngest age group (twenty-one to
twenty-eight), with 79 percent approval, and the oldest age
group (sixty-one and over), with 80 percent approval, being
only 1 percent. By 1968, the proportion of every age group
supporting the statement had declined substantially. Of even
greater significance was the major gap of 25 percent which
had opened up between the youngest age group (37 percent
approval) and the oldest age group (62 percent approval). 33
Whereas young and old related almost identically to political
participation in 1952, they had very different attitudes
toward it sixteen years later.

The democratic surge can also be explained as the first
manifestation in the United States of the political impact of
the social, economic, and cultural trends towards the
emergence of a post-industrial society. Rising levels of
affluence and education lead to changes in political attitudes
and political behavior. Many of the political and social values
which are more likely to be found among the young than
among the elderly are also more likely to be found among
better-off, white-collar, suburban groups than among the
poorer, working-class, blue-collar groups in central and
industrial cities. The former groups, however, are growing in
numbers and importance relative to the latter, and hence

1 10 The Crisis of Democracy

their political attitudes and behavior patterns are likely to
play an increasingly dominant role in politics.34 What is true
today in North America is likely to be true tomorrow in
Western Europe and Japan.

The single most important status variable affecting
political participation and attitudes is education. For several
decades the level of education in the United States has been
rising rapidly. In 1940, less than 40 percent of the popula-
tion was educated beyond elementary school; in 1972, 75 per-
cent of the population had been either to high school (40
percent) or to college (35 percent). The more educated a per-
son is, the, more likely he is to participate in politics, to have
a more consistent and more ideological outlook on political
issues, and to hold more "enlightened" or "liberal" or
"change oriented" views on social, cultural, and foreign
policy issues. Consequently the democratic surge could be
simply the reflection of a more highly educated populace.

This explanation, however, runs into difficulties when it is
examined more closely. Verba and Nie, for instance, have
shown that the actual rates of campaign activity which
prevailed in the 1950s and 1960s ran far ahead of the rates
which would have been projected simply as a result of
changes in the educational composition of the population.
(See Table 7.) In part, the explanation for this discrepancy
stems from the tremendous increase in black political
participation during these years. Before 1960, blacks
participated less than would have been expected in terms of
their educational levels. After 1960, they participated far
more than would have been expected by those levels; the gap
between projected and actual participation rates in these
latter years being far greater for the blacks than it was for the
whites. The difference in participation between more highly
educated and less highly educated blacks, in turn, was much
less than it was between more highly educated and less highly
educated whites. Black political participation, in short, was

The United States 111

the product primarily not of increased individual status but
rather of increased group consciousness.35 That political
participation will remain high as long as their group
consciousness does. A decline in the saliency of school
integration, welfare programs, law enforcement, and other
issues of special concern to blacks will at some point
presumably be accompanied by a decline in their group
consciousness and hence their political participation.

Table 7

Mean Number of Campaign Acts: Actual and Projected

1952 '" 1956 I960 1962 1964 1968 1970

Actual .58 .66 .83 .69 .77 .73 .83

Projected - .57 .59 .61 .62 .65 .66

Source: Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie, Participation in America:
Political Democracy and Social Equality (New York: Harper & Row,
1972), p. 252.

In a similar vein, the assumption that increased attitude
consistency can be explained primarily by higher levels of
education also does not hold up. In fact, during the 1950s
and 1960s major and roughly equal increases in attitude
consistency occurred among both those who had gone to
college and those who had not graduated from high school.
In summarizing the data, Nie and Anderson state:

The growth of attitude consistency within the mass
public is clearly not the result of increases in the
population's "ideological capacities" brought about by
gains in educational attainment. . . . Those with the
lowest educational attainment have experienced the
largest increases in consistency on the core domestic

112 The Crisis of Democracy

issues; and little significant difference appears to be
present between the two educational groups in
comparison to the dramatic increases in consistency
which both groups have experienced.

Instead, they argue, the increase in ideological thinking is
primarily the result of the increased salience which citizens
perceive politics to have for their own immediate concerns:
"The political events of the last decade, and the crisis
atmosphere which has attended them, have caused citizens to
perceive politics as increasingly central to their lives."36
Thus, the causes of increased attitude consistency, like the
causes of higher political participation, are to be found in
changing political relationships, rather than in changes in
individual background characteristics.

All this suggests that a full explanation of the democratic
surge can be found neither in transitory events nor in secular
social trends common to all industrial societies. The timing
and nature of the surge in the United States also need to be
explained by the distinctive dynamics of the American politi-
cal process and, in particular, by the interaction between
political ideas and institutional reality in the United States.
The roots of the surge are to be found in the basic American
value system and the degree of commitment which groups in
society feel toward that value system. Unlike Japanese and
most European societies, American society is characterized
by a broad consensus on democratic, liberal, egalitarian
values. For much of the time, the commitment to these
values is neither passionate nor intense. During periods of
rapid social change, however, these democratic and egali-
tarian values of the American creed are reaffirmed. The in-
tensity of belief during such creedal passion periods leads to
the challenging of established authority and to major efforts
to change governmental structure to accord more fully with
those values. In this respect, the democratic surge of the
1960s shares many characteristics with the comparable egali-

The United States 113

tarian and reform movements of the Jacksonian and Progres-
sive eras. Those "surges" like the contemporary one also
occurred during periods of realignment between party and
governmental institutions, on the one hand, and social forces,
on the other.37 The slogans, goals, values, and targets of all
three movements are strikingly similar. To the extent this
analysis is valid, the causes of the democratic surge in the
United States would be specific to the United States and
limited in duration but potentially recurring at some point in
the future.

VI. CONCLUSIONS: TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC BALANCE

Predictively, the" implication of this analysis is that in due
course the democratic surge and its resulting dual distemper
in government will moderate. Prescriptively, the implication
is that these developments ought to take place in order to
avoid the deleterious consequences of the surge and to
restore balance between vitality and governability in the
democratic system.

Al Smith once remarked that "the only cure for the evils
of democracy is more democracy." Our analysis suggests that
applying that cure at the present time could well be adding
fuel to the flames. Instead, some of the problems of
governance in the United States today stem from an excess of
democracy— an "excess of democracy" in much the same
sense in which David Donald used the term to refer to the
consequences of the Jacksonian revolution which helped to
precipitate the Civil War. Needed, instead, is a greater degree
of moderation in democracy.

In practice, this moderation has two major areas of
application. First, democracy is only one way of constituting
authority, and it is not necessarily a universally applicable
one. In many situations the claims of expertise, seniority,
experience, and special talents may override the claims of
democracy as a way of constituting authority. During the
surge of the 1960s, however, the democratic principle was

114 The Crisis of Democracy

extended to many institutions where it can, in the long run,
only frustrate the purposes of-those institutions. A university
where teaching appointments are subject to approval by
students may be a more democratic university but it is not
likely to be a better university. In similar fashion, armies in
which the commands of officers have been subject to veto by
the collective wisdom of their subordinates have almost in-
variably come to disaster on the battlefield. The arenas where
democratic procedures are appropriate are, in short, limited.

Second, the effective operation of a democratic political
system usually requires some measure of apathy and
noninvolvement on the part of some individuals and groups.
In the past, every democratic society has had a marginal
population, of greater or lesser size, which has not actively
participated in politics. In itself, this marginality on the part
of some groups is inherently undemocratic, but it has also
been one of the factors which has enabled democracy to
function effectively. Marginal social groups, as in the case of
the blacks, are now becoming full participants in the political
system. Yet the danger of overloading the political system
with demands which extend its functions and undermine its
authority still remains. Less marginality on the part of some
groups thus needs to be replaced by more self-restraint on the
part of all groups.

The Greek philosophers argued that the best practical state
would combine several different principles of government in
its constitution. The Constitution of 1787 was drafted with
this insight very much in mind. Over the years, however, the
American political system has emerged as a distinctive case of
extraordinarily democratic institutions joined to an
exclusively democratic value system. Democracy is more of a
threat to itself in the United States than it is in either Europe
or Japan where there still exist residual inheritances of
traditional and aristocratic values. The absence of such values
in the United States produces a lack of balance in society
which, in turn, leads to the swing back and forth between

The United States 115

creedal passion and creedal passivity. Political authority is
never strong in the United States, and it is peculiarly weak
during a creedal passion period of intense commitment to
democratic and egalitarian ideals. In the United States, the
strength of democracy poses a problem for the governability
of democracy in a way which is not the case elsewhere.

The vulnerability of democratic government in the United
States thus comes not primarily from external threats,
though such threats are real, nor from internal subversion
from the left or the right, although both possibilities could
exist, but rather from the internal dynamics of democracy
itself in a highly educated, mobilized, and participant society.
"Democracy never lasts long," John Adams observed. "It
soon wastes, exhausts, and murders itself. There never was a
democracy yet that did not commit suicide." That suicide is
more likely to be the product of overindulgence than of any
other cause. A value which is normally good in itself is not
necessarily optimized when it is maximized. We have come to
recognize that there are potentially desirable limits to eco-
nomic growth. There are also potentially desirable limits to
the indefinite extension of political democracy. Democracy
will have a longer life if it has a more balanced existence.

NOTES

1 . Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie, Participation in America:
Political Democracy and Social Equality (New York: Harper & Row,
1972), pp. 251-52. The campaign acts measured included: urging others
to vote for a party or candidate; contributing money; attending a
meeting or rally; doing other work for a candidate; belonging to a
political organization; using a campaign button or bumper sticker.

2. See, for example, S. M. Miller and Pamela A. Roby, The Future
of Inequality (New York: Basic Books, 1970); Christopher Jencks,
Inequality (New York: Basic Books, 1972); Herbert J. Gans, More
Equality (New York: Pantheon, 1973); Lee S. Rainwater, Social
Problems: Inequality and Justice (Chicago: Aldine Press, 1974);
Edward C. Budd, Inequality and Poverty (New York: W. W. Norton,

116 The Crisis of Democracy

1967); Murray Milner, The Illusion of Equality (San Francisco:
Jossey-Bass, 1972); David Lane, The End of Equality? (Har-
mendsworth, Middlesex, England and New York: Penguin Books,
1971); "On Equality," Symposium, The Public Interest, Fall 1972;
Frank Parkin, Class Inequality and Political Order (London:
MacGibbon & Kee, 1971).

3. See Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1961), pp. 33-64.

4. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United
States: 1973 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 410.

5. Edward R. Fried, et al., Setting National Priorities: The 1974
Budget (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1973) p. 5.

6. Huntington, Common Defense, pp. 234-48.

7. William Watts arid Lloyd A. Free, State of the Nation: 1974
(Washington: Potomac Associates, 1974); The Gallup Opinion Index,
Report No. 1 12, October 1974, p. 20.

8. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract, 1973, p. 410;
U.S. Office of Management and Budget, The United States Budget in
Brief-Fiscal Year 1975 (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1974), p. 47.

9. Daniel Bell, "The Public Household-On 'Fiscal Sociology' and
the Liberal Society," The Public Interest, no. 37, (Fall 1974), p. 41;
James O'Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of The State (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1973), p. 221.

10. Norman H. Nie and Kristi Anderson, "Mass Belief Systems
Revisited: Political Change and Attitude Structure," The Journal of
Politics, 36 (August 1974), pp. 558-59.

1 1 . William Schneider, "Public Opinion: The Beginning of
Ideology?" Foreign Policy, no. 17 (Winter 1974-75), pp. 88 ff.

12. Arthur H. Miller, "Political Issues and Trust in Government:
1964-70," American Political Science Review, 68 (September 1974),
pp.951 ff.

13. Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1965), pp. 64-68; Gallup Survey, New York
Times, October 14, 1973, p. 45.

14. University of Michigan, Survey Research Center, Codebook,
1960 Survey, p. 146, and Codebook, 1968 Survey, p. 310.

15. See Norman H. Nie, Sidney Verba, and John R. Petrocik, The

The United States 117

Changing American Voter (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, forth-
coming, 1976), Chapter 15.

16. Jack Citrin, "Comment: Political Issues and Trust in
Government: 1964-70," American Political Science Review, 68
(September 1974), pp. 982-84.

17.Nie, Verba, and Petrocik, Changing American Voter, Chapter 15,
pp. 2-10.

18. Gallup Survey reported in New York Times, October 17, 1971,
p. 34; N. D. Glenn, "Sources of the Shift to Political Independence,"
Social Science Quarterly, 53 (December 1972), pp. 494-519.

19. Frederick G. Dutton, Changing Sources of Power: American
Politics in the 1970s (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971), p. 228; Richard
W. Boyd, "Electoral Trends in Postwar Politics," in James David
Barber, ed., Choosing the President (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, 1974), p. 185.

20. Boyd, ibid, p. 189.

21. Gerald M. Pomper, "From Confusion to Clarity: Issues and
American Voters, 1956-1968," American Political Science Review, 66
(June 1972), pp. 415 ff.; Miller, ibid., 68 (September 1974), pp. 951
ff.; Norman H. Nie, "Mass Belief Systems Revisited," Journal of
Politics, 36 (August 1974), pp. 540-91; Schneider, Foreign Policy, no.
17, pp. 98 ff.

22. Samuel H. Beer, "Government and Politics: An Imbalance," The
Center Magazine, 7 (March-April 1974), p. 15.

23. Daniel Yankelovich, Changing Youth Values in the '70 's: A
Study of American Youth (New York: JDR 3rd Fund, 1974), p. 37.

24. Walter Dean Burnham, Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of
American Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 1970); James L.
Sundquist, Dynamics of the Party System (Washington: The Brookings
Institution, 1973); Samuel Lubell, The Future of American Politics
(New York: Harper, 1951).

25. Quoted in Michael J. Robinson, "American Political Legitimacy
in an Era of Electronic Journalism: Reflections on the Evening News,"
in Richard Adler, ed., Television as a Social Force: New Approaches to
TV Criticism (New York: Praeger-Aspen, 1975), p. 123.

26. Michael J. Robinson, "Public Affairs Television and the Growth
of Political Malaise: The Case of The Selling of the Pentagon,"
American Political Science Review, forthcoming, June 1976.

118 The Crisis of Democracy

27. Robinson, "American Political Legitimacy," pp. 126-27.

28. Louis Harris and Associates, Confidence and Concern: Citizens
View American Government (Committee Print, U.S. Senate, Committee
on Government Operations, Subcommittee on Intergovernmental
Relations, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., December 3, 1973), pp. 4243, 299.

29. Tax Foundation, Inc., Unions and Government Employment
(New York, 1972), pp. 29, 39-41.

30. Huntington, Common Defense,pp. 271-75.

31. See University of Michigan, Survey Research Center, surveys
1958, 1964, 1966, 1968 and 1970, on black and white "Attitudes
Toward Government: Political Cynicism," and John E. Mueller, War,
Presidents, and Public Opinion (New York: John Wiley, 1973), pp.
14048.

32. Yankelovich, Changing Youth Values, p. 9.

33. Anne Foner, "Age Stratification and Age Conflict in Political
Life," American Sociological Review, 39 (April 1974), p. 190.

34. Samuel P. Huntington, "Postindustrial Politics: How Benign Will
It Be?" Comparative Politics, 16 (January 1974), pp. 177-82; Louis
Harris, The Anguish of Change (New York: W. W. Norton, 1973), pp.
35-52,272-73.

35. Verba and Nie, Participation in America, pp. 251-59.

36. Nie and Anderson, Journal of Politics, 36 (August 1974), pp.
570-71.

37. Samuel P. Huntington, "Paradigms of American Politics: Beyond
the One, the Two, and the Many," Political Science Quarterly, 89
(March 1974), pp. 18-22.

CHAPTER IV

JAPAN

Joji Watanuki

I. JAPANESE DEMOCRACY'S GOVERNABILITY

There is no absolute governability or ungovernability.
Governability is always a function of tasks, both imposed
from the outside and generated from the inside, and of
capabilities, of both the elite and the masses.

1. External Conditions Surrounding Japanese Democracy

Although there seems to be no impending external threat
of military aggression to Japan, there exist uncertainties of a
military nature which, if they should be actualized, would
impose enormous strains on Japanese leaders. One is the
instability of the Korean situation and possible escalating
confrontation between the Republic of Korea and the
People's Democratic Republic of Korea. Another is the
possibility of Sino-Soviet military confrontation. In both
cases, if the conflicts should escalate enough, they would
cause worldwide repercussions, and the United States, at
least, would inevitably be involved in them. If, however,
the escalation should remain below certain limits and could
be regarded as a local problem, it is possible that particularly
strong pressures to force Japanese decision-makers to make

119

120 The Crisis of Democracy

difficult policy decisions would be generated from both sides'
of the conflict. The former, the Korean problem, has a
special significance for the problem of the internal governa-
bility of Japan.

Apart from such critical, and hopefully, improbable cases,
there are two external factors which beset Japan and create
tasks for the Japanese leadership. One is the well-known
international dependency and vulnerability of the Japanese
economy in terms of resources needed not only for industry
but also for feeding the Japanese people. According to
often-cited figures, Japan's ratio of dependency on overseas
resources is: almost 100 percent in oil; 85 percent in total
energy supply^ 100 percent in aluminum; and 95 percent for
iron ore (1970 level). Of Japan's total food supply, 23 per-
cent comes from abroad, and among vital foodstuffs, 92
percent of the wheat and 96 percent of the soybeans con-
sumed in Japan in 1971 came from abroad. In comparison
with the equivalent figures for the United States, these
figures are impressive enough to show Japan's international
dependency in the acquisition of resources.

Japan's dependency is, however, of the same level as that
of many West European societies. What distinguishes Japan
from West European societies is the second external factor.
Japan stands alone in its region with no equal partner for
joint action, which would share common interests due to a
similar stage of industrial development, combined with the
same degree of commitment to principles of political
democracy. Of course, in spite of the European Community,
West European countries are far from achieving complete
accord and being able to take united action to cope with
their difficulties. And West European countries and the
European Community as a whole always have to take into,
consideration the moves of other regions— those of the Soviet
bloc, the Arab countries, and all other Third World countries.
As the most economically advanced country in Asia and
because of the historical backgrounds of Japan and the

Japan 121

countries of Asia, the Japanese elite and masses are torn
between a feeling of belonging to Asia and a feeling of
isolation from Asia, with an orientation to the United States
and West Europe.1 On the other hand, the Asian countries
are also ambivalent toward Japan. The Japanese, including
those in other Asian countries, are expected to perform a
positive role because they are Asians; at the same time they
are often severely criticized for certain behavior which would
be permitted for Europeans or Americans. This delicate
position of Japan in the region can be made to serve as an
asset linking the other Asian countries with advanced
economies and those advanced economies with developing
economies in the region. On the other hand, it could become
a liability which could confuse Japan's policy choices and
aggravate the relationship between developing countries and
economically advanced countries.

2. Domestic Conditions and Capabilities
of Japanese Democracy After World War II

(a) Consolidation of postwar democracy. In discussing the
governability of democracy in Japan, the place to start is
with the reforms after World War II and the 1947 Con-
stitution of Japan, which is the key political institution of
postwar Japanese democracy. It has been argued that the
Japanese Constitution of 1947 was prepared under the U.S.
occupation. The draft was written by the staff of SCAP
(Supreme Commander of Allied Powers) and General Douglas
MacArthur, and handed to the Japanese government with
strong pressure in early 1947.

However, in spite of apparent record of such imposition or
implantation by the Allied— and actually American-
occupation forces, and although there has been a tenacious
movement by rightists both outside and inside the Liberal
Democratic party to abolish this "given Constitution'"
and to make an "autonomous" constitution, the 1947

122 The Crisis of Democracy

Constitution has been in operation for thirty years and will
be kept intact for the forseeable future, including its unique
Article 9 which forbids Japan to wage war as a nation and to
maintain armed forces. It is a miracle of modern history and
is a key to understanding and predicting Japanese society and
politics.

The miracle occurred for three good reasons.2 In the first
place, the draft Constitution prepared by SCAP was not
made in a void. It had many ideas in common with a draft
constitution prepared by the Japanese liberals at that time.
Besides the Constitution itself, many postwar reforms
performed under the American occupation were congruent
with (or some steps in advance of) the proposals made by the
liberals and even by the enlightened bureaucrats either then
or even in prewar days. Thus, many reforms made during the
U.S. occupation helped to release and encourage "reform
potentials" which had already accumulated in Japan during
World War II. Second, a positive role was played by the
opposition— especially that of the Japan Socialist party in the
period of 1952-1955, just after the end of occupation in
1952. The Conservatives, at that time consisting of the Japan
Liberal party and the Japan Democratic party, wanted to
revise the "excessive" reforms made under the occupation
and campaigned for rewriting the whole Constitution. The
key parts of the Constitution which the Conservatives wanted
in common to rewrite were those on the status of the
Emperor, Article 9, and those concerning the family system.
Extreme conservatives wanted more general deliberalization
concerning the rights of labor unions, freedom of speech and
association, and so on. If their attempts had been successful,
what consequences would have followed for Japanese society
and politics? Since this is just a matter of sheer conjecture, it
is open to various arguments. My argument, however, is this:
The consequence would have been less stability in Japanese
politics and the accumulation of more frustration and
alienation among more-educated people and also among

Japan 123

younger people in Japanese society. A Japan with recognized
armed forces but with more domestic political confrontation
and more accumulation of frustration among the populace,
and possibly with repeated attempts at constitutional revision
in both radical and reactionary directions, would have been
possible. As it was, the Socialists, who at that time were
divided between the right-wing Socialists and the left-wing
Socialists but who both agreed to preserve the 1947
Constitution, succeeded in winning one-third of both Houses
of the Diet in elections in the early 1950s and blocked the
Conservatives' attempt to revise the Constitution, which
required the approval of two-thirds of the Diet. The legacy of
the Constitutional dispute in this period still remains in the
usual way of thinking of the 1947 Constitution as one
package, that is, thinking based on an either-or way so that
no part of the Constitution can be revised without rewriting
the whole. Third, the mainstream of the Conservatives— the
Liberal Democratic party— is presently indifferent about this
matter and does not want to take the trouble to confront the
Socialists and the Komei party. Behind the Conservative
attitude not to take the trouble to alter the 1947 Constitu-
tion is another factor which has contributed to the consolida-
tion of that Constitution. In the process of economic growth
in the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s, with a number
of concomitant social changes, the 1947 Constitution and
most of the postwar reforms became necessary to the
operation of the Japanese economy and society. The issues
raised by the Conservatives, especially by the rightist wing of
them, against the 1947 Constitution became obsolete. For
example, the 1947 Constitution and the reform of the family
code assured the independence of family members. Younger
people, who were supposed to be under the control of the
familyhead before the reforms, were given legal freedom
from the family by the postwar reforms and actually received
economic freedom because of the labor shortage and rise of
wages. From the viewpoint of industry, also, voluntary

124 The Crisis of Democracy

mobility of younger people irrespective of the assent of the
familyhead was welcome. To the expanding, more-educated
population, which has contributed to the labor force with
higher quality, the idea and stipulation of the status of the
Emperor as a symbol of the state in the 1947 Constitution
has been more acceptable than either the idea of the Emperor
as God in prewar days or the policy of the Conservatives, that
the Emperor should have more substantial power. Labor
unions recognized and protected by the 1947 Constitution,
with their peculiarly Japanese form of "enterprise unions,"
were found to be no obstacle to technological innovation and
contributed to the maintenance of commitment of the
workers to the company.

Thus, the mainstream of the Liberal Democratic party and
the mainstream of Japanese economic circles have no serious
intention of revising the 1947 Constitution now or in the
near future. According to opinion polls, the majority of the
public also supports the 1947 Constitution. In addition, the
Socialists and the Komei party are firmly committed to it.
The Japan Communist party has also declared its
commitment to defend the present Constitution, at least in
the near future, although at the same time it does not hide its
view that at some future time the Constitution should be
rewritten in more socialistic style, a point which the Komei
party has been fiercely attacking.

Thus, in comparison with the German Weimar Republic of
1919-33 Japanese postwar democracy has a far firmer basis.
A doubt remains about whether or not the Japanese people
have accepted the postwar democratic system primarily
because of Japan's economic prosperity in the postwar
period. However, even if this is so, the prewar system offers
no competing attraction, especially to the younger genera-
tion. There is little possibility of a powerful revival of prewar
Japanese militarism or political traditionalism in the future.
Rather, the problem is how, within the 1947 Constitution,
Japan can handle the status of Japanese Self Defense Forces,

Japan 125

which have been regarded by the Socialist and the Commu-
nist parties as unconstitutional on one hand, and on the
other, have accumulated capability and de facto legitimacy
during their existence and development over twenty years
under the LDP government.

(b) The capability of the Liberal Democratic party. The
Japanese Conservatives, particularly the Liberal Democratic
party since its formation in 1955, have ruled Japan through-
out the postwar period, except for the short and unsuccessful
coalition of the Socialist and Democratic parties in 1947-48.
The capability of the LDP is open to partisan disputes. LDP
people and ardent -supporters of the LDP can say that under
the rule of the LDP's majority for twenty years, Japan's
economic growth and its peaceful existence with other
nations are the proofs of the LDP's high capability. The
award of the 1974 Nobel Peace Prize to ex-Prime Minister
Eisaku Sato seems to back up such an argument. But the
opposition parties have naturally been critical of the LDP's
capability and actually expressed astonishment and criticism
of the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Sato. Apart from
such partisan disputes, two observations can be made. First,
the LDP's rule has carried with it both merits and demerits—
in other words, functions and dysfunctions. Second, the
social and cultural bases which have hitherto supported the
functional side of the LDP have been declining. Thus, the
changing tides of Japanese society seem to be less congruent
with, or more beyond the adaptability of the LDP than
before.

As for the LDP's merits, I can cite three points. First, the
close coordination between the LDP, the higher elite corps of
the bureaucracy, and the economic elite (which have been
called "Japan Incorporated" since Time magazine's story of
May 10, 1971, invented the term), certainly contributed to
Japan's economic growth and will also function positively in
future times of economic crisis through skillful "consensus
economy." Certainly the LDP's capability for policy forma-

126 The Crisis of Democracy

tion is high in the sense that it is fused with the bureaucratic
elite. This group consists of ex-high-level bureaucrats, who
became either LDP parliamentary members or top executives
of public and private corporations after their relatively early
retirement (around the ages of fifty to fifty five); of active
senior bureaucrats; and of successive generations of successful
candidates in the higher civil service examination. Ex-high-
level bureaucrats as LDP politicians contribute their know-
ledge and experiences accumulated during their bureaucratic
careers to the formation of policies by the party. They can
also maintain communication with their ex-colleagues in
public and -private corporations and, moreover, may utilize
the cooperation and assistance of their successors on active
duty in the bureaucracy.

Second, the LDP has build up skillful vote-getting ma-
chines in its koenkai (associations supporting individual
politicians), through which various demands— personal,
regional, and occupational— of the vast populace have been
absorbed and satisfied. All LDP Diet members maintain their
koenkai,3 which often comprise tens of thousands of
"members" who rarely pay membership dues. Almost all the
expenses to maintain such koenkai are paid by the LDP
politicians themselves, who therefore always badly need
money. LDP politicians are very responsive to their koenkai
clients, especially to the key persons in them, who are often
the local influential persons in agricultural associations or
small- and medium-sized trade associations. Therefore, in
spite of its close coordination with big businesses and its
financial dependency on them, the LDP has not ignored the
interests of local leaders in agriculture, fisheries, small- and
medium-sized commerce, and manufacturing. The LDP at the
grass roots level has been loosely structured and has consisted
of federations of hundreds of small parties. Therefore, it has
been able to absorb a variety of interests and demands. As is
well known, however, mainly because of the distribution of
money, LDP politicians are "aggregated" into several

Japan 127

factions, and eventually, the formation of LDP policy is
made in close contact with the bureaucracy and big business-
es. Here, in a sense, there is a beautiful pattern of wide inter-
est articulation through individual LDP members and their
koenkai, with interest aggregation through factions, and
eventual agreement by the triumvirate of big business,
bureaucracy, and the LDP.

Third, although the LDP has been self-identified as a
conservative party and many members of it have expressed
nostalgia for a number of aspects of the prewar system from
time to time, and although a close tie with the United States
has been the LDP's official line on foreign policy, still LDP
Diet members have enjoyed a wide range of freedom to
express divergent policy views and even behavior concerning
both domestic and foreign policies. In the sphere of foreign
policy, members of the Asian and African Problem Study
Group had visited the People's Republic of China a number
of times before Tanaka's visit to China, and also have been
keeping in contact with the People's Democratic Republic of
Korea. However, the LDP still has strong Taiwan supporters
and also a Korean lobby, composed of those who keep close
ties with the Republic of Korea. In the sphere of domestic
policy, a fairly wide divergence of opinions exists among LDP
politicians. This ideological looseness and vagueness of the
LDP is due to the independence of LDP politicians in
vote-getting and to the nonideological formation of factions
within the LDP, and these characteristics have, in their turn,
contributed to neutralizing the party image against the attack
from the opposition parties that the LDP is a reactionary
party. These characteristics have, moreover, given the LDP
wider channels of contact and assets to be utilized in case of
policy change.

As has been pointed out, all three of these "merits," on
the other hand, carry demerits and involve dysfunctions. On
the first, close contact and skillful coordination between the
groups in the triumvirate has meant their disproportional

128 The Crisis of Democracy

predominance in policy formation. Powers to countervail and
check that triumvirate have been disporportionally weak. As
for the second mechanism, the koenkai which have made the
LDP _ capable of absorbing various interests and demands,
since the supporting groups of LDP are not distributed
equally in terms of region, occupation, and generation,
unavoidably some interests are systematically respected and
others are ignored. And, continuation of LDP rule for nearly
twenty years has generated a sense of alienation from power
and a feeling of ill-treatment in certain sectors of society. To
supporters of the opposition parties, not only LDP rule, but
also the whole "period of Japanese history under LDP rule, is
subject to criticism. It has been their rule, and their period,
not ours, from this perspective. This kind of feeling of
alienation was clearly expressed when ex-Prime Minister
Eisaku Sato was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Third,
concerning the looseness of ideological control within the
LDP, there is the widely held fear of unpredictability of LDP
behavior. Some policies are formed on the basis of factional
fights or compromise within the LDP, and many others are
made upon consultation with, or according to the advice of,
bureaucratic and business circles. Concerning the former
policies, especially from the viewpoints of opposition par-
ties, the LDP is a party which can suddenly propose ultra-
conservative, even rightist proposals. Partly due to the
result of these features of LDP rule, and partly due to the
nature of the opposition parties— especially the Japan Social-
ist party which has been tightly committed to Marxist
doctrine— a lack of trust between governing party and
opposition parties has been conspicuous. And also, those
intellectuals supporting the opposition parties are more
numerous and vocal in their criticisms of the LDP than
expected, given the stability and achievements of LDP rule.
Another source of vulnerability of the LDP is an ethical
one concerning its way of procuring and spending political
funds. All LDP politicians have to constantly procure and

Japan 129

spend money in order to maintain their own koenkai. The
minimum necessary expenditure of LDP Diet Members is said
to be 3 million yen (10,000 U.S. dollars) per month in an
off-election period. They raise part of this money themselves,
and part comes from their faction leaders. Faction leaders
have to take care of the funds of their followers. And it has
been a well-known fact that the main part of these political
funds is given by business corporations. The points are: Are
huge sums of political donations by business corporations
really pure and voluntary contributions, or is this implicit
bribery? And is it fair political competition that the LDP and
LDP factions combined are spending political funds five
times larger than the total political funds spent by all four
opposition parties together according to an official report
released by the government?4 Moreover, it is widely believed
that the actual total of political spending by the LDP is more
than this official record.

It is a well-known fact that the LDP's share of the votes in
national elections has been gradually declining. Although in
the case of the House of Representatives the LDP still
maintained a 46.8 percent share of the votes in the 1972
general election, the LDP share fell below 40 percent (39.5
percent) in the Prefectural Constituency of the election of
the House of Councillors in 1974. Partly due to the
overrepresentation of the rural districts in the Diet and partly
due to the split of the opposition parties, the LDP still
succeeds in getting a majority of the seats in the Houses (27 1
out of 49 1 in the House of Representatives, and 1 26 out of
252 in the House of Councillors). The LDP's majority is slim
in the House of Councillors, however, and the LDP lacks
sufficient majority legitimacy even in the House of Repre-
sentatives due to rural overrepresentation and disproportional
spending of political funds.

(c) Quality of the Japanese bureaucracy. Although it
depends on the definition of governability, in any under-
standing of governability as a synthetic capability relating the

130 The Crisis of Democracy

governing and the governed, the quality of bureaucracy, as
the governing framework or as an intermediary between the
governing and the governed or^s an autonomous third force,
has special significance. In this respect, the Japanese bureau-
cracy seems to deserve some attention. Historically, the
Japanese bureaucracy was formed after the Prussian model,
legacies of which remain even today in formalistic legalism
and alleged neutralism which does not, however, prevent the
high bureaucrats from committing themselves to partisan
stands of the governing party, as representing the interest of
the state. Many high-level bureaucrats, after retirement, have
joined the LDP and, after their successful election, have
become key figures in the governing party. The bureaucrats,
on duty are, however, fairly autonomous under the control
of administrative vice-ministers and the elite bureaucratic
corps has a high degree of esprit de corps, similar to the
British Civil Service. During the recent period of economic
growth, mainly in the Ministries of Financed and of
International Trade and Industry, and in the Economic
Planning Agency, technocrats, consisting primarily of eco-
nomic specialists, have been gaining power, and in this
predominance of technocrats, Japanese bureaucracy can be
compared with the French bureaucracy.

Thus, the capability of Japanese bureaucracy can be
evaluated as rather high. The members of the elite bureau-
cratic corps, consisting of those who passed the higher civil
service examination— whose number is still limited to 400 or
so annually in this age of expansion of higher education with
■1.5 million university students, are really elite both in terms
of their initial caliber and the opportunities for training and
accumulation of administrative experience given to them
during their careers. This elite bureaucratic corps of about
1 0,000 is still prepared today to work twenty-four hours per
day and seven days a week if necessary, because of its
privileged position of good care and faster promotion and the
prevailing ethos of diligence and self-sacrifice in the elite

Japan 131

There are, however, dysfunctions and vulnerability in the
Japanese bureaucracy. The top level of the Japanese bureau-
cratic elite corps and alumni from this group have been too
fused with the LDP. Furthermore, with the expansion of
higher education, a system designed to recruit only 400 or so
per year to the elite bureaucratic corps cannot maintain itself
forever. Actually, many university graduates are taking
examinations for middle civil service positions which have
been intended for high school or junior college graduates.
The point is that in such a situation it will become difficult
to give special favor to those who passed higher civil service
examinations and to discriminate against other members of
the bureaucracy who are now also university graduates. In
the near future the notion and practice of the elite
bureaucratic corps will be forced to give way to more
egalitarian, less privileged forms. Local governments have
been doing this already. For instance, the Tokyo metropol-
itan government has been recruiting several hundred universi-
ty graduates on an equal basis. In addition it has been an
established practice for Japanese ministries to recruit their
own personnel, both elite and non-elite, as the personnel of
their own ministries only. The aim has been to build up the
ministry's own bureaucracy of specialists on matters over
which that ministry presides and to build up strong solidarity
in the elite bureaucratic corps within a particular ministry.
This practice has brought with it the pattern of ministerial
bureaucrats acting to promote the interests of their clienteles
and ardently promoting interests and demands within their
jurisdictions even in dispute with the governing party, thus
serving as guardians of interests which might be neglected by
the governing party. But, the cost paid for this is bureaucratic
sectionalism and there is no bureau to take care of overall
policy. To be sure there are the Prime Minister's office and
the Cabinet Secretariat, which are supposed to perform this
function, but these bureaucrats come from various ministries,
serve for a couple of years, and go back to their home

132 The Crisis of Democracy

ministries; therefore, they are likely to remain committed to
the particular interests of their home ministries.

(d) The economy. As is well known, Japanese economic
growth during the two decades before the oil crisis of Octo-
ber 1973 was amazing, continuously maintaining an annual
growth rate over 10%. GNP and also per capita income dou-
bled every five years. Even considering the rise of commodity
prices, real wages still nearly doubled between 1960 and
1972.6 Japan's GNP is larger than that of any West European
country and its per capita income or wage is roughly equal
with, or even slightly more than, that of Britain or France,
according to the statistics. With this growth of GNP and in-
crease of per capita income and wages, government revenue
and spending have expanded enormously. From 1965 to
1973, for instance, the government budget grew from 3,658
billion yen to 14, 284 billion yen, that is, over three times.7
In other words, so far, with the growth of the Japanese econ-
omy, the government has acquired tremendous amounts of
goods and services which it can dispose, and this has made it
possible for the Japanese government to distribute goods and
services in response to the increased demands of the popu-
lace. Under these circumstances, government has been able to
avoid serious priority problems.

Again, as is well known, since the successive revaluation of
the yen, the oil crisis and the subsequent jump of oil prices,
the picture has been changing rapidly. The growth rate for
fiscal year 1973 (April 1973 to March 1974) dropped sharply
to 5.4 percent, and that for the 1974 fiscal year was
eventually found to be minus (—1.8 percent). According to
the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), the
expected growth rate for 1975 is 2 percent. Although
somewhat slowed, the rise of consumer prices as of March
1975 in comparison with the previous year was still 13
percent. The government target is to lower the rise of
consumer prices to a single digit by the end of 1975. In this
economic situation, the national government could still
increase its budget to 17,180 billion yen in the 1974 fiscal

Japan 133

year and 21,280 billion yen in fiscal year 1975, without
creating serious deficits and increasing the rate of inflation,
but local governments now face serious deficits in their
budgets. It is- expected that the national government too will
face a tighter financial situation and priority problems in
budget-making for next fiscal year, beginning in April 1976.

As for the longer economic perspective, the government
defines the period from 1974 to 1976 as an adjustment
period from rapid economic growth to stable economic
growth or a "less accelerated" economy, as it is called. After
1976, the MITI is expecting, an annual economic growth rate
of about 7 percent. If so, this moderate growth can bring
with it some leeway for priority problems but that leeway
will be far more restricted in comparison with previous years
of more than 10 percent growth of the economy.

(e)Mass media. Development of mass media in Japan is
quite conspicuous. The total number of copies of newspapers
issued daily is 56 million copies, which is second only to that
of the United States (63 million copies). The estimated
number of television sets currently in use is 48 million, and
there are five nationwide television networks— one is the
publicly operated NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation)
and the other four are privately owned (NTV, TBS, Fuji, and
NET).8 Besides the press and TV, the plethora of magazines
is a characteristic of the Japanese mass media scene. In
particular, the variety of weekly magazines with huge
circulations (about fifty different weekly magazines are
selling eight million copies per month) is striking.

What is the relevance of the Japanese mass media to the
governability of Japanese democracy? Under the postwar
democracy, there has been no governmental censorship
except during the occupation period, and all the major
newspapers and TV networks have been avowed guardians of
democracy. Their quality is not bad, especially the five major
newspapers with nationwide circulation {Asahi, Mainichi,
Yomiuri, Sankei, and Nihon Keizai), which are proud of

1 34 The Crisis of Democracy

being quality newspapers with circulations of several million
and which compete with each other in terms of their
excellence.

Thus we can say that the Japanese mass media as a whole
are a positive factor in the maintenance and operation of
Japanese democracy. However, the Japanese mass media have
several characteristics peculiar to Japan, which function as a
kind of constraint, within which Japanese democracy has to
operate and which might make Japanese democracy
vulnerable under possible changed conditions.

First, as has often been pointed out, Japanese newspapers
are highly standardized, in the sense that they tend to refrain
from presenting partisan opinion, and allocate their space in a
quite similar way to coverage of 'everything from on-the-
street human interest stories to highbrow academic articles.

Second, alongside their nonpartisanship, another
established characteristic of Japanese newspapers is what is
called their "opposition spirit," which means critical of the
government, but within the limits of nonpartisanship. The
result is that nonpartisan intellectual radicalism is treated
rather favorably in the newspapers and a tone of moral
sensationalism colors the reports and articles in newspapers.

In the case of broadcasting, NHK clings more strictly to
the principle of nonpartisanship and to a less critical spirit
than the newspapers. Other TV networks are more and more
tied to particular major newspapers and show similar
characteristics to these newspapers in their reporting.
However, sensationalism is more obvious in several weekly
magazines, such as Shukan-Post, Shukan-Gendai and, al-
though in a rather conservative tone, Shukan-Shincho , each
of which sells over 500,000 copies every week.

Those characteristics of Japanese mass media can have
both positive and negative functions for the governability of
Japanese democracy. The newspapers' and NHK's nonparti-
sanship is good in preventing manipulation by the powerful
mass media. Sensationalism has helped to arouse the atten-

Japan 135

tion of the public to politics from issue to issue as they arise.
Negative functions, however, also follow from these charac-
teristics. Nonpartisanship of the mass media can bring with it
the loss of the function of stimulating political discussion,
and the critical spirit and moral sensationalism can obstruct
necessary mobilization of support by the government and
encourage political distrust of the government.

(f) Education. Expansion of higher education in Japan has
been amazing during the past decade. The percentage of
those enrolling in universities and colleges among the eligible
age group has doubled during the decade and reached 30
percent in 1974. Furthermore, it is expected that his trend
will continue and that enrollment will reach 40 percent by
1980. From an educational standpoint, the Japanese uni-
versity system has a number of problems to be solved,9 but
only the political relevance of this expansion of higher
education will be considered here.

So far, university expansion has had relatively little direct
impact on politics. Of course, there has been sporadic campus
unrest, emergence of a variety of radical groups recruited
from university students, and participation of a number of
students in antipollution movements. Also, the Japan Com-
munist Party has maintained its influence on student move-
ments through its Democaratic Youth League, and the
League's members are quite active in assisting JCP's election
campaigns. However, a majority of the 1 .5 million Japanese
university students and the couple millions of recent grad-
uates have been relatively calm politically. One of the rea-
sons for this calm has been the favorable situation of the
job market for rapidly expanding numbers of university
graduates. The decade has witnessed an enormous expansion
of tertiary industries and of professional, technical, and
clerical jobs, which have absorbed a couple million university
graduates. The shortage of young blue-collar workers resulted
in the improvement of the wages of not only young
blue-collar workers but also of young white-collar workers. In

136 The Crisis of Democracy

spite of an ongoing change of values in the younger
generation, organizational disciplines regulating the new
recruits in business or bureaucracy have persisted and have
been successful in making them adapt to organizational
norms. Moreover, so far the expansion of higher education
has coincided with the expansion of local governmental
activities and personnel. The percentage of university gradu-
ates among newly recruited civil servants on the local
government level has increased rapidly, which has certainly
contributed to upgrading the quality of the local civil
service.

Another aspect of higher education has been the increase
of social science specialists in the universities, some of whom
have begun to keep closer contact with governmental
policy-making than previous Japanese university professors.
In the fields of econometrics, social engineering, and regional
planning a number of specialists are giving more advice and
keeping close contact with the government. On the other
hand, expansion of higher education has also brought with it
an increasing number of intellectual oppositionists. In Japan's
case, however, intellectual opposition has a long tradition.
What is new is the emergence of policy-oriented fields of
social science and policy-oriented intellectuals prepared to
give advice to government.

The crucial question, however, is whether the Japanese
economy can continue to offer suitable jobs to university
graduates who constitute over 30 percent or even 40 percent
of the corresponding age group. And another crucial question
is the cost and quality of higher education. Government has
been increasing the appropriation of public funds to assist
private universities. In the expected tight budgetary situation,
whether government can and should expand such assistance is
questionable.

(g) Labor unions. In postwar Japanese democracy, labor
unions have established their recognized position firmly.

Japan 137

Also, Japanese labor unions with their form of "enterprise
union"— meaning that unions have been organized
corresponding to the scope of each company, embracing all
employees in that company— have had no essential objection
to the introduction of technological innovations so long as
the company has guaranteed favorable treatment and offered
retraining to those who were transferred to new jobs in the
company, unlike British unions based on a particular job or
craft. In spite of their basic form of "enterprise union,"
Japanese labor unions have succeeded in building up
federations of unions within the same kind of industries, and
eventually nationaL federations of labor unions. (Sohyo and
Domei are two big national federations of labor unions which
have been exercising fairly strong influence through their
jointly scheduled plan of wage-raise demands [the so-called
"spring struggle"] and electoral campaigning in support of
the opposition parties. Sohyo supports the Socialists and
Domei supports the Democratic Socialists.)

Present-day democracy cannot exist without the recog-
nition of, and support from, labor unions. Actually, the
Japanese labor unions, especially the two big national
federations, have been the avowed guardians of postwar
democracy, although in different senses and directions. Sohyo
has been in close cooperation with the Socialists, not com-
pletely unfavorable to the Communists, and definitely against
the LDP. Domei has been supporting more moderate Demo-
cratic Socialists. While definitely against the Communists, it
has been prepared to cooperate with the LDP and LDP
government upon certain conditions.

The roles to be played by labor unions in a democracy,
however, involve a number of delicate situations. In Japan's
case, even under the LDP government which has had no labor
union to support it, government cannot ignore labor unions
in labor administration and has had representatives of Soh-
yo and Domei on a number of Deliberation Councils on

138 The Crisis of Democracy

labor administration and also on Labor Relations
Committees. But essentially, the LDP has been on the side of
business and more concerned with the interests of its
supporters— farmers, small and medium-size manufacturers,
.and all other miscellaneous people organized into their own
koenkai. One might argue that it has been rather a good
balance since organized labor has had powerful say even if
it has not been respected by the LDP. The opposite argu-
ment is that organized labor should have been respected
more in order to counterbalance the influence of big business
on LDP governments. Some people argue that organized
labor has been representing not only the interests of its mem-
bers buf also all those who have been unfavorably treated
under LDP governments. The third view, which has been
emerging recently, does not trust either LDP governments or
labor unions. It insists that since labor unions represent the
interests of only a fraction of the total population (only
about 30 percent of the employed are organized into labor
unions) and since the two national federations represent an
even smaller fraction (Sohyo, with its 4 million membership,
organizes 10 percent; and Domei, with its 2.5 million mem-
bership, 7 percent of the total employed), the interests of
ordinary citizens should be respected more, that is, emerging
consumers' movements and various citizens' movements
should be respected more than, or at least alongside, organ-
ized labor in order to increase the responsiveness and equity
of Japanese democracy.

II. CHANGING VALUES, NEW GENERATIONS

AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE GOVERNABILITY

OF JAPANESE DEMOCRACY

Since values determine the way people think and act, it is
important to see how changing values, which are most
conspicuously observable in the younger generation and are
expected to accumulate in years to come, will affect the

Japan 139

governability of Japanese democracy.

1 . Political Beliefs

(a) The 1947 Constitution as a package as the key political
belief. All the survey data collected in recent years reinforce
the point that there is no sign of weakening of the support
for the 1947 Constitution as a whole. On the contrary,
younger and more-educated people tend to support more
strongly the 1947 Constitution as a whole, including its
Article 9 forbidding Japan to wage a war and to have armed
forces for that purpose.10 Therefore, the 1947 Constitution
has become a given.

One argument against the Constitution is that the Japanese
"warlike" national character will not change so easily;
therefore, if international situations slightly change, the
Japanese will easily change their minds and discard the 1947
Constitution, especially its Article 9. But this kind of
argument, which is often found among overseas Chinese
scholars, is highly improbable. Another argument stresses
that if some grave change should occur in international
relations, in other words if some real threat of aggression to
Japan by some foreign powers should occur, the Japanese
"mood" would change rapidly to support rearmament and
consequently a revision of the 1947 Constitution. The
possibility certainly exists, but this argument seems to be
based on assumptions of low probability.

At the same time, because of the recent activities of the
Japanese Red Army abroad, there are continued possibilities
that minority radicals will resort to individual or small group
terrorism both abroad and at home. These incidents are not
the expression of general bellicosity of the Japanese people,
but the expression of New Left minority radicals, also widely
found in North America and West European countries, and of
Japanese ignorance of the Arabs and the lack of a connection
between Japanese radicalism and Jewish intellectuals, such as
is found in North America or Western Europe.

140 The Crisis of Democracy

It is undeniable that the radical minorities on the far left
will continue to commit terrorism abroad in supporting the
Arabs (or, precisely, being utilized by the Arabs) and within
Japan by bombing the offices of such companies as the
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Company or the Mitsui Bussan
Company. The ultrarightists, too, will be able to recruit a
small number of new members constantly from the youth
both in and outside universities, and they might succeed in
political terrorism in the future too, such as the assassination
of the Socialists' Chairman Inejiro Asanuma, which occurred
in 1960. As a whole, however, the Japanese younger
generations have the political beliefs congruent with, and
definitely supporting, the 1947 Constitution.

(b) Emergence of "participation" and "protest" mo-
tivations and movements. An ongoing change of political
beliefs is occurring, which is not incompatible with the
beliefs in the 1947 Constitution, but is not identical with it,
and which will exercise a far-reaching influence on the future
of Japanese democracy. It is a change from submissiveness to
authority to active protest and demands for participation,
that is, from "subject" political culture to "participatory"
political culture. There are excellent data which show this
change. (Table 1 ).

Two comments are specially warranted on this table. When
the first survey was conducted in 1953, a majority of the
Japanese over twenty years old were prepared to leave things
to competent politicians, if such were available. In other
words, at that time, the majority of the masses were prepared
to obey a competent politician; therefore, the governability
problem was simply a problem of the politicians— that is,
whether such competent politicians were available or not.
During the period of economic growth, people have become
more self-assertive and have come to dislike leaving things
even to competent politicians. Then, the governability
problem becomes not only, the problem of the competence of
the governing, but the problem of both the governing and the

Japan 141

Table 1

Responses to the question: "In order to improve the
Japanese nation, do you agree or disagree to the statement
that, if a competent politician is available, it is better to
leave things to him instead of discussing them among
ordinary citizens?"

Agree

Case by
case

Disagree

Others,
DK,NA

Total

1953

43

- 9

.._ 38

10

100%(n=2,254)

1958

35

10

44

11

100%(n=2,369)

1963

29

12

47

12

100%(n=2,698)

1968

30

10

51

9

100%(n=3,033)

1973

23

15

51

11

100%(n=3,055)

Source: Institute of Mathematical Statistics, Ministry of Education, A
Study of the Japanese National Character-The Fifth Nation-wide
Survey- 1973.

governed.

Other transnational data show the existence of the
phenomena of increasing demands for participation in Japan
similar to those in West European and North American
countries. Respondents in a poll were asked to choose two
most important values from "law and order," "encourage-
ment of more participation in vital political decisions,"
"restraint of the rise of prices," and "freedom of speech,"
values which were used in Professor Ronald Inglehart's six
West European surveys.11 Japanese respondents reacted in
the following way. According to the marginal distribution,
"price restraint" was the first choice (70.4 percent), and the
others followed with "law and order" (45.3 percent), "par-
ticipation" (35.1 percent), and "freedom of speech" (13.8
percent). The age and educational differences, however,

142 The Crisis of Democracy

were conspicuous. Among younger people in their twenties
and those with university education, the choice of "partici-
pation" surpassed that of "law and order" and gained the
second ranking after "price restraint." In combinations of
two values, the combination of "participation and free
speech," which Professor Inglehart assumed to be the pure
type of "postindustrial value," was less popular in Japan than
in West European countries. Japanese responses, however,
were more concentrated in the intermediary type of "prices
and participation." (Tables 2 and 3.) And again, the younger
and the more-educated clearly show their preference for the
value of participation. (Among those in their twenties, about
15 percent prefer the combination of "participation and free
speech," and, if coupled with "participation and prices,"
they are the top choice.)

The heightening of participatory motivation, however, is
often related to increasing distrust of institutionalized
channels of participation— that is, elections and political
parties. Thus, the other side of the coin is the decline of
political parties and rise of various voluntary citizens' and
residents' movements which dislike and refuse to follow the
leadership of any political party and prefer protests instead
of institutionalized participation. Respondents in a recent
nationwide survey12 were asked the question "which would
you prefer about the future of Japanese party politics— one,
to back up the political party which can be relied on; two, to
promote citizens' or residents' movements as they become
necessary; three, I have nothing to do with political parties or
politics at all?" The responses divided as follows: 57.0
percent chose the first response, 17.3 percent the second, and
5.3 percent the third. The distribution is not so bad from the
viewpoint of political parties. Again, however, the younger
(among those in their twenties, 22.4 percent prefer citizens'
movements to parties and 6.5 percent are totally against
politics) and the more-educated (23.1 percent of the univer-
sity graduates prefer citizens' movements rather than political

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1 44 The Crisis of Dem ocracy

parties) have less trust in institutional channels of partici-
pation and are turning more to uninstitutional, protest-orien-
ted movements.

Protest-oriented movements Jiave been spreading beyond
the younger and more-educated people and beyond urban
and industrial areas to older, less-educated people and to
local, agricultural, and fishery areas. The Mutsu, the first
Japanese nuclear-powered test ship, drifted for fifty-four
days because of fierce protest actions of the fishermen of the
bay in which the base for that ship was located. There were
complicated reasons for this protest. Fear of nuclear
accidents and consequent possible contamination was
certainly one of the reasons. However, the antipathy of the
fishermen, living in the "periphery" and ill-treated by the
"center" for a long time, against the government was
reported to be another reason. The point of the drifting
incident of the Mutsu was that, whatever the reasons for the
protest were, even the fishermen in remote local areas were
prepared to organize protest movements when they felt the
government was doing them an injustice. Also, farmers are no
longer silent and obedient to the government whenever they
feel they are treated unjustly.

If "governability" involves the capacity of the government
to impose policies or plans unilaterally which will affect the
living of the citizens concerned, certainly such governability
in Japan has decreased. The Japanese government, however,
because of its long tradition of Obrigkeit-staat, often violates
the usual standard of democracy in its behavior vis-a-vis
citizens. In order to talk about the governability of
democracy in the Japanese case, sometimes democracy
should still be emphasized at the cost of governability.
Moreover, the cost can be partly covered by learning and
efforts on the side of bureaucrats to be more careful and
humane in doing their business. Fortunately, Japanese
bureaucrats— both national and local— nowadays have such a
learning capacity. Another factor which has worked so far in

Japan 145

recent years is the financial ability of government to afford
additional spending in order to appease the protest
movements by compensating the alleged damage or promising
costly changes of plans. It is certainly an easy solution,
avoiding the. priority problem, which will become difficult in
the approaching tighter governmental budget situation.

2. Social and Economic Values

In a society such as Japan after World War II, where
indoctrination from above with the threat of punishment was
nonexistent, where any kind of religious inhibitions after
the separation of the Shinto from the state were virtually
nonexistent, and where social changes, such as urbanization,
rise of income, and change of consumption styles due to the
rapid economic changes, were so rapid, it would be natural to
expect that every aspect of social relationships and values
underlying them would change considerably. Again, the most
illuminating data showing the kinds of changes of social
relations and their underlying values are found in the surveys
conducted by the Institute of Statistical Mathematics,
Ministry of Education every five years since 1953. One
question notes that "there are all sorts of attitudes toward
life. Of those listed here (the list is shown), which one would
you say comes closest to your feeling?" The percentages of
those who picked "don't think about money or fame, just
live a life that suits your own tastes," have increased from 2 1
percent in 1953 to 27 percent in 1958, 30 percent in 1963,
32 percent in 1968, and 39 percent in 1973 by national
average.13 People have come to prefer less strenuous, more
relaxed ways of life. The change has been most conspicuous
among the younger generation.

What are the effects of such value changes on Japanese
working behavior? Other survey data14 show that the
younger workers have stronger demands for shorter working
hours, more holidays, and longer vacations, as well as more
opportunity for self-actualization on the job. (Table 4).

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Japan 147

However, the same table tells us about a number of other
features of Japanese workers' demands. ( 1 ) Even among the
young workers wage raises is still the most outstanding
demand. Money is not the goal of life as the survey data
show; however, wage increases are the gravest concern for
workers in all ages. (2) Middle-aged people, especially those
with growing families, have an increased desire to own a
house, particularly on their own land, which will serve as
security in an age of continued inflation. (3) Senior workers
are naturally more concerned about their retirement, health
care, and other welfare measures.

In spite of the ^hanging values of the workers, the
Japanese organizations— both governmental organizations and
private enterprises— have coped skillfully so far in maintaining
a high level of motivation for work among their employees,
as indicated by a very low rate of absence (2.12 percent in a
survey of February 197315). The reasons for this success are:
(1) The workforce still contains a large proportion of older
generations who are committed to older values which lay
emphasis on dedication to hard work and loyalty to the
organizations. It is often pointed out that the middle-aged,
middle-management people in particular have a generational
feature of this kind. (2) Japanese big organizations with their
paternalistic tradition have the capacity and resources to
absorb a variety of demands of the workers of various
generations including the youngest: better medical care,
housing loans with lower interest, better recreational
facilities, and of course, so far, large annual increases in
wages. Moreover, they are now introducing a five-day work
week, longer vacations, and an extension of the retirement
age from fifty-five to sixty— on these points, they are in a
position to make concessions to workers' demands. (3) The
Japanese younger generation is, in comparison with the
previous, older generation, less work-oriented, less
organization-oriented, and more self-assertive. In comparison
with West European or American youth, however, the

148 The Crisis of Democracy

present Japanese youth still retains some virtues favorable to
the functioning of organizations if the Japanese organizations
are clever enough to make an improvement in their
operations. For instance, according to national character
surveys, the preference of the Japanese for department chiefs
who are paternalistic over those who are rationally specific
remains unchanged,16 Many of them want "self-actualization
on the job." According to an eleven-country study of youth
conducted by the Japanese government, the percentages of
Japanese youth who have chosen "a job worth doing" as the
most precious thing in their lives are the highest among the
countries surveyed. In spite of signs of decline and less
diffuse commitment to the organizations among Japanese
youth, comparatively speaking, the Japanese youth are
still seeking more from the organizations, and, when or-
ganizations are flexible enough to introduce an improve-
ment to take care of more self-assertive youth, they can
maintain a fairly high level of work motivation among
the youth, keeping the basic lines of Japanese organizations
such as life employment, enterprise union, diffuse social
relationships within the organizations, and so on. For
example, so far .there has never even been serious discussion
of abolishing the belt conveyor system in assembly lines in
Japanese factories.

All the labor and business specialists seem to agree17 that
the Japanese organizational structures with life employment,
enterprise unions, relatively strong commitment to the
organizations, and higher motivation to work will survive at
least until 1980, as far as the internal factors within them are
concerned. Conversely, this means that in the first part of the
1980s Japan will reach the critical point where the
accumulated changes of work ethics, attitudes toward life,
and those toward company and union will necessitate
corresponding changes in the hitherto established institutions
and practices in labor relations. Therefore, it will be wiser for
Japanese society to prepare for that period and preempt

Japan 149

some of the anticipated reforms in advance.

III. CONSEQUENCES FOR AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES

ON THE GOVERNABILITY OF

JAPANESE DEMOCRACY

1 . Time Lag

Comparing the three regions, Japanese democracy seems to
be suffering less from various changes which have already had
threatening effects on democracies in the other two regions.
Japan seems to be enjoying the time lag between causes
already occurred and the consequences to follow, partly
due to the remaining reservoir of traditional values,18 and
partly due to the structure of its economy.

2. Decline of Leadership and Delay of Decisions

Some of the consequences of these changes have, however,
already emerged to weaken the leadership capacity of
Japanese democracy, and the world situation has been
changing in the direction of demanding more positive action
of Japan, which will be generated only by a higher level of
leadership capacity.

As is well known, the LDP is facing the possibility of
losing its majority position in the Diet. The opposition
parties are split, that is, there is no opposition party which
can take the responsibility of governing by itself. Of course, a
multiparty system and coalition formation are not
intrinsically dysfunctional to the operation of democracy.
Moreover, the LDP as the majority governing party for twen-
ty years generated a number of dysfunctions such as a sense
of alienation on the part of the supporters of opposition
parties, excessive fusion of the LDP with the bureaucracy and
big business, the ethical problem of political funds, and
sporadic attempts to revive some part of prewar institutions,
thereby causing unnecessary friction.19 On the other hand,
since coalition formation is quite a new experience to Japan-

1 50 The Crisis of Democracy

ese politics on the national level, some confusion and delay
of decision would be unavoidable. Especially in foreign
policy decision-making, any coalition— even the most moder-
ate one of the LDP and the small Democratic Socialists— will
bring with it a weakening of the Japan-U.S. alliance to some
degree and probably recourse to a less positive role in inter-
national affairs, from the U.S. viewpoint. In other words,
coalition formation can bring a more drifting or flexible
foreign policy than that under the LDP's single rule. 20
Domestically also, a multiparty system and coalition
formation are good for interest articulation but not neces-
sarily good for interest aggregation. Even under the LDP's
single rule, pressure groups have been rampant in getting
shares in the government budget. Any coalition will be ex-
posed to more diverse pressures in budget-making and policy
formation.

3. Vagaries of Urban, Educated Nonpartisans

A decade ago, the Socialists seemed to have a bright
future, replacing the LDP and taking the position of
governing party at some time. The Socialists were then
getting the support of the more-educated in the urban
areas.21 Today, however, in the urban areas, not only the
LDP, but also the Socialists are declining. The Komei, the
Communists and, although in less degree, the Democratic
Socialists are getting a larger share of the votes than before.
But these parties are also uncertain about their future
because what exists in big cities is a vast number of floating
voters with a nonpartisan orientation, whose educational
level t is high. It seems that no single party will be able to
organize this section of the voters as the solid basis of
support for it. Fortunately, the possibility is quite slim or
nonexistent that these people will come to support the
extreme rightists or extreme leftists even in the case of a
sudden international or domestic crisis. But they are
vagarious in voting, switching their votes from one party to

Japan 151

another, and they like to vote for a popular nonpartisan
candidate if such a candidate can be found. Successful
candidates in gubernatorial elections or mayoral elections in
urban areas are those who can appeal to this kind of voter in
addition to gaining the support of more than one party. The
increasing importance of urban, educated nonpartisans has a
positive function in making politicians and political parties
more responsive to the demands of the populace outside their
regular supporters. However, by encouraging excessive
populistic responsiveness by the politicians and political
parties, this can also lower their capacity for integration.

4. The Place of theXToffinTunists in the Multiparty System

The Japan Communist party (JCP) has been successful in
recent elections in increasing its votes and seats at both the
national and local level. To take the case 'of the House of
Representatives, the JCP's votes have increased from 2.2
million votes (4.76 percent of the total votes cast) in 1967 to
3.2 million votes (6.81 percent) in 1969, and to 5.5 million
votes (10.49 percent) in 1972. Especially in metropolitan
areas, the JCP is now getting about 20 percent of the total
vote. And the JCP has more than 300,000 members (virtually
the largest solid party membership in Japan) and its
daily party newspaper has more than a million circulation. A
number of prefectural governors and big city mayors were
elected with the joint support of the JCP together with the
Socialists, and, in some cases, the Komei party.

Does the JCP present any possible threat to the
governability of Japanese democracy in near future? Most of
the observations seem to support the negative, that is,
optimistic answer, for the following reasons. First, the JCP
seems to be approaching its ceiling in terms of share of the
votes. As a nationwide average 15 percent would be the
ceiling at least for the 1970s, with 30 percent in metropolitan
areas where the JCP is maintaining its strongholds. Second, a
major factor which contributed to the increase of support for

152 The Crisis of Democracy

the JCP is its soft and flexible domestic policies and
nationalistic foreign policies independent from the Soviet and
Chinese Communist parties. Domestically, the JCP with an
average of 15 percent of the votes, or 30 percent in big cities,
adopting soft lines would do no harm at all to Japanese
democracy. Many domestic issues would be negotiable with
this kind of JCP. In the foreign policy area, an independent
and nationalistic JCP would function as a factor to enhance
Japan's isolation, not only from the United States but also
from China and other Asian countries. In this respect, it can
be said that the JCP would work dysfunctionally.

-5. What Will Happen in the 1980s?

Japanese democracy is not in a serious crisis at the present
moment. However, the time lag mentioned above means that
Japanese democracy will face the consequences of social
changes in a future, possibly tighter situation. In comparison
with the United States, where the "democratic surge" can be
regarded as already having passed the peak, in Japan there is
no sign of decline in the increasing tide of popular demands.
On the other hand, financial resources of the government are
showing signs of stagnation. The reservoir of traditional
values of obedience, groupism, frugality, etc., which are still
working to counterbalance the rising tide of popular demands
and protest, might be exhausted at some future time. Thus,
the emergence of the time-lagged consequences and the
exhaustion of the "traditional" reservoir will both come in
the early 1980s, as many people argue.

What will become of Japanese democracy after 1980?
According to a survey on national goals,22 a majority of the
Japanese leaders surveyed believe that Japan will continue to
be committed to democratic principles and to a "uniquely
Japanese democracy" in the future. But what this would be
and how it can be built are still unclear.

Japan 153

NOTES

1 . Joji Watanuki, "Contemporary Japanese Perceptions of
International Society," Sophia University, Institute of International
Relations Research Paper Series A-13, 1973.

2. Joji Watanuki, "Formation and Survival of Japanese Democracy
after the Second World War," a paper presented to the VIII World
Congress of Sociology, Toronto, Canada, August 1974.

3 . As for koenkai, see also Joji Watanuki, "Japanese Politics in
Flux," in James William Morley (ed.), Prologue to the Future-The

United States and Japan in the Postindustrial Age (Lexington: D. C.

Heath, 1974), pp. 77-79.

4. According to ._ the. report on the revenue of political funds
compiled by Ministry of Autonomy for the first half of 1974, out of a
registered total of 51.6 billion yen ($172 million) in political funds, the
LDP itself and LDP factions together got 40 billion yen. See The
Yomiuri Shimbun, December 25, 1974. Moreover, it is widely believed
that, if we take "hidden money" into consideration, the LDP is
spending more. For instance, it was pointed out that the actual sum of
money the LDP spent in 1972 was nearly 100 billion yen, although the
official record for that year was 26 billion yen. See Bungei Shunju,
September 1974.

5 . In a survey on Bureay and Section Chiefs in the Japanese
national bureaucracy, 37 percent answered that they are independent
when asked about their party preference. Especially in the Ministry of
International Trade and Industry and the Economic Planning Agency,
the majority chose the position of independent. This is proof of the
high political neutrality of technocrats. Nikkei Business Henshubu,
Nippon no Kigyo Kankyo (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 1974), pp.
182-83.

6. Ibid., p. 72.

7. These figures include the general account but exclude special
accounts and governmental investment; they include the starting budget
but do not count any additional budget; and they are nominal values.

. 8. These figures are cited from Nobutaka Shikauch, "Nihon no
Masukomi no Genjo to Fuji-Sankei-Group no Chosen," Seiron,
November, 1974. Also, I am indebted to this article in describing the

154 The Crisis of Democracy

characteristics of Japanese mass media.

9. For instance, see "Review of National Policies for Education,"
Education Committee, OECD, November, 1970.

10. For instance, see Joji Watanuki, "Contemporary Japanese
Perceptions of International Society," op. cit., table 4 in appendix.

11. -Japanese data were gathered by Komei Senkyo Renmei in a
nationwide survey conducted in December 1972. European data were
based on a survey conducted by Professor Inglehart. See Ronald
Inglehart, 'The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational Change
in Postindustrial Societies ," American Political Science Review, vol. 65,
no. 4 (December 1971), pp. 991-1017.

12. Komei Senkyo-Renmei, Sangiin Tsujosenkyo no Jittai, 1974.

13. Institute of Statistical Mathematics, A Study of the Japanese
National Character— The Fifth Nationwide Survey, Research Report
General Series No. 38, 1974, p. 25.

14. From a survey conducted by the Ministry of Labor in 1971.
Cited from Shokuken, 1974, Spring, p. 3.

15. From the survey on the illness and absence of workers,
conducted by the Ministry of Labor, February 1973. Moreover,
vacations are counted as absence.

16. Institute of Mathematical Statistics, op. cit., p. 55.

1 7. Sadayoshi Okubo, Rodo no Miraiyosoku [Prediction of Future
Labor] (Tokyo: Teikoku Chihogyosei Gakkai, 1972).

1 8. Since the oil crisis, many observers argue that we have to return
to traditional values. For instance, ex-Vice Minister of MITI, Eimei
Yamashita, answered a question by Bernard Krisher, Newsweek's
Tokyo bureau chief, as follows: Question: What about the impact of
Japan's economic crunch on traditional values?" Answer: "I see it as
leading to a return to traditional values rather than a departure from
them. During the past decade, Japanese youth abandoned all ideas of
saving. They spent lavishly on clothes, electronics, and cars. But since
the oil crisis, we have returned to more basic Japanese concepts. I don't
think we will revert entirely to the mentality of Tokugawa feudalism,
but we will be able to strike a happy balance." Newsweek, November
18, 1974, p. 15.

19. For instance, even today, under the Miki Cabinet, some LDP
members are tenaciously trying to make the Yasukuni shrine— a Shinto
shrine dedicated to those who died in battle since Meiji— a national

Japan 155

institution, despite fierce protest from not only opposition parties but
also Christians.

20. Whether Japanese toreign policy will be labeled "drifting" or
"flexible" depends on whether we can establish our own principles of
diplomacy under a multiparty system or not.

21. Cf. Joji Watanuki, "Patterns of Politics in Present-day Japan," S.
M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, eds., Party Systems and Voter Alignments
(New York: The Free Press, 1967).

22. Yasumasa Tanaka, "Toward a Multi-Level, Multi-Stage Model of
Modernization: A Case Study of Japanese Opinion Leaders on the
Present and Future National Goals," Gakushuin Review of Law and
Politics, 9, 1974, p. 27.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

I. THE CHANGING CONTEXT
OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT

If ever there was a democratic success story, it was written
by the Trilateral societies during the quarter-century
following World War II. The components of that success
included: generally positive and broadgauged political
leadership within individual countries and by the United
States for the community of democratic nations; sustained
and, for some countries, spectacular economic growth;
widespread social and economic amelioration, involving a
lessening of class conflict and the assimilation of substantial
portions of the population to middle-class values, attitudes,
and consumption patterns; and successful resistance, on a
collective and individual basis, to the challenges posed
externally by Soviet military might and internally by
communist party strength. During these years democratic
institutions, mostly of a parliamentary nature, demonstrated
their viability in all the Trilateral societies; liberal,
conservative, social democratic, and christian democratic
parties competed with each other in regular elections and
shared the responsibilities of government and the
opportunities for opposition; individual citizens and

157

158 The Crisis of Democracy

organized groups participated more actively in the politics
of their societies than they had previously; the rights of the
citizen against the state became more firmly guaranteed and
protected; and new institutions for international collaboration
among democratic societies emerged in Europe for economic
and political purposes, between North America and Europe for
military purposes, and among Europe, North America, and
Japan for economic purposes.

This happy congruence of circumstances for democracy
has come to an end. The challenges which democratic
governments now face are the products of these past
successes as well as of the changes in past trends. The
incorporation of substantial elements of the population into
the middle classes has escalated their expectations and
aspirations, thereby causing a more intense reaction if these
are not met in reality. Broadened political participation has
increased the demands on government. Widespread material
well-being has caused a substantial portion of the population,
particularly among the young and the "intellectual"
professional classes, to adopt new life-styles and new
social-political values. Internationally, confrontation has
given way to detente, with a resultant relaxation of
constraints within societies and of the impetus to collaborate
among societies. There has been a substantial relative decline
in American military and economic power, and a major
absolute decline in American willingness to assume the
burdens of leadership. And most recently, the temporary
slowdown in economic growth has threatened the
expectations created by previous growth, while still leaving
existent the "postbourgeois" values which it engendered
among the youth and intellectuals.

II. CONSENSUS WITHOUT PURPOSE:
THE RISE OF ANOMIC DEMOCRACY

Dissatisfaction with and lack of confidence in the

Conclusion 1 59

functioning of the institutions of democratic government
have thus now become widespread in Trilateral countries. Yet
with all this dissatisfaction, no significant support has yet
developed for any alternative image of how to organize the
politics of a highly industrialized society. Before World War
II both right-wing and left-wing movements set forth
clear-cut political alternatives to the "decadent" institutions
of "bourgeois" parliamentary democracy. Today those
institutions are accepted even if they are not praised. The
active proponents of a different vision of the political order
are, by and large, limited to small bands of radical students
and intellectuals whose capacity to attract attention through
propaganda and terrorism is heavily outweighed by their
incapacity to attract support from any significant social
groups. In Japan, the 1 947 "occupation" Constitution is now
accepted as the way in which Japanese politics will be
organized for the foreseeable future. In Europe, even the
French and Italian communist parties have adapted
themselves to the democratic game and at least assert that if
admitted to power they will continue to play according to
the rules of that game. No significant social or political group
in a Trilateral society seriously proposes to replace existing
democratic institutions with a nationalist autocracy, the
corporate state, or even the dictatorship of the proletariat.
The lack of confidence in democratic institutions is clearly
exceeded by the lack of enthusiasm for any alternative set of
institutions.

What is in short supply in democratic societies today is
thus not consensus on the rules of the game but a sense of
purpose as to what one should achieve by playing the game.
In the past, people have found their purposes in religion, in
nationalism, and in ideology. But neither church, nor state,
nor class now commands people's loyalties. In some measure,
democracy itself was inspired by and its institutions shaped
by manifestations of each of these forces and commitments.
Protestantism sanctified the individual conscience; nation-

160 The Crisis of Democracy

alism postulated the equality of citizens; and liberalism
provided the rationale for limited government based on
consent. But now all three gods have failed. We have
witnessed the dissipation of religion, the withering away of
nationalism, the decline— if not the end— of class-based ide-
ology.

In a nondemocratic political system, the top leadership
can select a single purpose or closely related set of goals and,
in some measure, induce or coerce political and social forces
to shape their behavior in terms of the priorities dictated
by these goals. Third World dictatorships can direct their
societies towards the "overriding" goal of national de-
velopment; communist states can mobilize their populace
for the task of "building socialism." In a democracy,
however, purpose cannot be imposed from on high by fiat;
nor does it spring to life from the verbiage of party
platforms, state of the union messages, or speeches from the
throne. It must, instead, be the product of the collective
perception by the significant groups in society of a major
challenge to their well-being and the perception by them that
this challenge threatens them all about equally. Hence, in
wartime or periods of economic catastrophe, common pur-
poses are easily defined. During World War II and then the
cold war, there was a general acceptance in the United States
of the overriding priority of national security as a goal. In
Europe and Japan, after World War II, economic reconstruc-
tion and development were supported as goals by virtually all
major groups in society. World war, economic reconstruction,
and the cold war gave coherence to public purposes and im-
posed a set of priorities for ordering government policies
and programs. Now, however, these purposes have lost their
salience and even come under challenge; the imperatives of
national security are no longer obvious, the desirability of
economic growth is no longer unquestioned.

In this situation, the machinery of democracy continues to
operate, but the ability of the individuals operating that

Conclusion 161

machinery to make decisions tends to deteriorate. Without
common purpose, there is no basis for common priorities,
and without priorities, there are no grounds for distinguishing
among competing private interests and claims. Conflicting
goals and specialized interests crowd in one upon another,
with executives, cabinets, parliaments, and bureaucrats
lacking the criteria to discriminate among them. The system
becomes one of anomic democracy, in which democratic
politics becomes more an arena for the assertion of
conflicting interests than a process for the building of
common purposes.

III. THE DYSFUNCTIONS OF DEMOCRACY

Quite apart from the substantive policy issues confronting
democratic government, many specific problems have arisen
which seem to be an intrinsic part of the functioning of
democracy itself. The successful operation of democratic
government has given rise to tendencies which impede that
functioning.

(1) The pursuit of the democratic virtues of equality and
individualism has led to the delegitimation of
authority generally and the loss of trust in leadership.

(2) The democratic expansion of political participation
and involvement has created an "overload" on
government and the imbalanced expansion of
governmental activities, exacerbating inflationary
tendencies in the economy.

(3) The political competition essential to democracy has
intensified, leading to a disaggregation of interests
and the decline and fragmentation of political parties.

(4) The responsiveness of democratic government to the
electorate and to societal pressures encourages
nationalistic parochialism in the way in which
democratic societies conduct their foreign relations.

162 The Crisis of Democracy

1 . The Delegitimation of Authority

/*■

In most of the Trilateral countries in the past decade there
has been a decline in the confidence and trust which the
people have in government, in their leaders, and, less clearly
but most importantly, in each other. Authority has been
challenged not only in government, but in trade unions,
business enterprises, schools and universities, professional
associations, churches, and civic groups. In the past, those
institutions which have played the major role in the
indoctrination of the young in their rights and obligations as
members of society have been the family, the church, the
school, and the army. The effectiveness of all these
institutions as a means of socialization has declined severely.
The stress has been increasingly on individuals and their
rights, interests, and needs, and not on the community and
its rights, interests, and needs. These attitudes have been
particularly prevalent in the young, but they have also
appeared in other age groups, especially among those who
have achieved professional, white-collar, and middle-class
status. The success of the existing structures of authority in
incorporating large elements of the population into the
middle class, paradoxically, strengthens precisely those
groups which are disposed to challenge the existing structures
of authority.

The democratic spirit is egalitarian, individualistic,
populist, and impatient with the distinctions of class and
rank. The spread of that spirit weakens the traditional threats
to democracy posed by such groups as the aristocracy, the
church, and the military. At the same time, a pervasive spirit
of democracy may pose an intrinsic threat and undermine all
forms of association, weakening the social bonds which hold
together family, enterprise, and community. Every social
organization requires, in some measure, inequalities in
authority and distinctions in function. To the extent that the
spread of the democratic temper corrodes all of these,

Conclusion 163

exercising a leveling and an homogenizing influence, it
destroys the bases of trust and cooperation among citizens
and creates obstacles to collaboration for any common
purpose.

Leadership is in disrepute in democratic societies. Without
confidence in its leadership, no group functions effectively.
When the fabric of leadership weakens among other groups in
society, it is also weakened at the top political levels of
government. The governability of a society at the national
level depends upon the extent to which it is effectively
governed at the subnational, regional, local, functional, and
industrial levels. In the modern state, for instance, powerful
trade union "bosses" are often viewed as a threat to the
power of the state. In actuality, however, responsible union
leaders with effective authority over their members are less of
a challenge to the authority of the national political leaders
than they are a prerequisite to the exercise of authority by
those leaders. If the unions are disorganized, if the
membership is rebellious, if extreme demands and wild-cat
strikes are the order of the day, the formulation and
implementation of a national wage policy become impossible.
The weakening of authority throughout society thus
contributes to the weakening of the authority of government.

2. The Overloading of Government

Recent years in the Trilateral countries have seen the
expansion of the demands on government from individuals
and groups. The expansion takes the form of: (1) the
involvement of an increasing proportion of the population in
political activity; (2) the development of new groups and of
new consciousness on the part of old groups, including
youth, regional groups, and ethnic minorities; (3) the
diversification of the political means and tactics which groups
use to secure their ends; (4) an increasing expectation on the
part of groups that government has the responsibility to meet

164 The Crisis of Democracy

their needs; and (5) an escalation in what they conceive
those needs to be.

The result is an "overload" on government and the
expansion of the role of government in the economy and
society. During the 1960s governmental expenditures, as a
proportion of GNP, increased significantly in all the principal
Trilateral countries, except for Japan. This expansion of
governmental activity was attributed not so much to the
strength of government as to its weakness and the inability
and unwillingness of central political leaders to reject the
demands made upon them by numerically and functionally
important groups in their society. The impetus to respond to
the demands which groups made on government is deeply
rooted in both the attitudinal and structural features of a
democratic society. The democratic idea that government
should be responsive to the people creates the expectation
that government should meet the needs and correct the evils
affecting particular groups in society. Confronted with the
structural imperative of competitive elections every few
years, political leaders can hardly do anything else.

Inflation is obviously not a problem which is peculiar to
democratic societies, and it may well be the result of causes
quite extrinsic to the democratic process. It may, however,
be exacerbated by a democratic politics and it is, without
doubt, extremely difficult for democratic systems to deal
with effectively. The natural tendency of the political
demands permitted and encouraged by the dynamics of a
democratic system helps governments to deal with the
problems of economic recession, particularly unemployment,
and it hampers them in dealing effectively with inflation. In
the face of the claims of business groups, labor unions, and
the beneficiaries of governmental largesse, it becomes
difficult if not impossible for democratic governments to
curtail spending, increase -taxes, and control prices and wages.
In this sense, inflation is the economic disease of
democracies.

Conclusion *"5

3. The Disaggregation of Interests

A primary function of politics is to aggregate the various
interests in society so as to promote common purposes and
to create coalitions behind policies and leaders. In a
democratic society this process takes place through
complicated processes of bargaining and compromise within
government, within and between the political parties, and
through electoral competition. The multiple sources of power
in a democratic society insure that any policy decision, when
it is made, usually has to have at least the tacit support of a
majority of those affected by and concerned with it. In this
sense, consensus-building is at the heart of democratic
politics. At the same time, however, the opportunities which
democratic politics offers to particular opinions, interests,
and groups to be represented in the political process
necessarily tend to stimulate the formulation and articulation
of such opinions, interests, and groups. While the common
interest is in compromise and consensus, it is often beneficial
to the particular individual or group to differentiate its
interest from other interests, to assert that interest
vigorously, and at times to be intransigent in defending that
interest against others. In a democracy, in short, the top
political leaders work to aggregate interests; the political
process often works to disaggregate them.

The most obvious political manifestation of the
disaggregation of interests and the withering away of
common purposes is in the decomposition which has affected
the political party systems in Trilateral societies. In almost
every country the support for the principal established
political parties has declined, and new parties, small parties,
and antiparty movements have gained in strength. At one
time or another during 1974, no party had a majority in the
legislatures of Great Britain, Canada, France, the Federal
Republic of Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands,
Norway, Sweden, and Denmark. And the functional

1 66 The Crisis of Democracy

equivalent to the lack of a majority existed in the United
States with different parties in control of the executive and
legislative branches of the government. This failure of the
party system to produce electoral and parliamentary majori-
ties obviously had adverse effects on the ability of govern-
ments to govern.

A party system is a way of organizing the electorate,
simplifying choice, selecting leaders, aggregating interests,
and shaping policy choices and priorities. The development
of political parties in the nineteenth century went hand-in-
hand with the expansion of the suffrage and the increased
responsibility of governments to their citizens. Parties made
democratic government possible. Throughout the twentieth
century, the strength of democracy has varied with the
strength of the political parties committed to working with-
in a democratic system. The decay of political party systems
in the industrialized world poses the question: How viable is
democratic government without parties or with greatly
weakened and attenuated parties?

4. Parochialism in International Affairs

Just as the opportunities afforded by the democratic
process tended to increase the strength and assertiveness of
particularistic groups domestically, so they also tended to
encourage a greater degree of parochialism in international
affairs.

The seeming decline in the external military threat
produced a general slackening of concern throughout the
Trilateral countries with the problems of security. In the
absence of a clear and present danger to security, it is very
difficult to mobilize support within a democracy for
measures which may be necessary to provide for security. In
the European and North American countries, compulsory
military service has been reduced or abandoned entirely;
military expenditures have declined in real terms and relative
to national product; antimilitarism has become the vogue in

Conclusion 1 67

intellectual and political circles. Yet detente presumably rests
upon the achievement of a rough military balance between
the communist powers and the democracies. During the
1960s the military exertions of th& communist powers
brought such a balance into being and hence made detente
feasible. During the 1970s military passivity on the part of
the democracies could well undermine that balance and
hence the basis for improved relations with the communist
states.

By and large, the quarter-century after World War II saw a
removal of restrictions on trade and investment, and a general
opening up of the economies of the industrialized, capitalist
countries. In times of economic scarcity, inflation, and
possible long-term economic downturn, however, the
pressures in favor of nationalism and neo-mercantilism mount
and democratic political systems find themselves particularly
vulnerable to such pressures from industry groups, localities,
and labor organizations, which see themselves adversely
affected by foreign competition. The ability of governments
to deal with domestic social and economic problems is
reduced, as well as the confidence people have that
legislatures will be able to deal with those problems. As a
result, the leaders of democratic governments turn
increasingly to foreign policy as the one arena where they can
achieve what appear to be significant successes. Diplomatic
triumph becomes essential to the maintenance of domestic
power; success abroad produces votes at home. Heath and
the Common Market, Brandt and the Moscow treaties, Nixon
in Peking and SALT I, and Pompidou in challenging
American leadership may or may not have done the best in
terms of securing the long-term interests of their countries,
but their domestic political needs left them little leeway not
to come up with something. At the same time, the impact of
inflation and domestic special interests engenders economic
nationalism increasing the difficulties of cooperative action
among the democratic powers. Given these pressures, the

168 The Crisis of Democracy

extent to which the democratic societies have been able to
avoid the worst forms of beggar-thy-neighbor policies and
devise some common responses to the economic and energy
crises is, in many respects, quite remarkable. Yet the impact
of domestic politics still leads democratic leaders to display
greater eagerness to compromise when negotiating with their
enemies and to have greater difficulty in compromising when
they negotiate with each other.

While the processes of democratic politics induce
governmental leaders to look abroad for victories to sustain
them at home, those same processes also tend to produce a
tendency towards greater provincialism and nationalism in
their outlook. The parochialization of leadership is surely
one of the most striking trends of the past decade in the
Trilateral democracies. Down through the early 1960s,
leading statesmen in the democratic countries not only had
(as was a prerequisite to statesmanship) a standing among
their own people, but they also often had an appeal and a
standing abroad among people in the other industrialized
democracies. They were, in a sense, Trilateral statesmen as
well as national statesmen. The resignation of Willy Brandt,
however, removed from the scene the last of the democratic
leaders who had a stature, a reputation, and a following that
transcended his own society. This is not to say that the
current leaders are necessarily narrowly nationalistic in their
outlook and policies. It does mean, however, that they are
the product of peculiarly national processes and that
whatever their qualities as leaders, the names of Gerald Ford,
Takeo Miki, Harold Wilson, Giscard d'Estaing, and Helmut
Schmidt do not inspire enthusiasm and commitment outside
their own societies.

IV. VARIATIONS AMONG REGIONS

The features we have described above are found in all three
rilateral regions. The relative intensity of the different

Conclusion 1 69

aspects of the problem varies, however, from country to
country and from time to time within a country. The overall
legitimacy of government is greater in Britain than in
Italy. Confidence and trust in political institutions and
leaders in the United States was much less during the 1960s
and early 1970s than it was in the 1940s and 1950s and very
probably considerably less than it will be during the coming
years. The differing cultures and political traditions of the
various countries means that each problem concerning the
governability of democracy manifests itself in different ways
and has to be dealt with by different means. Each country
has its own peculiar strengths and weaknesses. In continental
Europe and in Japan, for instance, there is a tradition of a
strong and effective bureaucracy, in part because of the
polarization and fragmentation among political parties. This
bureaucracy furnishes continuity and stability to the system,
functioning in some ways as both a gyroscope and an
automatic pilot. In Britain and the United States, on the
other hand, there are strong traditions of citizen participation
in politics which insure the vitality of democracy at the same
time that they may lower the competence and authority of
government. If one were to generalize, one might say that the
problem in the United States is more one of governability
than of democracy, in Japan it is more one of democracy
than of governability, while in Europe both problems are
acute.

The demands on government and the needs for govern-
ment have been increasing steadily in all the Trilateral soci-
eties. The cause of the current malaise is the decline in the
material resources and political authority available to gov-
ernment to meet these demands and needs. These deficiencies
vary significantly, however, from region to region. In the
United States, the government is constrained more by the
shortage of authority than by the shortage of resources. In
Japan, the government has so far been favored with a huge in-
crease in resources due to rapid economic growth, and it has

170 The Crisis of Democracy

been able to utilize the reservoir of traditional acquiescence
among the people to support its authority. The growth in re-
sources, however, is about to stop, and the reservoir of ac-
quiescence is more and more draining down. In Europe, gov-
ernments seem to be facing shortages of both authority and
resources, which is the major reason why the problems con-
cerning the governability of democracy are more urgent in
Europe than in the other Trilateral regions.

At the moment the principal strains on the governability
of democracy may be receding in the United States, cresting
in Europe, and pending in the future for Japan. During the
1960s, the United States went through a period of creedal
passion, of intense conflict over racial issues and the
Indochina War, and of marked expansion in the extent and
forms of political participation. In addition, in the 1970s the
United States suffered a major constitutional crisis in the
whole complex of issues involved in Watergate and the
resignation of the President. At present, much of the passion
and intensity has departed from American politics, leaving
the political leadership and institutions with the problem of
attempting to redefine their functions in altered circum-
stances, to restore the prestige and authority of central
government institutions, and to grapple with the immediate
economic challenges. Japan, on the other hand, appears to
still have some time before the major challenges to
democracy will come to a head, which they probably will in
the early 1980s. Its organizational fabric and patterns of
social control, moreover, provide advantages in giving control
and direction to the new political forces and demands on
government. This gain in time will give the existing
democratic institutions in Japan opportunity to consolidate
themselves further and will permit the party leaders in all the
major parties to adapt to a situation in which the Liberal
Democratic party no longer commands a secure majority.

Europe, in contrast, has to face current issues which make
it the most vulnerable of the three regions at the present

Conclusion 171

time. It must make long-term investments quickly inasmuch
as it will not be able to handle its problems with the current
resources it has available. In addition, it must maintain tight
enough control over short-run issues since it has to face a
crisis from within as well as a crisis from without.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX I: DISCUSSION OF STUDY

DURING PLENARY MEETING OF

THE TRILATERAL COMMISSION

Kyoto, May 31, 1975

The study by Michel Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington, and
Joji Watanuki, prepared for the Trilateral Commission, was
discussed during plenary meetings of the Commission in
Kyoto, Japan in May 1975. This three-part appendix is aimed
at advancing dialogue on the issues involved. The first part
lists some "arenas for action" prepared as points of departure
for the Kyoto discussion; the second provides remarks by
Ralf Dahrendorf, who opened the discussion in Kyoto; and
the third summarizes discussion of the report among mem-
bers of the Commission.

A. ARENAS FOR ACTION

While there is much to praise in the performance of
democratic government in the Trilateral societies, there are
also areas of critical weakness and potential breakdown. The
heart of the problem lies in the inherent contradictions
involved in the very phrase "governability of democracy."
For, in some measure, governability and democracy are
warring concepts. An excess of democracy means a deficit in
governability; easy governability suggests faulty democracy.
At times in the history of democratic government the
pendulum has swung too far in one direction or the other.

At the present time, it appears that the balance has tilted
too far against governments in Western Europe and the
United States; in Japan, as yet, this problem is not acute,
although it may well become so. The United States and

173

174 The Crisis of Democracy

Western Europe consequently need to restore a more
equitable relationship between governmental authority and
popular control, and Japan may face this necessity in the
not-too-distant future. The - steadily rising need for
government to manage the interrelations of a complex
society is likely to require an increase in the material
resources and political authority available to government. In
the United States and Western Europe, both have been in
short supply already. Even in Japan, both will be in short
supply in the future. There are at least seven areas in which
these problems can be tackled, which are relevant
immediately to Europe and the United States and in the
not-too-remote future also to Japan.

1 . Effective Planning for Economic and Social Development

The historical record indicates that democracy works
best — indeed, that it may only work — when there is a
gradual but relatively constant increase in the economic
well-being of society. The record of the recent past suggests
that in industrialized societies each additional increment in
the rate of economic growth tends to be distributed in order
to provide more benefits to the poor than the previous
increment. Reasonable rates of economic growth and
relatively stable prices are essential for the achievement of
socioeconomic equity. The control of inflation and the
promotion of economic growth, taking into careful
consideration the effects of such growth on resource
exhaustion and environmental pollution, consequently must
have top priority on the agenda of democracy. In addition,
poverty remains a problem in many parts of Europe and the
United States, and governmental programs must give the
highest priority to establishing a minimum floor of
guaranteed subsistence for all citizens. The specific measures
by which governments can promote these goals must be
devised by economists and planners, but critical considera-
tion should be given to proposals such as that recently

Appendix 175

advanced in the United States for a new economic planning
agency attached to the White House. It is necessary here
simply to underline the extent to which the governability of
democracy seems dependent upon the sustained expansion of
the economy. Political democracy requires economic growth;
economic growth without inflation depends upon effective
democratic planning. The opportunities for more effective
planning are not, moreover, simply confined to issues of
economic growth. The trilateral societies have an accumu-
lation of social knowledge which could be used for solution
of some social problems. The governments in Trilateral
societies have the possibility of becoming "wiser" in allocat-
ing scarce resources in the most effective way, searching for
alternatives, and assessing the effects of policies, through
proper use of the social knowledge and skills which have been
accumulated and may still be developed.

2. Strengthening the Institutions of Political Leadership

In recent years, the publics in the Trilateral societies have
expected much of their political leaders. They have been
expected to "deliver the goods" in terms of achieving policy
outputs and outcomes to which they have committed
themselves and their governments. In many instances,
however, political leaders have been left deficient in the
institutional resources and authority necessary to achieve
these goals. A pervasive suspicion of the motives and power
of political leaders on the part of the public has given rise to
the imposition of legal and institutional barriers which serve
to prevent them from achieving the goals which the public
expects them accomplish. In the long run the leadership
vacuum will be filled in one way or another, and strong
institutionalized leadership is clearly preferable to personal-
ized charismatic leadership.

In the United States, the strengthening of leadership
institutions requires action with respect to both the Congress
and the president. In Congress, for the past decade the trend

176 The Crisis of Democracy

has been toward a greater dispersion of power in both the
House and Senate. Yet if Congress is to play an effective
governing role as distinct from a critical and opposition role,
it has to be able to formulate overall goals, determine
priorities, and initiate programs. Inevitably this requires some
centralization of power within Congress.

The imperial presidency is rapidly disappearing into
history, and there is clearly no need to bring it back. There is
a need, however, to insure that the pendulum does not swing
too far in the other direction. Proposed legislative restrictions
on presidential power should always be judged by the
question: If -the president does not exercise this power, who
will? If Congress can exercise the power effectively, there
may be good grounds for restricting the president. But every
restriction of presidential power does not necessarily redound
to the benefit of Congress. It may equally well increase the
power of bureaucratic agencies or private interest groups.

In Japan, the prime minister's leadership has been re-
stricted by the bureaucratic sectionalism of each ministry.
Budget-making is done totally by the Budget Bureau in the
Ministry of Finance. The prime minister has no staff, and
there is no coordinating agency under his direct command.
The institutional strengthening of the prime minister's leader-
ship through the transfer of the Budget Bureau to the prime
minister's office or the Cabinet Secretariat, the creation of
positions for high-level aides to the prime minister, and the
reorganization and development of policy research and co-
ordinating functions in the Cabinet Secretariat and prime
minister's office, including various "Deliberation Councils,"
should be considered seriously.

Under the LDP's single majority rule, the Diet has never
exercised any leadership role. The budget presented by the
government has been approved by the LDP majority without
fail. Almost 100 percent of legislation has been presented by
the government upon prior consultation with the governing
party and been approved by the majority in the Diet. In light,
however, of the possibility of the loss of a majority by the

Appendix 177

LDP, the Diet should be prepared to take more initiative in
legislation and budget-making.

The European situation is extremely diverse and does not
call for common or even convergent remedies. The French
presidency for the time being is extremely strong, much
stronger than the American. If there is a problem it is to
reintroduce democratic checks. If the problem is difficult, it
is because very little margin has ever existed in the French
tradition between the predominance of the executive, which
means too few checks, and the predominance of Parliament,
which means a rather impotent regime d'assemblee. The
Italian government presents almost exactly the other side of
the coin. Its decision-making capacity has almost disinte-
grated and the problem is to restore conditions for
developing a stronger, more stable, more active executive
which can at the same time be accepted by the political class.

Even if one does not focus on these extreme examples, one
discovers that each country has its own idiosyncratic
problems to which there is no common solution. Two
common problems nevertheless emerge on which more
general recommendations could be made. First of all, there is
almost everywhere a crisis of parliaments. It is due only
partially to legal or constitutional evolution, since it develops
equally within opposite setups. One could better hypothesize
that the divergent structural evolutions are just different
answers to the same problem. This crisis involves the problem
of representation and the problem of expertise. Modern
parliaments do not have the necessary expertise to maintain
an effective check on the executive and their members
cannot represent citizens adequately in policy-making
debates since they have to rely on earlier, now meaningless
cleavages to be elected.

The second common problem area is that of implementa-
tion and public administration. Everywhere one discovers a
complete dissociation between the decision-making system,
dominated by traditional and often quite rhetorical political
debate, and the implementation system, which is the preserve

178 The Crisis of Democracy

of administrative systems quite often centralized and strong,
but usually even more irresponsive when they are centralized
and strong. This dissociation is the main cause of political
alienation amongst citizens. It continually nourishes Utopian
dreams and radical postures and reinforces opposition to the
state. The main effort in Europe should be, therefore, to
reinsert democratic debate in administrative procedure, to
prevent the monopoly of expertise by public administration,
and to restore functions to parliament, by giving parliament
new expertise and thus the possibility to debate on an equal
level with the civil servants. Finally, a general reform of
public administration. and especially of local implementation
systems should be a central practical concern that could be
answered by European countries in a genuinely comparative
and cooperative way.

3. Reinvigoration of Political Parties

Party loyalties, like loyalties to church, state, and class,
have tended to weaken throughout much of the Trilateral
area. A more highly educated, more affluent, and generally
more sophisticated public is less willing to commit itself
blindly and irrevocably to a particular party and its
candidates. Yet partisan allegiances, along with party
conflicts, have historically been the bedrock of democracy.
Even today political parties remain indispensable to insure
open debate over meaningful choices, to help aggregate
interests, and to develop political leaders. To continue to
perform these functions they will have to adapt themselves to
the changed needs and interests of the electorate. If the
"post-industrial world" is a world in which knowledge is
king, the political parties must increasingly devote themselves
to supplying this commodity, just as in an earlier — and
poorer — age they focused on material benefits such as jobs,
patronage, and social insurance.

To fulfill its political functions properly, a political party
must, on the one hand, reflect the interests and needs of

Appendix 179

major social forces and interest groups and, on the other
hand, it must also in some measure be independent of
particular interests and capable of aggregating them and
working out broader compromises among them. Changes in
party structure, membership, leadership, and activities should
be oriented towards increasing the ability of parties to
perform these two conflicting but indispensable functions. In
Europe, for instance, parties are still divided between parties
of notables and mass membership parties. Mass parties
emphasizing the defense of group interests and status
positions prevent the aggregation of interests and the learning
of compromise. Not only do they not train citizens for the
difficulties of choice and the understanding of government,
but they condition them to misunderstanding and to
alienation. Nor do traditional parties of notables do a better
job. They may emphasize aggregation much more in their
action but keep themselves as narrow as possible and refuse
to train citizens in real participation.

Nowhere are the horns of the dilemma of interest
representation versus interest aggregation more painfully
visible than in the difficult area of party finance. Historically,
political parties have in large part been dependent on the
dues and subscriptions of individual members and supporters
on the one hand, and on substantial contributions from
business corporations and labor unions on the other. But, in
addition, a number of Trilateral societies (including the four
Scandinavian countries, France, Italy, Germany, and Canada)
now appropriate public monies to cover party expenses
between and during elections. In Germany the government
provides an estimated 35 percent of party funds.

The reinvigoration of political parties, needed for the
effective working of democratic politics, seems to require a
diversification of the sources from which parties raise their
funds. Political parties should not be dependent exclusively
upon either individual members or organized interests or the
state for the resources needed to perform their functions.
They should be able to draw support from all three sources.

180 The Crisis of Democracy

The achievement of the appropriate balance among these
sources requires different action in different societies. In the
United States, for instance, recent legislation providing public
monies for presidential candidates represents a step in the
proper direction. So also is the movement during the past
decade to broaden the base of party finance and to solicit
small sums from a large number of contributors. On the other
hand, the laws prohibiting political contributions by
corporations serve little useful purpose and, as recent
prosecutions make clear, have been regularly evaded. The
desirability of repealing such restrictions should be carefully
considered. The danger that political parties will become
unduly dependent upon and responsive to a few corporate
interests can best be countered by (a) requiring full publicity
for all political contributions and (b) insuring the availability
of public monies as an alternative and balance to funds from
the private sector.

In Japan, the amount of money contributed by business
corporations to the LDP has been disproportionally huge and
has given rise to a sense of unfair competition and the
suspicion of implicit corruption between the governing party
and business. This unfairness might be attacked first of all by
measures prohibiting all contributions by corporations, or at
least setting strict upper limits on them and also requiring full
publicity for the contributions made. The LDP needs to
survive such a trial in order to consolidate the legitimacy of
Japanese democracy itself. Even if such measures are destined
to fail, by evasion and utilization of loopholes, they will still
serve to create fairer competition between parties and
stimulate individual contributions and involvement in party
activities. Most difficult to achieve in Japan is an increase in
individual contributions. Politicians and political parties
should do their utmost to stimulate them. For instance, the
personal sponsoring associations (koenkai) of individual
politicians should undertake to finance themselves by
contributions from their members.

Appendix 181

4. Restoring a Balance between Government and Media

For well over 200 years in Western societies, a struggle has
been underway to defend the freedom of the press to
investigate, to criticize, to report, and to publish its findings
and opinions against the efforts by government officials to
curb that freedom. Freedom of the press is absolutely
essential to the effective working of democratic government.
Like any freedom, however, it is a freedom which can be
abused. Recent years have seen an immense growth in the
scope and power of the media. In many countries, in
addition, either as a result of editorial direction or as a result
of the increasing influence of the journalists vis-a-vis owners
and editors, the press has taken an increasingly critical role
towards government and public officials. In some countries,
traditional norms of "objectivity" and "impartiality" have
been brushed aside in favor of "advocatory journalism." The
(responsibility of the press should now be increased to be
commensurate with its power; significant measures are
required to restore an appropriate balance between the press,
the government, and other institutions in society.

These recent changes in the press-government relationship
are perhaps most clearly marked in the United States. The
increase in media power is not unlike the rise of the industrial
corporations to national power at the end of the nineteenth
century. Just as the corporations enveloped themselves in the
constitutional protection of the due process clause, the media
now defend themselves in terms of the First Amendment.* In
both cases, there obviously are important rights to be
protected, but broader interests of society and government

The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
declares that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press." The due process clause is from the Fourteenth
Amendment — "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law."

182 The Crisis of Democracy

are also at stake. In due course, beginning with the Interstate
Commerce Act and the Sherman Antitrust Act,* measures
had to be taken to regulate the new industrial centers of
power and to define their relations to the rest of society.
Something comparable appears to be now needed with
respect to the media. Specifically, there is a need to insure to
the press its right to print what it wants without prior
restraint except in most unusual circumstances. But there is
also the need to assure to the government the right and the
ability to withhold information at the source. In addition,
there is no reason for denying to public officials equal
protection of the laws against libel, and the courts should
consider moving promptly to reinstate the law of libel as a
necessary and appropriate check upon the abuses of power
by the press. Journalists should develop their own standards
of professionalism and create mechanisms, such as press
councils, for enforcing those standards on themselves. The
alternative could well be regulation by the government.

The Japanese press, especially the five nationwide
newspapers with several millions circulation each and the
commercial TV networks closely associated with each of
them, have somewhat different traditions and problems from
their counterparts in the United States or in Western Europe.
Nonpartisanship and an opposition attitude towards the
government have been the traditions of the Japanese press.
The results are a policy of equal distance from all political
parties, and a high sensitivity to the mood of the mass public.
The functioning of Japanese democracy would be improved
if the individual newspapers took clearer stands in support of
or opposition to the government.

In Europe, the more traditional and numerous press has
given way to fewer, stronger and less committed oligopolistic

The Interstate Commerce Act, passed by Congress in 1887, was
aimed particularly at the major railroad companies. The Sherman
Antitrust Act, passed in 1890, was aimed more generally.

Appendix 183

papers. This change, which was viewed at first as a trend
toward depoliticization, in the end increased the political
power of the press as an independent institution, thus
bringing it closer to the American and Japanese situations.
The same dangers therefore seem to appear with the need for
the same kind of difficult but essential counterbalance.

5. Reexamination of the Cost and the
Functions of Higher Education

The 1960s saw a tremendous expansion in higher
education throughout the Trilateral societies. This expansion
was the product of increasing affluence, a demographic bulge
in the college-age group, and the increasingly widespread
assumption that the types of higher education open formerly
in most societies (with the notable exception of the United
States) only to a small elite group should "by right" be made
available generally. The result of this expansion, however, can
be the overproduction of people with university education in
relation to the jobs available for them, the expenditure of
substantial sums of scarce public monies and the imposition
on the lower classes of taxes to pay for the free public
education of the children of the middle and upper classes.
The expansion of higher education can create frustrations
and psychological hardships among university graduates who
are unable to secure the types of jobs to which they believe
their education entitles them, and it can also create
frustrations and material hardships for nongraduates who are
unable to secure jobs which were previously open to them.

In the United States, some retrenchment in higher
education is already underway as a result of slower growth in
enrollments and new ceilings on resources. What seems
needed, however, is to relate educational planning to
economic and political goals. Should a college education be
provided generally because of its contribution to the overall
cultural level of the populace and its possible relation to the
constructive discharge of the responsibilities of citizenship? If

184 The Crisis of Democracy

this question is answered in the affirmative, a program is then
necessary to lower the job expectations of those who receive
a college education. If the question is answered in the
negative, then higher educational institutions should be
induced to redesign their programs so as to be geared to the
patterns of economic development and future job
opportunities.

In Japan, the expansion of higher education in the 1960s
was achieved mainly through low-cost education by private
universities without much money from the government.
Financially, however, the private universities are now
approaching bankruptcy, and low-cost education has created
doubts about the quality of university education. An increase
in public financial support to private universities is now
under way. As for the employment of university graduates, at
least so far, because of rapid expansion of the tertiary service
sector, there has as yet been no problem of overproduction
and unemployment. Major uncertainties, however, exist
concerning the future of Japanese higher education. With the
stagnation of the governmental budget, the increase of public
funds for higher education will face a ceiling, and the choice
as to whether Japan should have "low-quality and
high-quantity higher education or "high-quality and
limited-quantity" higher education will become serious. In
addition, both employment and mobility of university
graduates depend on the expansion of the tertiary sector,
which is not unlimited. In this respect, also, Japan is now
rapidly approaching the point where some "retrenchment" in
higher education will be necessary.

European higher education, in contrast, needs
consolidation and rejuvenation more than retrenchment.
Here again, it differs widely from country to country in its
structure, modes of operation, and place in society. But
everywhere it is parochial, conservative, and compartmenta-
lized. With a few exceptions in sectors such as the profession-
al schools and in countries such as Britain, it is chaotic,

Appendix 185

inefficient, operates extremely poorly, and develops opposi-
tion and alienation among the students. One cannot overem-
phasize the significance of such a state of affairs. By now
higher education is the most important value-producing
system in society. That it works either poorly or at cross-
purposes with society should be a matter of great concern.
Such opposition may be good and creative up to a point, but
it has become more and more sterile since it is now depriving
society of the necessary stimulus of the younger generation's
creativity.

6. More Active Innovation in the Area of Work

A long tradition exists in the West and in Japan of
governmental involvement in the broad area of labor and
social policies. Such policies may be considered as one of the
greatest achievements of Trilateral democracies. Health,
hazard and security coverage, freedom of association,
bargaining rights, the right to strike, and workers councils all
provide broad protection and broad possibilities for correc-
tive action.

Two basic new problems have arisen, however, which take
on more and more prominence as older ones recede. They are
the problems of, first, the working structure of the
enterprise, and, second, of the content of the job itself. Both
of these problems call for a new kind of active intervention
which is of great importance for each society's internal
equilibrium and governability. These problems unfortunately
are not amenable to easy legislative fiat or executive
intervention. They require a painful transformation of social
relations, of cultural and authority patterns, and even of
modes of reasoning.

Up to now the dominant social democratic or even liberal
schools of thought have focused on proposals for industrial
democracy modeled on patterns of political democracy. They
have rarely succeeded, and when they did the proposals did

186 The Crisis of Democracy

not appear very effective, basically because they were
running against the industrial culture and the constraints of
business organization. This movement has found a new
impetus, especially in Western Europe, with strong popular
pressure for self-management and the rediscovery by the left
of nationalization as a key argument in the political arena.

Many people advocate the more moderate course of
participation by labor in crucial decisions affecting output,
productivity, and working conditions, such as developed in
Germany under the name of codetermination. This would,
they think, provide a strong incentive for unions to act
responsibly. Income circumstances this could indeed be the
result. On the other hand, however, codetermination has
been only partially successful in Germany, and it would raise
impossible problems in many Western democracies, either
because leftist trade unionists would oppose it and utilize it
without becoming any more moderate, or because employers
would manage to defeat its purposes.

A quite different, more promising, and more fundamental
strategy is to focus on the second set of problems, those of
the job, working conditions, and work organization. This is a
much more concrete field where deep resentment and
frustrations have developed, feeding back into the more
conventional aspects of labor-management bargaining. This is
a problem area where basic change is becoming possible. New
thinking and experimentation has occurred, which should be
widely encouraged and subsidized. Industry should be given
all possible incentives to move ahead and implement
gradually new modes of organization. This is the only way
now to alleviate the new tensions that tend to mark
post-industrial society in this area and which otherwise
nourish irresponsible blackmailing tactics and new inflation-
ary pressures. At the sanie time this is a necessary step to
restore the status and dignity of manual work and therefore

Appendix 187

help solve the more and more acute problem of the immi-
grant workers in Western Europe, which might otherwise
become equivalent to the racial problems of the United
States.

7. Creation of New Institutions for the
Cooperative Promotion of Democracy

The effective working of democratic government in the
Trilateral societies can now no longer be taken for granted.
The increasing demands and pressures on democratic
government and ihe crisis in governmental resources and
public authority require more explicit collaboration. One
might consider, therefore, means of securing support and
resources from foundations, business corporations, labor
unions, political parties, civic associations, and, where
possible and appropriate, governmental agencies for the
creation of an institute for the strengthening of democratic
institutions. The purpose of such an institute would be to
stimulate collaborative studies of common problems involved
in the operations of democracy in the Trilateral societies, to
promote cooperation among institutions and groups with
common concerns in this area among the Trilateral regions,
and to encourage the Trilateral societies to learn from each
other's experience how to make democracy function more
effectively in their societies. There is much which each
society can learn from the others. Such mutual learning
experiences are familiar phenomena in the economic and
military fields; they must also be encouraged in the political
field. Such an institute could also serve a useful function in
calling attention to questions of special urgency, as, for
instance, the critical nature of the problems currently
confronting democracy in Europe.

188 The Crisis of Democracy

B. EXCERPTS OF REMARKS BY RALF DAHRENDORF
ON THE GOVERNABILITY STUDY

I

Governability presumably refers to the ability of
governments to give direction to the economies, societies,
and political communities in which they govern, and to do so
effectively. Could it not be argued that one of the traditional
characteristics of democracies is that we do not ask
governments to give direction to the economies, societies,
and political communities, at least not to the extent to which
nondemocralic societies are doing this? Might it not be
argued, therefore, that by raising the question of governabil-
ity in relation to democracies, one is in fact raising the
question of whether the power of government should be
increased rather than the question of whether the power of
government should be restored? Is it not misleading to imply
that governments in democracies had all those powers in the
past which are now demanded for them? Should we not
perhaps check ourselves every now and then and remember
that one of the things democracy is about is to enable people
and groups to operate in what might be called a market
environment rather than an environment which is largely
determined by directives issuing from government and politi-
cal institutions?

II

In the "arenas for action"*, you find a number of
remarkable statements about the relationship between de-
mocracy and economic growth. "The promotion of economic
growth, taking into careful consideration the effects of such
growth on resource exhaustion and environmental pollution,
consequently must have top priority on the agenda of

* See Part A of this appendix.

Appendix 189

democracy. . . . Political democracy requires economic
growth; economic growth . . . depends upon effective demo-
cratic planning." Important, and, as you will admit, far-reach-
ing statements. It is clearly desirable, at least that is my view,
that economic growth should continue. Yet there may be a
point in asking a number of questions in relation to these
statements. And there may be a point in discussing them at
some length. Why should it be so that democracy is to some
extent dependent on economic growth? Is there anything in
the concept of democracy that relates it to economic
growth? Is democracy unthinkable without it? Is it actually
true that those countries in which economic growth was least
effective were also the countries in which democratic institu-
tions were least effective? Could it not be said that it is the
one-party socialist states above all which are in trouble
without economic growth. Is not the link between the as-
sumption of economic growth and political organization in
fact much closer in the communist countries, and is that not
one of the reasons why they are worried at a time when, for
them, too, economic growth is by no means a certainty?
Does not perhaps Mr. Brezhnev have much more reason to
worry about the future of economic growth than Mr. Ford? I
should have thought that it would be useful to examine these
questions in the study, although I am not at all sure that I
would be able to give a proper answer to them. If I were to
try to give an answer, I would like to add another question
which I believe is and should be of major concern for
anybody who is thinking about the future of industrial
societies under liberal conditions. Is growth presumably
growth of a gross national product? Is this the only kind of
expansion of human life chances which we can think of in
free societies? Are there not perhaps other forms of growth
and improvement of human lives? Is it really necessary to
assume that we have to continue along the lines which have
been characteristic for the last twenty-five years in order to
maintain democratic institutions? The important and prima
facie plausible statements about democracy and economic

190 The Crisis of Democracy

growth would warrant and perhaps require a rather more
elaborate reasoning.

Ill

My next point relates to governability more or less
directly. The paper for discussion here is in my view an
important and in many ways convincing analysis of a difficult
and changing political, social, and economic situation. I
would like to underline an aspect of the problem which I
believe is of overriding importance.

I start with three simple things— simple to put in words but
much less simple to cope with in fact. First, there is a
growing desire for more immediate participation on the part
of many citizens in the developed countries, which confronts
national governments with unfamiliar but extremely serious
problems and makes it more difficult for them to give
direction to developments in their countries. This is, of
course, what Mr. Huntington in his chapter calls the
democratic challenge to authority. It is a development which
may be regarded as a natural consequence of the
development of citizenship over the last century or two. This
development of citizenship has led more and more people in
local communities and industrial enterprises and other
institutions to express a desire to be a part of the machinery
of decision-making to a much greater extent than may have
been the case in the past. And governments have in fact
found it difficult to make decisions, even apparently simple
decisions such as those about the sites of nuclear power
stations. Participation is not merely the taking of
responsibility but is very often an attempt to check
government action or object to it.

The second aspect is that for many important problems
the national political space has become evidently and largely
insufficient, although at the same time we do not have
satisfactory institutions, let alone democratic ones, to cope

Appendix 191

with new problems as they arise in new, international
political spaces.

The third aspect is new for governments. Democratic
governments find it difficult to cope with the power of
extraparliamentary institutions which determine by their
decisions the life chances of as many (or in some cases more)
people as the decisions of governments can possibly
determine in many of our countries. - Indeed, these
extraparliamentary institutions often make governmental
power look ridiculous. When I talk about extraparliamentary
institutions, I am essentially thinking of two powerful
economic institutions— giant companies and large and
powerful trade unions.

All three of these developments have a common
denominator. The greater demand for participation, the
removal of effective political spaces from the national to the
international level, and the removal of the power to
determine people's life chances from political institutions to
other institutions are all signs of what might be called the
dissolution, perhaps the dilution of the general political
public which we assumed was the real basis of democratic
institutions in the past. Instead of there being an effective
political public in democratic countries from which
representative institutions emerge and to which representa-
tives are answerable, there is a fragmented public, in part a
nonexistent public. There is a rather chaotic picture in the
political communities of many democratic countries. A pub-
lic of citizens who cast their votes from individual interests
and thereby influence the choice of representatives who in
turn feel their responsibility to an identified public has to
some considerable extent disappeared. To that extent, repre-
sentative government has become very different indeed from
the sort of creature that was described in The Federalist
papers, or by John Stuart Mill, or by many others before and
after.

I would argue that the main thing to think about is what

192 The Qisis of Democracy

we can do to reestablish an effective general political public
under the changed conditions in which we are living today.
One would have to discuss the ways in which the legitimate
demand for immediate individual participation can be linked
to national and international decisions. One would have to
discuss what in this Commission has been called the
renovation of the international system, not only in terms of
the effectiveness of new international institutions but also in
terms of their democratic quality. This would raise familiar
and yet new problems of the relation between representation
and expertise, between democratic election and knowledge of
those standing for election.

I am quite certain that a number of things must not
happen if we want to reestablish an effective political public
(or perhaps establish an effective political public for a very
large number of citizens for the first time in the history of
democratic countries). I for one believe that one of the things
that must not happen under any condition is a deliberate
policy of educational retrenchment— a policy in which
educational institutions are once again linked to economic
output and economic performance rather than to the need to
give every individual a chance to take part in the political
process. I also believe that one of the things that must not
happen is that we establish any greater dependence of the
media on governments. On the contrary, I believe that the
media in most of our democratic societies are in need of
protection. They are endangered by a number of processes,
some of them economic. At the same time I believe they are
some of the main media of expression for what is left of a
general political public, and we should keep them that way.

My main point here is that as we think about a political
public in our day, we cannot simply think of a political
public of individual citizens exercising their common sense
interests on the marketplace, as it were. In rethinking the
notion of the political public, we have to accept the fact that
most human beings today are both individual citizens and

Appendix 193

members of large organizations. We have to accept the fact
that most individuals see their interests cared for not only by
an immediate expression of their citizenship rights (or even
by political parties which organize groups of interests) but
also by organizations which at this moment act outside the
immediate political framework and which will continue to
act whether governments like it or not. And I believe,
therefore, somewhat reluctantly, that in thinking about the
political public of tomorrow we shall have to think of a
public in which representative parliamentary institutions are
somehow linked with institutions which in themselves are
neither representative nor parliamentary. I think it is useful
to discuss the exact meaning of something like an effective
social contract, or perhaps a "Concerted Action," or "Conseil
Economique et Social" for the political insitutions of
advanced democracies. I do not believe that free collective
bargaining is an indispensable element of a free and
democratic society. I do believe, however, that we have to
recognize that people are organized in trade unions, that
there are large enterprises, that economic interests have to be
discussed somewhere, and that there has got to be a
negotiation about some of the guidelines by which our
economies are functioning. This discussion should be related
to representative institutions. There may be a need for
reconsidering some of our institutions in this light, not to
convert our countries into corporate states, certainly not, but
to convert them into countries which in a democratic fashion
recognize some of the new developments which have made
the effective political public so much less effective in recent
years.

IV

I am not, contrary to many others today, pessimistic about
the future of democracy. Indeed, it seems to me that a
number of recent social developments are likely to make life

194 The Crisis of Democracy

much more difficult for the dictatorships of this world. Like
many of you, however, I notice with dismay that it seems to
be difficult, perhaps even impossible, to liberalize a
dictatorship within a short period of time and convert it into
a free and democratic country. There is a sad dialectic of
dictatorships in which any attempt to liberalize them rapidly
seems to lead to another kind of authoritarianism.

I do think that in order for democracies to cope with the
new types of problems with which they are faced, they have
to avoid a number of mistakes. They must avoid the belief
that the very progress which they made possible for a large
number of citizens must now be undone because it feels
uncomfortable for some. They have to avoid the belief that a
little more unemployment, a little less education, a little
more deliberate discipline, and a little less freedom of
expression would make the world a better place, in which it
is possible to govern effectively. Indeed, I think, this attempt
to turn back the wheels of history to try to recreate the state
which we have fortunately and deliberately left is in many
ways as uncivilized, indeed primitive, as the belief that all we
need is nationalized ownership, public planning, and worker
control. Either- of these mistakes must be avoided if we hope
to manage to create democratic conditions and maintain
them, conditions which offer the largest number the largest
chance for their lives.

In my view, what we have to do above all is to maintain
that flexibility of democratic institutions which is in some
ways their greatest virtue: the ability of democratic
institutions to implement and effect change without
revolution— the ability to rethink assumptions— the ability to
react to new problems in new ways— the ability to develop
institutions rather than change them all the time— the ability
to keep the lines of communication open between the leaders
and the led-the ability to make individuals count above all.

We talk about the Trilateral societies, and certainly they
have a lot in common, but there are many differences

Appendix 195

between them also, and some have so far managed better
than others to cope with the problems which I have
indicated. I have to confess that at this time, at this time in
particular, I belong to those who believe that it is the North
American societies above all which have managed to maintain
the kind of flexibility which holds out hope for democracy
everywhere.

C. DISCUSSION OF STUDY

Discussion of the governability study in Kyoto opened
with the above-printed comments of Ralf Dahrendorf, now
Director of the London School of Economics. These com-
ments were followed by remarks from each of the three
authors. Michel Crozier reviewed the thrust of his chapter on
Western Europe, including the judgment that democratic
political systems in Europe are now the most vulnerable of
those in the Trilateral regions. The West European democra-
cies have to carry through "a basic mutation in their model
of government and their mode of social control while facing
at the same time a crisis from within and a crisis from
without." Samuel P. Huntington responded to some of
Dahrendorf s comments. Dahrendorf had raised the issue of
somehow linking to parliamentary institutions such major
extraparliamentary institutions as large labor unions and
business organizations. Huntington expressed surprise that
there was no mention in this analysis of political parties as
aggregators of the interests of extraparliamentary organiza-
tions. On the matter of democracy and economic growth,
Huntington noted that the rather steady growth of the last
twenty-five years has created expectations of continuing
growth, a growth which cannot now be assumed. This is
likely to create problems. As for the effects of international
developments, Huntington stressed that detente has had
negative implications for the cohesion of Trilateral societies.
He argued that the growing importance and visibility on the

196 The Crisis of Democracy

foreign policy agenda of international economic issues and
interdependence has involved problems for democratic gov-
ernments, sensitive to domestic interests. Reaching for an
overall formulation of the governability question, Huntington
asked if there are inherently destabilizing forces at work in
democratic political systems or whether self-stabilizing, "gy-
roscope" effects predominate. One could elaborate an "op-
timistic scenario" based on the flexibility and openness of
democratic systems, but one could also elaborate a "pessi-
mistic scenario" of self-destructive tendencies and a mount-
ing accumulation of demands. We need to take advantage of
the self-correcting opportunities that do exist. In his intro-
ductory remarks, Joji Watanuki noted that rapid growth in
Japan has brought automatic large increases in government
revenues. This has greatly helped the government meet rising
demands. If there is a revenue shrinkage, a "higher degree of
governability" would be required to see the society through
the necessary adaptations.

In the discussion which followed the introductory remarks
of Dahrendorf and the three authors, the United States
chapter aroused particularly lively discussion. The Founding
Fathers of the United States, one North American
Commissioner stated, did not see their first problem as that
of creating a governable democracy. At least as important in
their minds was the guaranteeing of the rights of citizens
against the possible excesses of their governors. This Commis-
sioner is particularly impressed after the Watergate episode
with the wisdom of an emphasis on the protection of rights.
The study should emphasize the vitality of American demo-
cratic institutions, particularly the press, the Congress, and
the courts. The authors, he stated, need to balance their
focus on governability with an equal concern for protection
of the rights of citizens. Another Commissioner concurred,
suggesting it might be more appropriate to examine the
"excesses" of the "governors" than those of the governed.
Another participant traced problems in the United States

Appendix 197

more to the failure of leadership than a "democratic surge."
He argued that the decline of political parties is related to the
growth of government bureaucracies, which are to some
extent substituting for parties. More attention should be
given to the problems of big bureaucracy for democracy. This
Commissioner stated that it is "simply not true" that the press
is automatically in opposition to the government in the
United States. Congress is not always in opposition either,
even though in the last eight years Congress has been under
control of the other party, with no obligation to back the
President. Some of the remedies outlined in the "arenas for
action," this member concluded, would be "wrong, self-
defeating, deadly."" According to another North' American
Commissioner, who disagreed that the need is for "less
democracy," the current relative deadlock in U.S. politics is
not unique. Contrary to the pessimists, he feels recent
developments indicate "triumph" and a "finest hour" for
American democracy. The disenchantment of the American
public comes from the poor performance of the government,
lurching from crisis to crisis. The country needs more
appropriate planning, carried on in such a way that the
people are involved in helping to set goals. This is a preferred
alternative to some kind of technocratic elite model for
progress. A number of other Commissioners also associated
themselves in general with the above points, arguing for
"more democracy, not less" and expressing particular con-
cern for maintenance of "absolutely free new media." One
participant saw the Constitution and system of law in the
United States as the principal "self-correcting" mechanism
there.

A Canadian Commissioner argued the unhealthiness for
Canada of a recommendation for reinvigoration of political
parties. Parties are ways to control members, he stated. They
alienate more capable young politicians and favor
conformists. Issues are considered less on their merits than
they should be. In Canada, this Commissioner stressed, we

198 The Crisis of Democracy

need institutions to "blue" and "mute" parties. Parliamen-
tary committees are important here and should be strength-
ened. The reinvigoration we should seek is of parliamentary
institutions, with decision-making done publicly to the great-
est extent possible. This Commissioner was also troubled by
the recommendations on the media in the "arenas for
action." The press needs strengthening and protection. In
Canada, it has been more effective in opposing the govern-
ment than the Opposition party. The Opposition gathers
information from the press and uses the press to make its
views known. These are very valuable functions.

Later in the discussion, Huntington responded to critics of
the chapter on the United States. As for the views of the
Founding Fathers, Huntington quoted from a well-known
contribution of James Madison to The Federalist. Madison
states that the "first" problem is to "enable the government
to control the governed," and then to "oblige it to control
itself." Comments in the discussion had suggested,
Huntington stated, that this "balance" is now tilted toward
government and not the citizens; but never before in
American history, he argued, have citizens and citizen
organizations been more assertive and effective. Huntington
put much emphasis on the "balance" idea, and argued there
had been a shift against government authority which should
not be allowed to go too far. On the media, he stressed that
their power has undeniably increased, and that this must be
taken into account in our analysis. The comments made on
the press in Canada, he added, also applied in the United
States and indicate the power of the media. In conclusion,
Huntington asked the two questions he thought most essen-
tial. First, where is the proper place to draw the balance?
Second, what is the state of the balance in the United States
now? Huntington sees overwhelming evidence that the bal-
ance has shifted away from government.

A European Commissioner underlined the weakness of
constitutional systems in some European countries, particu-

Appendix 199

larly those whose electoral systems encourage a multiplicity
of parties without this being counter-balanced by a strong
executive. He mentioned Denmark, Holland, and Belgium.
These countries might usefully learn from or perhaps adapt
constitutional features of other states like France, Western
Germany or Britain, particularly for restoring executive
power and gaining "a new lease on life" for their democratic
systems without loss of liberties. This Commissioner realized
that systems for constitutional amendment were very diffi-
cult in the countries requiring change, but the effort should
be made. In closing, he expressed "anguish" and "despair"
that European unification has not made more progress,
progress essential for democracy's future in Europe. Another
European Commissioner recalled Dahrendorfs comments
about the insufficiency of national political space. Among
the Trilateral regions, this is more true in Europe and Japan
than in North America, he stated. In Europe in particular the
adequacy of national political space is very much in question.

Another European Commissioner noted that in most
Western European countries there is not a chance that
communist parties will come to power. France and Italy are
important exceptions. Change there would "create waves." It
would erode the Community and Atlantic Alliance. On
Britain, this Commissioner emphasized its remarkable
democratic resilience and political resources. Another
Commissioner concurred, terming comments about the
"ungovernability" of Britain "completely nonsense." He
noted that Britain had been an industrial society much longer
than other states and was thus far ahead of the others in the
problems it now faces.

The future of the Communist party in Italy was raised by
another European Commissioner later in the discussion. This
was already the largest Communist party in Europe in the
years just after the war. Its election advances since then have
actually been quite limited, this Commissioner stated. When
the Communist party moves toward power in Italy, there is

200 The Crisis of Democracy

an "allergic reaction" from the others which keeps the party
out of power. This Commissioner noted the municipal and
regional elections coming up in Italy on June 15. He thought
the events in Portugal would help the democratic parties.
Further European integration would also help keep the
Communist party in check.

One Commissioner noted that he found Dahrendorfs
comments "heartening," though they presented him with the
"eternal liberal dilemma"— protection of rights is not possible
without effective government. He noted the success of
"codetermination" in Germany as an effective way to
stabilize a system under stress. Another Commissioner added
two points "related" to governability concerns. For one,
democratic governments are run by politicians who make
decisions for political reasons. This is a fact of life. Second,
governments have assumed they could do the politically
attractive thing for the majority and the minority would pay.
Another European Commissioner cautioned that there be
"clear-cut responsiblity" in any arrangements that would link
powerful extraparliamentary institutions to parliaments, an
issue raised by Dahrendorf.

The chapter on Japan is the most optimistic of the regional
chapters, one North American Commissioner noted. Japan
has not lost the ability to achieve a consensus and act on it,
he stated. This may be attributable to a real difference in
values, including greater identification with the group. The
drive for individual satisfaction must be balanced with such
concern for the group.

One Japanese Commissioner related the cohesive strength
of the Japanese political system to the high quality of
middle-level leadership in the country, those in contact with
the people. This appears to be somewhat in decline, however.
With the growth of the mass media, people have less need for
these middle-level leaders in interpreting events and making
their views known. This also hurts the organization of
political parties. As the middle level has less political
responsibility, its quality will decline.

Appendix 201

This Commissioner sees some of the recent social problems
of the Trilateral regions related to a temporary shift in the
population structure, with an extraordinarily large number of
younger people, with different values. As this bulge in the
population structure moves on, problems will become less
severe.

Another Japanese Commissioner recalled a statement of
Lenin's that a revolution cannot be initiated by demands
from below, but only when the governing classes are divided
and dissatisfied. One might argue that governing classes are
now in this condition. This Commissioner pointed to three
weaknesses of democracy. For one, human beings are weak.
In a monopoly position they will wield excessive power. He
mentioned the press in Japan, whose decisions are sometimes
more important than the government's, and also associations
like the medical association, which is in a monopoly position,
with the tax system rigged in its favor. The Diet is not doing
much about these powerful organizations. Second, Japanese
intellectuals and students are being attracted by radicalism. If
these fill the middle level of leadership later, Japan may be
turning a corner toward a worse situation. Third, it seems
that opportunists are the ones who gain and hold political
power. Tolerant individuals generally do not.

Another Japanese Commissioner emphasized that
democracy in Japan is working rather well. He noted that at
all levels there are about 80,000 elected political leaders
throughout the country. Certainly there are some
governability problems. This Commissioner mentioned the
controversy over the Japanese nuclear ship which drifted in
the Pacific for some fifty days in August and September of
1974, having been refused port facilities by local communi-
ties. He mentioned the railway unions, which must be
confronted. He noted the current dispute about the Constitu-
tion centering on Minister Inaba, which held up Diet delibera-
tions on other matters for a week. He mentioned uncertain-
ties about the U.S. commitment in Korea after recent events
in Indochina, and uncertainty about whether the Japan

202 The Crisis of Democracy

Communist party could be excluded from a coalition formed
when the LDP majority disappears. These matters add ele-
ments of pessimism.

Another Japanese Commissioner also related international
issues to governability concerns. The world is searching for a
new system, he stated, and needs strong leadership in various
countries. Governability, however, is in decline. Even in
Japan, the government does not have much room to
maneuver. In the long term this Commissioner was optimistic
about Japanese democracy, but can we wait for its problems
to be solved? On the U.S.— Japanese relationship after the
Indochina war, Japan is not apprehensive about the
administration, but rather about Congress. Is the President in
control? Is there a trend in the United States toward
isolationism?

Looking over the whole discussion, one North American
Commissioner related it to discussion the previous day of
resources and global redistribution of power. He put it all in
the framework of "the central issue for the industrial
democracies," namely the "apparent conflict between equity
and effectiveness." With regard to developing countries, the
main issue is that of equity, but "one can have no more
equity than one can afford." And the wealth of the
developed world, he argued, should not be too narrowly
construed. It is "not especially physical resources but rather
the complex of spiritual, governmental, and political
(capabilities), the way in which (the people) manage to
attack and solve their problems." We see this most clearly in
the case of Japan, this Commissioner argued, which is
relatively "resource-less" in a physical sense. What could one
take away from Japan? What is its wealth? What is it except a
complex of going institutions?

Another participant returned to the issue raised by
Dahrendorf of somehow associating nonparliamentary groups
with the parliamentary process. It was suggested this might
be seen in relation to international institutions, not just

Appendix 203

national political systems. This participant sees underway a
"partial domestication of international society," with many
domestic problems of the nineteenth century finding their
analogs in international problems of the twentieth century.
"Partly civilianized international relations" must not become
so turbulent that we lose societal openness and freedom
while trying to achieve the equity that is necessary. The
Trilateral region, he argued, is a "vital core" in this effort.

A number of Commissioners emphasized the importance
of the issues being raised in the study and discussion and
hoped the Commission would continue work in this general
area. One Commissioner expressed his support "very
concretely" for the proposed institute for the strengthening
of democratic institutions.

APPENDIX II: CANADIAN PERSPECTIVES ON
THE GOVERNABILITY OF DEMOCRACIES

Discussion in Montreal, May 16, 1975

The rapporteurs of the Trilateral Commission Task Force
on the Governability of Democracies identified common
"governability" problems in the three regions. These have
been viewed as stemming from such factors as the "changing
democratic context," the rise of "anomic democracy," vari-
ous democratic "dysfunctions," the "delegitimization" of
authority, "system overload," the "disaggregation" of inter-
ests, and an increasing parochialism in international affairs.

Detailed background papers underlined the problems pe-
culiar to Europe, Japan, and the United States in the area of
governability. To explore the Canadian scene, a colloquium
sponsored by the Canadian Group of the Trilateral Commis-
sion brought together in May 1975 approximately thirty
Canadians involved in both the analysis and the practice of
government. Several of the Commission'? Task Force mem-
bers were on hand.

204 The Crisis of Democracy

The participants identified particular Canadian
perspectives on governability and, in dialogue with the Tri-
lateral Task Force members, drew out significant compari-
sons and contrasts in the experiences of Canada, the United
States, and to some extent the other Trilateral regions.

Discussion was conducted around four major issue-areas:
the problem of governability; social, economic and cultural
causes; components of stability; and domestic and foreign
implications. Several major themes emerged from the dis-
cussion, treated in the following short report on the pro-
ceedings.

A. The Canadian Governability "Challenge"

Despite the numerous problems and strains that were
identified with regard to Canadian institutions and values, a
general consensus emerged that Canada's governability prob-
lems were not insoluble and that, indeed, "governability"
itself may be less of a problem than the "reality of participa-
tion," the "accountability of governors," or as one partici-
pant put it, "the democratizability of governments."

Some felt that accountability was the real issue, both in
the context of governmental decison-making and from the
point of view of expanding participation in decision-making
by such groups as organized labour.

While Canada shares with the United States some major
governability "challenges" (rather than necessarily
"problems"), that is, an overload of demands on the political
system, a decline in traditional attitudes to authority,
changing social values, increasing "dehumanization" of so-
ciety, and labour/management conflicts, to name a few, these
challenges do not appear to have attained the serious
proportions they are said to have reached in the United
States. A few of the differentiating factors mentioned were
the racial problem in the United States, more extensive urban
problems, and domestic disillusionment engendered by the
decline of the leadership role of the United States in world

Appendix 205

affairs. Such phenomena as Vietnam and Watergate could be
seen as special focal points of long-term trends.

There remained a rather clear division of opinion among
the participants as to whether or not there was evidence of
"ungovernability" or a trend toward it in Canada.

B. System Overload

It was argued by some that the growing tendencies of
students and workers to challenge authority and the new
vigour of union demands may even be seen as healthy
democratic phenomena and may be heralding the end of a
period of "pseudo-democracy," providing the first real
atternpt at genuine and comprehensive democracy. However,
some of those who tended to regard Canadian democracy as
becoming increasingly ungovernable viewed these trends as
increasing the overload of demands on decision-making
institutions, thereby decreasing their capacity to sort out
priorities, and as a part of the general decline of a coherent
"public philosophy." One of the roots of disturbing trends
on the labour front in Canada was identified as the fact that
unions have generally not been brought in a real way into the
decision-making process and are often treated implicitly as
"outlaws." Such an attitude can only influence relations
between organized labour and the broader society in a
negative way.

Another speaker asserted that "system overload" in
Canada is a "fantasy," that the functioning of the system had
not changed and the structure was basically intact, for better
or for worse. Others expressed sympathy for the conditions
in which contemporary politicians operate and claimed that
there was strong evidence for the case that too much was
asked of them. A major criticism of the operation of
democratic governments was their inability to sort out
priorities in the face of increasing demands and their
consequent resort to incrementalism (extension of existing
programs) rather than creative policy-making.

206 The Crisis of Democracy

One or two participants suggested that the whole discussion
of governability distorted the real problems and was of
concern only to an elite uneasy about its declining position in
society! They maintained that factors such as rising inflation
and the growth of public expenditure as a percentage of GNP
(which were seen by some as causes or effects of
governability problems) had nothing to do with governability
and may, in fact, have produced more "positive" benefits by
forcing better income distribution, via the "catch up" of
wages and social welfare benefits.

C. Institutions

Canadian institutions (federalism, the parliamentary
system, the public service, the media) were identified as
distinctive and received particular attention by the
participants. Were they a protection against or a cause of
greater governability problems?

It was pointed out that the expansion and proliferation of
bureaucracy at the federal, provincial, and municipal levels
has contributed to the strains on the Canadian political
system because of diminishing clarity of direction and
accountability. There is a growing tendency, it was said, for
the bureaucracy to take over roles which were traditionally
the essential domain of the politicians— such as defining the
"public good." This could be regarded as a dangerous
development, particularly in light of the tendency of the
federal bureaucracy to become "Ottawa-centered" and not
properly representative of the regions of Canada.

There was a general consensus that more emphasis should
be placed on the democratically-derived institutions. It was
recommended that the House of Commons be enlarged to
provide better constituency representation and that its pro-
cedures be modernized to facilitate the handling of public
business. The so-called "decline of Parliament" was seen as
due, in part, to the growing importance of federal-provincial
relations in the face of the increasing power of the provinces.

Appendix 207

Effective opposition comes from the provinces rather than
the federal opposition parties, possibly attributable to the
situation of one-party dominance in Ottawa.

American participants concluded from the discussion that
the Canadian brand of federalism— in its maintenance of
a relative greater degree of decentralization— was a "highly
desirable situation." Despite equally impenetrable provincial
bureaucracies and the bargaining problems engendered by the
equality ascribed to federal and provincial governments, it
was convincingly argued by Canadians that governability
problems were reduced by the flexibility built into the
Canadian style of federal structure and parliamentary system.

It was noted" that in Canada, as in the United States, a
certain trend toward fragmentation and regionalization of
political parties could be observed, but there was no indica-
tion that there is anything in Canada approaching what had
been called by American analysts "the decline of the party
system" in the United States. It was held, however, by some
participant noted that the governing Liberal caucus, dominated
by "ministerialists," is consequently not sufficiently con-
representation in all major areas of the country. This ten-
dency toward decentralization was seen by others not only as
inevitable but as desirable, as parties would presumably
become more constituency- and region-oriented which would
offset bureaucratization among elected representatives. One
participant noted that the governing Liberal caucus, dominat-
ed by "ministerialists," is consequently not sufficiently con-
stituency-oriented. Another suggested that existing Canadian
political parties fulfilled an important role by effecting
trade-offs in nonideological terms.

D. Rhetoric/Performance Gap

Another major theme emerging from the discussion was
the problem of the gap between rhetoric and performance in
government. Two views, whose consequences are perhaps

208 The Crisis of Democracy

equally damaging if true, emerged on this issue: (1) that
people tend to ignore or disbelieve the rhetoric and
consequently lose their faith in the system and refuse to
participate (identified as an "apathy of despair"); and (2)
that, as a result of government rhetoric, expectations are
raised to a point of no possible return or satisfaction,
especially in regard to the allocation of benefits among
individuals and groups.

E. Decline of a "Public Philosophy"

Labour groups are not impeded, it was said, from making
outrageous demands due to the absence of a strong public
philosophy and to prevalent doubt as to whether fairness
underlies the general allocation of influence and resources.
The decline in "community" and a dehumanization of society
result in the aggressive self-assertion of the individual or
groups. In the absence of a national ethos, governments are
hamstrung in their efforts to cope with such prevalent diffi-
culties as inflation and labour/management disputes. This
phenomenon of declining cohesive values appears to be com-
mon to both Canada and the United States.

F. Communications and Governability

Finally, the theme of communications was identified as
both a cause and a result of the problems of governability. It
was noted, even by journalists, that the press tends to provide
short-term, personalized, sensationalist pictures of political
events, thereby widening the rhetoric/performance gap. It
was suggested that a strengthened periodical press is needed
to give more long-term perspective on events, trends, and
institutions.

Poverty of communication both within governments and
between governments and other sectors was also identified as
a governability problem. This was seen as resulting in a

Appendix 209

serious lack of knowledge as to how "the other side" takes
decisions, which tends to hamper desirable constructive
bargaining within the industry-government-labour triangle. It
was also suggested that parliament's capacity to achieve a
mediating function has decreased due to partisan factionalism
and its diminishing power over the bureaucracy.

G. Possible Conclusions

As identified by this colloquium, Canada's foremost-
governability problems can be regarded as falling within four
major areas: the questionable ability of the evolving political
institutions to aggregate an increasing volume of demands
efficiently and at the same time to retain their accountability
to the public; the increasing rhetoric/performance gap; the
decline of a "public philosophy"; and the problem of
communications. Several characteristics of the Canadian sys-
tem were found actually to enhance Canada's governability,
that is, its parliamentary and federal structures of govern-
ment, a reasonable degree of decentralization of authority
and the absence of class-based political parties. However, a
general consensus emerged that Canada's governability prob-
lems (as redefined) while not insoluble are real and deserve
urgent attention and remedial action.

CANADIAN GROUP COLLOQUIUM
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Doris Anderson, Editor, Chatelaine Magazine

Frances Bairstow, Director, Industrial Relations Center,

McGill University
Carl Beigie, Executive Director, C. D. Howe Research

Institute
Pierre Benoit, Journalist, Broadcaster, Former Mayor of

Ottawa

210 The Crisis of Democracy

Marvin Blauer, Special Assistant to the Premier of Manitoba
Robert Bowie, Professor of International Affairs, Harvard

University
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Director, The Trilateral Commission

Stephen Clarkson, Professor of Political Science, University

of Toronto
Tim Creery, Editor, The Gazette, Montreal
Peter Dobell, Director, Parliamentary Centre for Foreign

A "fairs f nd Foreign Trade
Gordon Fairweather, Member of Parliament
Francis Fox, Member of Parliament
Donald Fraser, United States Congress
Richard Gwyn, Ottawa Correspondent, Toronto Star
Reeves Haggan, Assistant Deputy Minister, Solicitor General

Department
Samuel P. Huntington, Professor of Government, Harvard

University

Robert Jackson, Professor of Political Science, Carleton

University
Pierre Juneau, Chairman, Canadian Radio-Television

Commission
Michael Kirby, Assistant Principal Secretary, Office of the

Prime Minister
Gilles Lalande, Professor of Political Science, University of

Montreal
Claude Lemelin, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State

for External Affairs
Vincent Lemieux, Professor of Political Science, Laval

University
Claude Masson, Vice-Dean of Research, Laval University
John Meisel, Professor of Political Science, Queen's

University
Geoffrey Pearson, Chairman, Policy Analysis Group,

Department of External Affairs
Jean-Luc Pepin, Co-ordinator, Canadian Group, the Trilateral

Commission; President, Interimco Limited

Appendix 211

Simon Reisman, Chairman, Reisman and Grandy Limited
Donald Rickerd, President, The Donner Canadian

Foundation
Claude Ryan, Editor, Le Devoir, Montreal
Garth Steyenson, Professor of Political Science, Carleton

University
Dale Thomson, Vice-Principal (Planning), McGill University

A The Triangle Papers

REPORTS OF TASK FORCES OF
THE TRILATERAL COMMISSION

The Crisis of Democracy is one of a series of reports of task forces

of the Trilateral Commission. The preceding reports, all published

by the Commission itself, are listed below.

1. Towards a Renovated World Monetary System (1973)

Trilateral Monetary Task Force

Rapporteurs: Richard N. Cooper, Motoo Kaji, Claudio Segre

2. The Crisis of International Cooperation (1973)

Trilateral Political Task Force

Rapporteurs: Francois Duchene, Kinhide Mushakoji, Henry

D. Owen

3. A Turning Point in North-South Economic Relations (1974)

Trilateral Task Force on Relations with Developing Countries
Rapporteurs: Richard N. Gardner, Saburo Okita, B. J. Udink

4. Directions for World Trade in the Nineteen-Seventies (1974)

Trilateral Task Force on Trade

Rapporteurs: Guido Colonna di Paliano, Philip H. Trezise,

Nobuhiko Ushiba

5. Energy: The Imperative for a Trilateral Approach (1974)

Trilateral Task Force on the Political and International

Implications of the Energy Crisis

Rapporteurs: John C. Campbell, Guy de Carmoy, Shinichi

Kondo

6. Energy: A Strategy for International Action (1974)

Trilateral Task Force on the Political and International

Implications of the Energy Crisis

Rapporteurs: John C. Campbell, Guy de Carmoy, Shinichi

Kondo

7. OPEC, the Trilateral World, and the Developing Countries: New
Arrangements for Cooperation, 1976-1980 (1975)

Trilateral Task Force on Relations with Developing Countries
Rapporteurs: Richard N. Gardner, Saburo Okita, B.J. Udink

213

(As of August 15,1975)

THE TRILATERAL COMMISSION

GERARD C. SMITH
North American Chairman

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSK1
Director

CHRISTOPHER J. MAKINS
Deputy Director

MAX KOHNSTAMM
European Chairman

FRANCOIS DUCHENE
European Deputy Chairman

TAKESHI WATANABE
Japanese Chairman

GEORGE S. FRANKLIN
North American Secretary

TADASHI YAMAMOTO
Japanese Secretary

North American Members

*I. W. Abel, President, United Steelworkers of America

David M. Abshire, Chairman, Georgetown University Center for Strategic and
International Studies

Graham Allison, Professor of Politics, Harvard University

Doris Anderson, Editor, Chatelaine Magazine

John B. Anderson, House of Representatives

Ernest C. Arbuckle, Chairman, Wells Fargo Bank

J. Paul Austin, Chairman, The Coca-Cola Company

George W. Ball, Senior Partner, Lehman Brothers

Russell Bell, Research Director, Canadian Labour Congress

Lucy Wilson Benson, Former President, League of Women Voters of the
United States

W. Michael Blumenthal, Chairman, Bendix Corporation
•Robert W. Bonner, Q.C., Bonner & Fouks, Vancouver

Robert R. Bowie, Clarence Dillon Professor of International Affairs,
Harvard University

John Brademas, House of Representatives
*Harold Brown, President, California Institute of Technology

James E. Carter, Jr., Former Governor of Georgia

Lawton Chiles, United States Senate

Warren Christopher, Partner, O 'Melveny & Myers

Alden W. Clausen, President, Bank of America
tWilliam T. Coleman, Jr., Secretary, Department of Transportation

Barber B. Conable, Jr., House of Representatives

Richard N. Cooper, Frank Altschul Professor of International Economics,
Yale University

John C. Culver, United States Senate

Gerald L. Curtis, Director, East Asian Institute, Columbia University

Lloyd N. Cutler, Partner, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering

Archibald K. Davis, Chairman, Wachovia Bank & Trust Company

Emmett Dedmon, Vice President and Editorial Director, Field Enterprises, Inc.

Louis A. Desrochers, Partner, McCuaig and Desrochers

215

Peter Dobell, Director, Parliamentary Center for Foreign Affairs and Foreign
Trade

Hedley Donovan, Editor-in-Chief, Time, Inc.

Daniel J. Evans, Governor of Washington

Gordon Fairweather, Member of Parliament

Donald M. Fraser, House of Representatives

Richard N. Gardner, Henry L. Moses Professor of Law and International

Organization, Columbia University
*Patrick E. Haggerty, Chairman, Texas Instruments

William A. Hewitt, Chairman, Deere & Company

Alan Hockin, Executive Vice President, Toronto-Dominion Bank

Richard Holbrooke, Managing Editor, Foreign Policy Magazine

Thomas L. Hughes, President, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

J. K. Jamieson, Chairman, Exxon Corporation

Lane Kirkland, Secretary-Treasurer, AFL-CIO

Sol M. Linowitz, Senior Partner, Coudert Brothers

Bruce K. MacLaury , President, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis

Claude Masson, Professor of Economics, Laval University

Paul W. McCracken, Edmund Ezra Day Professor of Business Administration,
University of Michigan

Walter F. Mondale, United States Senate

Lee L. Morgan, President > Caterpillar Tractor Company

Kenneth D. Naden, President, National Council of Farmer Cooperatives

Henry D. Owen, Director, Foreign Policy Studies Program, The Brookings
Institution

David Packard, Chairman, Hewlett-Packard Company
*Jean-Luc Pepin, ?.C, President, Interimco, Ltd.

John H. Perkins, President, Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Company

Peter G. Peterson, Chairman, Lehman Brothers
*Edwin 0. Reischauer, University Professor, Harvard University; former U.S.

Ambassador to Japan
t Elliot L. Richardson, United States Ambassador to the United Kingdom
*David Rockefeller, Chairman, Chase Manhattan Bank

Robert V. Roosa, Partner, Brown Bros., Harriman & Company
♦William M. Roth, Roth Properties

William V. Roth, Jr., United States Senate

Carl T. Rowan, Columnist

*William W. Scranton, Former Governor of Pennsylvania
*Gerard C. Smith, Counsel, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering

Anthony Solomon, Consultant

Robert Taft, Jr., United States Senate

Arthur R. Taylor, President, Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.

Cyrus R. Vance, Partner, Simpson, Thacher & Bartlett
*Paul C. Warnke, Partner, Clifford, Warnke, Glass, Mcllwain & Finney

Marina von N. Whitman, Distinguished Public Service Professor of Economics,
University of Pittsburgh

Carroll L. Wilson, Professor of Management, Alfred P. Sloan School of
Management, MIT

Arthur M. Wood, Chairman, Sears, Roebuck & Company

Leonard Woodcock, President, United Automobile Workers

•Executive Committee
tCurrently in Government Service

216

European Members

♦Giovanni Agnelli, President, FIAT, Ltd.
Raymond Barre, Former Vice President oj the Commission of the

European Community
Piero Bassetti,-President of the Regional Government ofLombardy
♦Georges Berthoin, Former Chief Representative of the Commission

of the European Community to the U.K.
♦Kurt Birrenbach, Member of the Bundestag; President, Thyssen

Vermogensverwaltung
Franco Bobba, Company Director, Turin
Frederick Boland, Chancellor, Dublin University; former President

of the United Nations General Assembly
Rene Bonety, Representant de la CFDT
Jean-Claude Casanova, Director of Studies, Foundation Nationale des

Sciences Politiques, Paris
Umberto Colombo, Director of the. Committee for Scientific Policy, OECD
Guido Colonna di Paliano,iVes/rfe/ir, La Rinascente; former member of

the Commission of the European Community
♦Francesco Compagna, Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of the Mezzogiorno
The Earl of Cromer, Former British Ambassador to the United States;

Partner, Baring Bros, and Co., Ltd.
Michel Debatisse, President de la F.N.S.EA.
♦Paul Delouvrier, Chairman, French Electricity Board
Barry Desmond, Member of the Lower House of the Irish Republic
Fritz Dietz, President, German Association for Wholesale and Foreign Trade
Werner Dollinger, Member of the Bundestag
♦Herbert Ehrenberg, Member of the Bundestag
Pierre Esteva, Directeur General de I'U.A.P.

♦Marc Eyskens, Commissary General of the Catholic University of Louvain
M. H. Fisher, Editor, Financial Times

Francesco Forte, Professor of Financial Sciences, University of Turin
Jacques de Fouchier, President, Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas •

Michel Gaudet, President de la Federation Francaise des Assurances
Sir Reay Geddes, Chairman, Dunlop Holdings, Ltd.
Giuseppe Glisenti, Director of General Affairs, La Rinascente
Lord Harlech, Former British Ambassador to the United States; Chairman,

Harlech Television
Karl Hauenschild, President, German Chemical-Paper-Ceramics Workers' Union
Jozef P. Houthuys, President, Belgian Confederation of Christian Trade Unions
Daniel E. Janssen, Deputy Director General, Belgian Chemical Union, Ltd.
Pierre Jouven, President de Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann
Karl Kaiser, Director of the Research Institute of the German Society for

Foreign Policy
Michael Killeen, Managing Director, Industrial Development Authority,

Irish Republic
Andre Kloos, Chairman of the Socialist radio and television network "V.A.R.A. ";
former chairman of the Dutch Trade Union Federation
♦Max Kohnstamm, /Yes/den f, European Community Institute for University Studies
Baron Le"on Lambert, President, Banque Lambert, Brussels
Count Otto Lambsdorff, Member of the Bundestag
Arrigo Levi, Director, La Stampa, Turin

217

Eugen Loderer, President, German Metal Workers ' Union
*John Loudon, Chairman, Royal Dutch Petroleum Company
Evan Luard, Member of Parliament
Robert Marjolin, Former Vice President of the Commission of the European

Community
Roger Martin, President de la Ge Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson
Reginald Maudling, Member of Parliament; former Cabinet Minister

F. S. McFadzean, Managing Director, Royal Dutch Shell Group
Cesare Merlini, Director, Italian Institute for International Affairs
Alwin Munchmeyer, President, German Banking Federation

tlvar Nfcrgaard, Minister of Foreign Economic Affairs and Nordic Affairs, Denmark
Michael O'Kennedy , Shadow Minister of Foreign Affairs, Irish Republic;

former Cabinet Minister
Bernard Pagezy , President Directeur General de la Patemelle- Vie
Pierre Pescatore, Luxembourg; Member of the European Court of Justice
Sir John Pilcher, Former British Ambassador to Japan
Jean Rey, Former President of the Commission of the European Community
Julian Ridsdaie,Member of Parliament; Chairman of the Anglo-Japanese

Parliament Group
Sir Frank K. Roberts, Advisory Director of Unilever, Ltd.; Advisor on

International Affairs to Lloyds of London
*Mary T. W. Robinson, Member of the Senate of the Irish Republic
Sir Eric Roll, Executive Director, S. G. Warburg and Company
Edmond de Rothschild, President de la Compagnie Financiere Holding
John Christian Sannes, Director, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
Gerhard Schroder, Member of the Bundestag; former Foreign Minister of the

Federal Republic of Germany
Roger Seydoux, Ambassador of France

Andrew Shonfield, Director, The Royal Institute of International Affairs
Hans-Gunther Sohl, President, Federal Union of German Industry ; President of the

Board of Directors of August Thyssen Hiitte A.G.
Theo Sommer, Editor-in-Chief Die Zeit

Myles Staunton, Member of the Lower House of the Irish Republic
Thorvald Stoltenberg, International Affairs Secretary, Norwegian Trade Union

Council

G. R. Storry, St. Antony 's College, Oxford (Far East Centre)
J. A. Swire, Chairman, John Swire and Sons, Ltd.

*Otto Grieg Tidemand, Shipowner; former Norwegian Minister of Defense and
Minister of Economic Affairs
A. F. Tuke, Chairman, Barclays Bank International
Heinz-Oskar Vetter, Chairman, German Federation of Trade Unions
iMcVizuttn, President, Kredietbank, Brussels

Otto Wolff von Amerongen, President, Otto Wolff A.G.; President, German
Chamber of Commerce
*Sir Kenneth Younger, Former Director of the Royal Institute of International

Affairs; former Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
*Sir Philip de Zulueta, Chief Executive, Antony Gibbs Holdings, Ltd.; former
Chief Assistant to the British Prime Minister

•Executive Committee
•(•Currently in Government Service

218

Japanese Members

Isao Amagi, Director, Japan Scholarship Foundation; former Vice Minister
of Education

Yoshiya Ariyoshi, Chairman, Nippon Yusen Kaisha

Yoshishige Ashihara, Chairman, Kansai Electric Power Company, Inc.

Toshio Doko, President, Japan Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren)

Jun Eto, Professor, Tokyo Institute of Technology

Shinkichi Eto, Professor of International Relations, Tokyo University
*Chujiro Fujino, Chairman, Mitsubishi Corporation

Shihtaro Fukushima, President, Kyodo News Service

Noboru Gotoh, President, TOKYU Corporation

Toru Hagjwara, Advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs; former Ambassador
to France

Sumio Hara, Chairman, Bank of Tokyo, Ltd.

*Yukitaka Haraguchi, Chairman, All Japan Federation of Metal and Mining
Industries Labor Unions

Norishige Hasegawa, President, Sumitomo Chemical Company, Ltd.
* Yoshio Hayashi, Member of~the Diet

Teru Hidaka, Chairman, Yamaichi Securities Company, Ltd.
*Kazushige Hirasawa, Radio-TV news commentator, Japan Broadcasting Inc.

Hideo Hon, President, Employment Promotion Project Corporation

Shozo Hotta, Chairman, Sumitomo Bank, Ltd.

Shinichi Ichimura, Professor of Economics, Kyoto University

Hiroki Imazato, President, Nippon Seiko K.K.

Yoshihiro Inayama, Chairman, Nippon Steel Corporation

Kaoru Inoue, Chairman, Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank, Ltd.

Rokuro Ishikawa, Executive Vice President, Kajima Corporation

Tadao Ishikawa, Professor, Department of Political Science, Keio University

Yoshizane Iwasa, Chairman of the Advisory Committee, Fuji Bank, Ltd.

MotooKaji, Professor of Economics, Tokyo University

Fuji Kamiya, Professor, Keio University

*Yusuke Kashiwagi, Deputy President, Bank of Tokyo, Ltd.; former Special
Advisor to the Minister of Finance

Ryoichi Kawai, President, Komatsu Seisakusho, Ltd.

Katsuji Kawamata, Chairman, Nissan Motor Company, Ltd.

Kazutaka Kikawada, Chairman, Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc.

Kiichiro Kitaura, President, Nomura Securities Company, Ltd.

Koji Kobayashi, President, Nippon Electric Company, Ltd.

Kenichiro Komai, Chairman, Hitachi, Ltd.

Fumihiko Kono, Counselor, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.

Masataka Kosaka, Professor, Faculty of Law, Kyoto University

Fumihiko lAakijPrincipal Partner, Maki and Associates, Design, Planning and
Development

Shigeharu Matsumoto, Chairman, International House of Japan, Inc.

Masaharu Matsushita, President, Matsushita Electric Company, Ltd.
tKiichi Miyazawa, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Akio Morita, President, SONY Corporation

Takashi Mukaibo, Professor, Faculty of Engineering, Tokyo University
*Kinhide Mushakoji, Director, Institute of International Relations, Sophia University

Yonosuke Nagai, Professor of Political Science, Tokyo Institute of Technology

Shigeo Nagano, President, Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry

219

Eiichi Nagasue, Member of the Diet

Toshio Nakamura, President, Mitsubishi Bank, Ltd.

Ichiro Nakayama, President, Janpa Institute of Labor

Sohei Nakayama, President, Overseas Technical Cooperation Agency

Yoshihisa Ohjimi, Advisor, Arabian Oil Company, Ltd.; former Administrative

Vice Minister of International Trade and Industry
*Saburo Okita, President, Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund

Kiichi Saeki, Director, Nomura Research Institute of Technology and Economics

Kunihiko Sasaki, Chairman, Fuji Bank, Ltd

*Ryuji Takeuchi, Advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; former Ambassador
to the United States

Eiji Toyoda, President, Toyota Motor Company, Ltd.

Seiji Tsutsumi, President, Seibu Department Store, Inc.

Kogoro Uemura, Honorary President, Japan Federation of Economic
Organizations (Keidanren)

Tadao Umezao, Professor of Ethnology, Kyoto University
*Nobuhiko Ushiba, Former Ambassador of Japan to the United States

Jiro Ushio, President, Ushio Electric Inc.

Shogo Watanabe, President, Nikko Securities Company, Ltd.
♦Takeshi Watanabe-, Chairman, Trident International Finance, Ltd., Hong Kong;
former President, the Asian Development Bank

Kizo Yasui, Chairman, Toray Industries, Inc.

'Executive Committee
•(•Currently in Government Service

220

Michel J. Crozier is the founder and director of the Centre de Soci-
ologie des Organisations in Paris, France as well as Senior Research
Director at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique. He is a
regular consultant to the French government on matters of economic
planning, education and public administration and has, since 1964,
spent several semesters as a visiting Professor at Harvard University. He
is the author of numerous important works in sociology his "La Societe
Bloquee" having been translated as "The Stalled Society" by Viking
Press in 1973. Prof. Crozier was President of the Societe Francaise de
Sociologie in 1970-72.

Samuel P. Huntington is Frank G. Thomson Professor of Government
at Harvard University and Associate Director of the Center for Interna-
tional Affairs at Harvard, as well as editor of the quarterly journal,
Foreign Policy. He is a Fellow on the American Academy of Arts and
Sciences and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the
International Institute of Strategic Studies. He was a member of the
Council of the American Political Science Association (1969-1971)
and a member of the Presidential Task Force on International Develop-
ment (1969 - 1970), among many other high level posts. Another of his
books appearing this year is "No Easy Choice: Political Participation in
Developing Countries," co-authored with Joan M. Nelson.

Joji Watanuki is Professor of Sociology at Sophia University in
Tokyo, Japan. Positions he has held include: Senior Scholar, Communi-
cation Institute, East-West Center, Honolulu, Hawaii; Professor, Insti-
tute of International Relations, Sophia University, Tokyo; Rockefeller
Foundation Fellow and Visiting Fellow at Princeton University; and
Research Associate at the Institute of International Studies, University
of California, Berkeley. He is the author of numerous studies in
political sociology, published in Japan.

Jacket design by Paul Agule & Cato Johnson Associates